A
licenseNot graded
qualityD
maintenanceEnables content moderation by checking user input against OpenAI's moderation API via Google ADK, with dual SSE/STDIO transport support and integration with local LLMs.
4
MIT
HallucC — Hallucination Fact-Check & AI Safety Guard
by fredyee
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TDQS
A3.6/5.0
Scored across 5 tools
Disambiguation3/5
The CUA-specific tools (check_cua_actions, check_cua_code_audit) and check_safety are clearly distinct, but verify_agent, verify_text, and check_safety overlap substantially — check_safety includes hallucination detection, verify_agent runs claim verification plus trajectory evaluation, and verify_text does claim verification on plain text. An agent must read carefully to decide whether to call verify_text vs verify_agent vs check_safety for a given output.
Naming Consistency4/5
All names are snake_case verb_noun with consistent structure and a sensible cua namespace prefix for the computer-use tools. The only blemish is mixing the verbs check_ and verify_ across functionally similar tools, which makes the prefix grouping slightly less predictable than a single-verb scheme would be.
Tool Count5/5
Five tools is well-scoped for a guard/verification server, with each tool earning its place across two sub-domains (CUA safety and general content verification). Nothing feels padded or redundant enough to be a separate trivial endpoint.
Completeness4/5
The surface covers the core lifecycle: pre-execution action grading, source code auditing, prompt/output safety gating, and post-hoc output/claim verification. Minor gaps exist, such as no tool to inspect ruleset metadata, quota/history, or batch verification, but these are workarounds rather than blockers.
Maintenance
ActivityMaintained
ResponsivenessNo issues