Skip to main content
Glama
glatinone

Secops Toolkit MCP

by glatinone

Server Configuration

Describes the environment variables required to run the server.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Instructions

Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.

This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.

Capabilities

Features and capabilities supported by this server

Protocol revision2025-11-25

CapabilityDetails
tools
{
  "listChanged": true
}
logging
{}
prompts
{
  "listChanged": false
}
resources
{
  "subscribe": false,
  "listChanged": false
}
extensions
{
  "io.modelcontextprotocol/ui": {}
}
experimental
{}

Tools

Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions

NameDescription
extract_iocsA

Extract indicators of compromise from free-form text or log output.

Finds IPv4 addresses, URLs, domains, MD5/SHA1/SHA256 hashes, and CVE IDs. Defanged indicators (1.2.3[.]4, hxxp://) are handled automatically. Returns a dict keyed by indicator type; only types that were found appear.

defang_iocB

Make an indicator safe to share by defanging it (1.2.3.4 -> 1.2.3[.]4).

refang_iocA

Reverse a defanged indicator back to its real form (1.2.3[.]4 -> 1.2.3.4).

hash_textA

Compute a cryptographic hash of a string.

algorithm is one of md5, sha1, sha256 (default), or sha512. Returns the algorithm used and the lowercase hex digest.

password_entropyA

Estimate password strength as bits of entropy over the charset used.

Returns length, charset size, entropy in bits, and a strength label. This is a quick floor estimate, not a check of whether a specific password is on a breach list.

cidr_infoA

Describe an IPv4/IPv6 network: netmask, host range, size, and privacy.

Accepts CIDR notation such as 192.168.0.0/24 or 10.0.0.5/8.

ip_in_cidrB

Check whether an IP address falls inside a given CIDR network.

scan_repo_rootA

Check a repo's top-level directory for files that shadow common developer command names (git.exe, node.exe, npm.cmd, etc.), and the whole tree for symlinks that resolve outside the directory.

Run this before opening a freshly cloned or downloaded repository in an agentic coding tool. On Windows, several tools (Cursor, GitHub Copilot CLI, Gemini CLI, Codex) resolve an unqualified command like git from the current directory before PATH, so a malicious repo shipping its own git.exe at the root runs instead of the real one, before any workspace-trust prompt appears. Severity: critical for git (the confirmed vector), high for shells/interpreters, medium for other common dev tools. Only the top-level directory is checked for this, not subdirectories.

Separately, a symlink anywhere in the tree whose resolved target lies outside this directory is flagged too (the GhostApproval/DuneSlide hidden-write-target pattern: an approval dialog shows a decoy path while the symlink redirects the real write elsewhere, e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys). Critical if the resolved target hits a known sensitive path (SSH/cloud-credential directories, private key files), high otherwise.

assess_shell_commandA

Assess a shell command for constructs that look benign to naive string matching but execute something else once a shell actually expands them.

Closes the bypass class GuardFall (2026-06) confirmed against 10 of 11 popular open-source AI coding agents (Aider, Cline, Goose, Plandex, and others): their command-safety guards check the raw string a model wrote, not what the shell rewrites it into via quote removal, backslash escapes, command substitution, and variable/IFS expansion. Never executes the command or any part of it.

Tokenizes with real POSIX quote-removal rules so quote-fragmented or backslash-obfuscated commands (r'm' -rf /) normalize to what actually runs (rm -rf /) before any check. Flags command substitution ($(...), backticks, recursively assessed), unquoted variable expansion, IFS manipulation, ANSI-C quoting, a fetch or encoded-payload decode piped straight into an interpreter (curl ... | sh, base64 -d | sh), setuid grants (chmod +s, install -m 4755), and in-place credential-file overwrites (sed -i/tee targeting ~/.aws/credentials and similar). Also flags the shell-level shape of Cursor's DuneSlide disclosure (CVE-2026-50548/50549): a symlink whose target or link name lands on a sensitive path (ln -s ~/.ssh/id_rsa ./notes.txt), and a cd into a sensitive directory chained with a further command that would act on relative paths inside it (cd ~/.aws && cat credentials). Also flags Cursor's Terminal Tool Allowlist Bypass (CVE-2026-22708): export/typeset/declare/readonly/ local assigning a behavior-redirecting variable (PAGER, BROWSER, PYTHONWARNINGS, PERL5OPT) that a later, separately- approved command would then respect, plus zsh's zero-click ${(e):-...} forced-parameter-expansion construct. Returns risk (safe, suspicious, or dangerous), per-segment findings, and bypassed_raw_pattern_match -- concrete evidence a normalized segment caught something the raw text alone would have missed.

Prompts

Interactive templates invoked by user choice

NameDescription

No prompts

Resources

Contextual data attached and managed by the client

NameDescription

No resources

Latest Blog Posts

MCP directory API

We provide all the information about MCP servers via our MCP API.

curl -X GET 'https://glama.ai/api/mcp/v1/servers/glatinone/secops-toolkit-mcp'

If you have feedback or need assistance with the MCP directory API, please join our Discord server