sieve-map
sieve-mcp
MCP server for Sieve — a macOS app that scans local AI coding tool history for secrets leaked into prompts.
sieve-mcp is bundled inside the Sieve Mac app. No separate install. No network calls. All operations run on-device.
Install
Download Sieve for Mac from the App Store.
Open Sieve → Settings → MCP → toggle Enable MCP server on.
Related MCP server: VaultBridge
Configure Claude Code
Add to ~/.claude/claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"sieve": {
"command": "/Applications/Sieve.app/Contents/MacOS/sieve-mcp"
}
}
}Restart Claude Code and run /mcp to verify sieve appears.
Configure Claude Desktop
Add the same block to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json and restart.
Tools
All tools are safe by design — no tool ever returns a plaintext secret value.
sieve_health_status
Returns service health and finding counts.
Response:
{
"status": "ok",
"findings_count": 12,
"scan_jobs": 3
}sieve_self_test
Verifies scanner rules and transcript source coverage are healthy.
Response:
{
"fingerprintHealthy": true,
"ruleCount": "<n>",
"transcriptSourceCount": "<n>",
"healthy": true,
"issues": []
}sieve_findings_list
Lists findings from the most recent scan.
Input: { "limit": 50 } (optional)
Response:
[
{
"findingId": "abc123",
"ruleId": "github-pat",
"severity": "critical",
"sourcePath": "~/.claude/projects/myapp/transcript.jsonl",
"sourceType": "ClaudeCode",
"secretFingerprint": "<fingerprint>",
"previewRedacted": "ghp_[REDACTED]",
"providerExposureAssumed": true,
"rotationStatus": "pending",
"redactionPlaceholder": "sieve://myapp/github-pat"
}
]providerExposureAssumed: true — secret found in an AI tool transcript. Assume the provider (Anthropic, OpenAI, etc.) can associate the prompt with your account identity.
sieve_issue_list
Lists scanner health issues — unreadable sources, permission errors, parse failures.
Response:
[
{
"issueId": "iss1",
"code": "SCAN_TARGET_UNREADABLE",
"severity": "warning",
"component": "ClaudeDesktop",
"message": "Could not read chat DB — Full Disk Access may be required",
"suggestion": "Grant Full Disk Access in System Settings → Privacy & Security"
}
]sieve_scan_history
Returns past scan job summaries.
Input: { "limit": 10 } (optional)
Response:
[
{
"jobId": "job1",
"startedAt": "2026-05-22T10:00:00Z",
"finishedAt": "2026-05-22T10:00:12Z",
"sourcesCount": 4,
"findingsCount": 3,
"issuesCount": 0
}
]sieve_scan_status
Returns status of the current or most recent scan.
Response:
{ "status": "idle" }Values: "idle" · "running" · "completed" · "failed: <reason>"
sieve_check_text
Checks whether text contains secrets. Returns boolean only — never echoes input or detected values.
Input: { "text": "<content to check>" }
Response:
{ "has_secrets": true }Use this to gate operations before sending content to an external API.
sieve_redact_text
Redacts secrets from text, replacing values with sieve:// placeholders.
Input: { "text": "<content>", "project_key": "myapp" }
Response:
{
"redacted": "export STRIPE_KEY=sieve://myapp/stripe-secret-key",
"hadSecrets": true,
"placeholders": [
{
"ruleId": "stripe-secret-key",
"placeholder": "sieve://myapp/stripe-secret-key",
"fingerprint": "<fingerprint>"
}
]
}Raw values are never included in the response.
sieve_vault_run
Executes a command with macOS Keychain-resolved secrets injected as env vars. Secrets never transit the MCP channel.
Input: { "command": "npm run deploy", "fingerprints": ["<fingerprint>"] }
Response:
{
"exit_code": 0,
"succeeded": true,
"timed_out": false,
"stdout_line_count": 14,
"stderr_line_count": 0
}stdout/stderr content is never returned — only line counts.
Supported AI tool sources
Tool | Source |
Claude Code | JSONL project transcripts |
Claude Desktop | SQLite chat database |
Cursor | SQLite state database |
VS Code / Copilot Chat | JSON history files |
Windsurf | JSON history files |
Cline | JSON session files |
Codex CLI | JSONL/JSON session files |
Gemini CLI | JSON history files |
| Selected project roots |
Custom sources | User-added folders |
Sieve correlates findings across source types — if the same secret appears in both a transcript and a .env file, it is flagged as a multi-source exposure.
Security posture
Local-only. stdio transport, no network calls, no cloud sync.
No plaintext secrets in responses. Hard invariant in the dispatcher — not configurable.
Fingerprint-only persistence. Findings DB stores HMAC fingerprints + redacted previews only.
Keychain-backed vault. Secret values live in macOS Keychain with biometric access control.
Explicit opt-in. MCP is off by default; requires toggle in Sieve Settings.
Unreadable sources reported.
SCAN_TARGET_UNREADABLEsurfaces insieve_issue_list— no silent skipping.
Transport
stdio. The sieve-mcp binary reads JSON-RPC 2.0 from stdin and writes to stdout. MCP clients (Claude Code, Claude Desktop) manage the process lifecycle.
Platform
macOS only. Requires Sieve app installed from the Mac App Store.
Links
Mac App Store: https://apps.apple.com/app/sieve-ai-secret-scanner/id6747506504
Product site: https://sieve.app
Available Tools
9 toolssieve_check_textA
Checks whether text contains secrets. Returns boolean only — never echoes input or detected values.
Inputs: text (required).
sieve_findings_listA
Lists findings from the most recent scan. Previews are redacted — no plaintext secret values.
Inputs: limit.
sieve_health_statusA
Returns Sieve service health and finding counts.
Inputs: no named parameters.
sieve_issue_listA
Lists scanner health issues: unreadable sources, permission errors, parse failures.
Inputs: no named parameters.
sieve_redact_textB
Redacts secrets from text, replacing values with sieve:// placeholders. Raw values are never returned.
Inputs: text (required), project_key.
sieve_scan_historyC
Returns past scan job summaries.
Inputs: limit.
sieve_scan_statusA
Returns status of the current or most recent scan: idle, running, completed, or failed.
Inputs: no named parameters.
sieve_self_testB
Verifies scanner rules and transcript source coverage are healthy.
Inputs: no named parameters.
sieve_vault_runA
Executes a command with macOS Keychain-resolved secrets injected as env vars. Returns exit code and line counts only — stdout/stderr content is never returned.
Inputs: command (required), fingerprints.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
TDQS
Scored across 9 tools
Each tool targets a distinct function: check vs redact text, list findings, health, issues, scan history/status, self-test, and vault run. No two tools have overlapping purposes, ensuring clear differentiation for an agent.
All tools share the 'sieve_' prefix and use snake_case, which is good. However, the part-of-speech order varies: some are verb_noun (check_text, redact_text), others are noun_noun (findings_list, health_status). This minor inconsistency prevents a perfect score.
With 9 tools, the server covers its core domain (secrets scanning and vault management) without bloat. Each tool addresses a specific need, and the count feels well-scoped for the functionality offered.
The tool set covers essential operations: checking, redacting, listing findings, health, issues, scan history/status, self-test, and vault execution. A minor gap is the absence of a tool to trigger a scan or manage vault entries, but the core workflows are supported.
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