Secops Toolkit MCP
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": true
} |
| logging | {} |
| prompts | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| resources | {
"subscribe": false,
"listChanged": false
} |
| extensions | {
"io.modelcontextprotocol/ui": {}
} |
| experimental | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| extract_iocsA | Extract indicators of compromise from free-form text or log output. Finds IPv4 addresses, URLs, domains, MD5/SHA1/SHA256 hashes, and CVE IDs.
Defanged indicators ( |
| defang_iocB | Make an indicator safe to share by defanging it ( |
| refang_iocA | Reverse a defanged indicator back to its real form ( |
| hash_textA | Compute a cryptographic hash of a string.
|
| password_entropyA | Estimate password strength as bits of entropy over the charset used. Returns length, charset size, entropy in bits, and a strength label. This is a quick floor estimate, not a check of whether a specific password is on a breach list. |
| cidr_infoA | Describe an IPv4/IPv6 network: netmask, host range, size, and privacy. Accepts CIDR notation such as |
| ip_in_cidrB | Check whether an IP address falls inside a given CIDR network. |
| scan_repo_rootA | Check a repo's top-level directory for files that shadow common
developer command names ( Run this before opening a freshly cloned or downloaded repository in an
agentic coding tool. On Windows, several tools (Cursor, GitHub Copilot
CLI, Gemini CLI, Codex) resolve an unqualified command like Separately, a symlink anywhere in the tree whose resolved target lies
outside this directory is flagged too (the GhostApproval/DuneSlide
hidden-write-target pattern: an approval dialog shows a decoy path while
the symlink redirects the real write elsewhere, e.g.
|
| assess_shell_commandA | Assess a shell command for constructs that look benign to naive string matching but execute something else once a shell actually expands them. Closes the bypass class GuardFall (2026-06) confirmed against 10 of 11 popular open-source AI coding agents (Aider, Cline, Goose, Plandex, and others): their command-safety guards check the raw string a model wrote, not what the shell rewrites it into via quote removal, backslash escapes, command substitution, and variable/IFS expansion. Never executes the command or any part of it. Tokenizes with real POSIX quote-removal rules so quote-fragmented or
backslash-obfuscated commands ( |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 9 tools
Each tool has a clear, distinct purpose: IOC handling (defang/refang/extract), hashing, password entropy, CIDR operations, shell command assessment, and repo scanning. No overlap or ambiguity.
All tools use snake_case, but naming pattern varies between verb_noun (extract_iocs, scan_repo_root) and noun_noun (password_entropy, cidr_info). Mostly consistent but minor mixing.
9 tools cover a broad range of secops tasks without being excessive. Each tool adds value, and the count is well-scoped for the server's purpose.
Covers core secops areas: IOC handling, hashing, password analysis, CIDR, shell assessment, repo scanning. Minor gaps like URL analysis missing, but no critical dead ends.