Detailed vulnerability-computer mapping (bulk, cursor-paged)

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and destructiveHint=false, and the description complements them by adding behavioral context such as the cursor pagination mechanism ('the first call needs no cursor; if the result says more data is available, call again passing the returned cursor') and version/MSP restrictions. This is valuable beyond the annotations, though it does not describe error handling or output structure in detail.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is three sentences long and front-loaded with the core purpose, followed by pagination behavior and requirements. Every sentence adds necessary information without redundancy or fluff, making it appropriately concise and well-structured.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with 5 parameters and no output schema, the description covers the essential operational context: the record structure, pagination flow, and environment requirements. It does not detail the response envelope (e.g., how cursor is returned), but given the lack of output schema, the description is reasonably complete for a bulk export tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% with each parameter having a detailed description, so the description does not need to re-explain them. It does add a high-level overview of the pagination workflow and mentions the server cap, but this is largely redundant with the schema's own parameter descriptions. The description adds some context but not a significant semantic layer beyond the schema, hence the baseline 3.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's purpose with a specific verb and resource: 'Retrieves the detailed vulnerability-to-computer mapping' and lists the exact fields returned (resource, FQDN, IP, CVEs, CVSS, status). It also distinguishes itself as a bulk export endpoint, setting it apart from related tools like threats_vulnerabilities_list or threats_system_report_vulnerabilities.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides clear context for use: built for bulk export and paginated by an opaque cursor, with explicit instructions on the cursor flow. It includes a firm exclusion (not supported on Endpoint Central MSP) and a version requirement, which serves as a when-not. However, it does not explicitly compare alternatives or state when to prefer this over sibling tools, stopping short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.