YUSA
OfficialProvides a GitHub Action that scans pull requests and agent-read files (prompts, SKILL.md, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, docs) for hidden or obfuscated prompt-injection instructions, reporting findings as annotations on changed lines and in the job summary with secrets masked.
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
YUSA
What you read is not what your agent reads.
YUSA is a prompt-injection firewall for AI agents. It reads text the way a model reads it, finds the instructions hidden from people, and stops a hijacked agent before it acts.
Live demo: https://yusasecurity.xyz · X: @yusasecurity
What it does
Layer | |
Unmask | Decodes Unicode TAG smuggling, base64 blobs, HTML comments and |
Score | 25 rules: instruction override, role hijack, prompt extraction, forged chat-template tokens, wallet drain and unlimited approvals, exfiltration beacons. 10 secret formats. A directive found in a hidden layer is always a block. |
Fence | Wraps untrusted text in a tag with a random nonce per call, so the model can tell data from orders. |
Gate | Checks every tool call before it runs: tool, recipient address, host, value cap, unlimited approvals, secrets in outbound arguments. Decodes raw transaction calldata too, so a spender or recipient hidden inside |
The engine (src/engine/) has no dependencies and no network access. It runs in the browser, in Node, as a CLI, and as an MCP server.
Related MCP server: @guardbee/mcp-security-proxy
Use
import { scan, fence } from "./src/engine/scan.ts";
import { checkToolCall } from "./src/engine/policy.ts";
const r = scan(page);
if (r.verdict === "block") return refuse(r.findings);
prompt += fence(page, "web");
const g = checkToolCall({ tool, args }, policy);
if (g.verdict !== "allow") return askOwner(g.reasons);node src/cli.ts -f page.html # exit 0 allow · 1 review · 2 block
curl -s $URL | node src/cli.tsMCP server
mcp/yusa-mcp.mjs gives any MCP client (Claude, Cursor, VS Code, ChatGPT desktop) three tools. One file, no dependencies, no network, stdio only.
Tool | Call it | Returns |
| on any text from outside the conversation, before acting on it |
|
| before putting that text into a prompt | the text in a random-nonce tag, invisible characters stripped |
| before any call that moves value or sends data out, including raw transactions with |
|
Listed in the MCP Registry as io.github.yusasecurity/yusa. For Claude Desktop, download yusa.mcpb and open it. Or run it straight from a clone:
git clone https://github.com/yusasecurity/yusa
claude mcp add yusa -- node /path/to/yusa/mcp/yusa-mcp.mjsOther clients:
{
"mcpServers": {
"yusa": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/path/to/yusa/mcp/yusa-mcp.mjs"],
"env": { "YUSA_POLICY": "/path/to/policy.json" }
}
}
}YUSA_POLICY is optional and only used by yusa_check_tool_call. Without it, every call must pass its own policy, and a call with neither is blocked.
{
"allowTools": ["swap", "get_price"],
"allowAddresses": ["0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111"],
"allowHosts": ["api.dexscreener.com"],
"maxValueEth": 0.05
}The tools are advisory: the model decides whether to call them. For a hard stop, call checkToolCall in your own code before the tool runs.
GitHub Action
Fails a pull request that adds hidden or obfuscated instructions to anything an agent reads: prompts, SKILL.md, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, docs. Findings show up as annotations on the changed lines and in the job summary, with secrets masked.
# .github/workflows/yusa.yml
on: [pull_request]
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
yusa:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: yusasecurity/yusa@v0.3.5Input | Default | |
|
| files or directories to scan |
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|
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| on PRs and pushes, scan only changed files |
| path prefixes to skip, e.g. test fixtures that contain attacks on purpose | |
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Outputs: blocked, review, scanned. Runs on the runner's Node, no install step, no network, no token.
Aeon skill pack
skills/yusa-skill-audit scans every SKILL.md, soul/ and STRATEGY.md in an Aeon instance for hidden or obfuscated injection, and alerts only on new or changed hits. Keyless, read-only, no network. yusa.mjs is the engine bundled into one 15 KB file.
Why it exists: a SKILL.md that hides an order in Unicode TAG characters renders as a harmless summary on GitHub and passes Aeon's install-time scripts/skill-scan.sh. YUSA blocks it with score 100 and shows the hidden text. Across 121 real upstream and community skill files it reports 0 blocks and 10 reviews.
Develop
npm install
npm test # engine tests
npm run build # site -> dist/
npm run build:skill # rebuild skills/yusa-skill-audit/yusa.mjs
npm run build:mcp # rebuild mcp/yusa-mcp.mjsBenchmark
Scored on three public datasets. Rules were tuned on train splits only (deepset and Gandalf). Every number below is a test split that was never used for tuning. "Detected" means the verdict was review or block.
test set | detection | false positives | precision |
deepset/prompt-injections (Apache-2.0, EN + DE) | 35.0% (21/60) | 0.0% (0/56) | 100% |
| 69.1% (96/139) | 0.8% (1/123) | 99.0% |
Lakera/gandalf_ignore_instructions (MIT, injections only) | 72.3% (81/112) | n/a | n/a |
The jailbreak set was never tuned on at all. For comparison, train-split detection: deepset 50.2%, Gandalf 70.0%.
Reproduce with npm run bench. YUSA is tuned to avoid false positives, so it misses more than it flags wrongly. Most misses are roleplay setups ("two actors in a film about a robbery") and plain task requests ("generate SQL code") that the dataset labels as injections. Patterns cannot tell those apart from normal use, so the Gate's policy checks are the backstop.
Limits
Detection is rule-based. A new phrasing can get past it, so a clean scan means no known pattern, not proof of safety. Use the Gate on anything that moves value.
Credits
3D button adapted from evil-buttons (Apache-2.0).
License
MIT
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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Maintenance
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