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Reject invitation

drive_invitation_reject
Destructive

Reject a pending Proton Drive sharing invitation permanently without notifying the sender. Use the uid from drive_list_invitations and set confirmed=true only after user approval.

Instructions

Reject a pending sharing invitation permanently; the sender is not notified. Get the uid from drive_list_invitations — never guess it. Requires confirmed=true after explicit user approval.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
uidYesInvitation uid from drive_list_invitations.
confirmedNoMust be true; only after the user approved this exact action.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv1.2.0
    • changedInput schema / properties / confirmed / description
      Previous value: -"Must be true. Only set after the user explicitly approved this exact action."New value: +"Must be true; only after the user approved this exact action."
    • changedInput schema / properties / uid / description
      Previous value: -"Invitation UID from drive_list_invitations output. E.g. 'drive:abc123' or 'photos:xyz456'."New value: +"Invitation uid from drive_list_invitations."
  2. Changed1 schema field changedv1.0.38
    • addedInput schema / properties / confirmed
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Must be true. Only set after the user explicitly approved this exact action.",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
  3. Addedv1.0.26

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare destructiveHint=true; the description adds substantial context beyond that — the rejection is permanent, the sender is NOT notified, and a confirmation flag plus user approval is required. These are the behavioral facts that actually change how an agent should call this.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight clauses, front-loaded with the action and its irreversibility, then the uid sourcing rule, then the approval gate. No filler sentences.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter destructive tool with no output schema, the description covers sourcing, irreversibility, notification behavior, and the approval gate, so an agent can act safely. Only marginal gaps remain (e.g., what happens if the invitation is no longer pending), which are not essential.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and both parameters are already documented there (uid source, confirmed must-be-true-after-approval). The description reinforces but does not extend the schema's parameter meaning, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb+resource ('Reject a pending sharing invitation') with a stated scope ('pending', 'permanently') that clearly distinguishes it from drive_invitation_accept and drive_share_leave. An agent can select it without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit preconditions and alternatives: get the uid from drive_list_invitations ('never guess it'), and confirmed=true only after explicit user approval. This is exactly the when/how guidance an agent needs for a destructive action.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.