Mcp-Warden
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| MCP_WARDEN_APPROVAL_TRANSPORT | No | Override the approval transport at runtime. Valid values: telegram, desktop, tui. |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| db_queryA | Run a NAMED QUERY against a database preset (PostgreSQL, MySQL,
or Redis). You supply |
| get_secret_for_envA | Reveal the raw secret value bound to a name. ALWAYS prompts for
approval, regardless of preset policy. Prefer |
| list_presetsA | List available mcp-warden presets — named, scoped actions you may
invoke. Returns name, description, type (http|ssh), and approval
policy (auto|prompt|deny). Read-only; never returns secret values.
Use |
| proxy_httpA | Make an HTTP request through a preset. The preset selects the base
URL and authentication; you supply |
| sftp_transferA | Transfer a file between the preset's SSH host and the local
machine. |
| ssh_execA | Run a shell command on the preset's SSH host. The command must
match one of the preset's |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 6 tools
Each tool targets a distinct channel or resource: preset discovery (list_presets), HTTP (proxy_http), SSH command exec (ssh_exec), file transfer (sftp_transfer), named DB queries (db_query), and raw secret exposure (get_secret_for_env). The descriptions even explicitly steer callers (e.g., prefer proxy_http over get_secret_for_env), leaving little room for misselection despite shared 'preset' framing.
All names are snake_case and readable, but conventions are mixed: two verb-first names (get_secret_for_env, list_presets) versus four resource/channel-first names (proxy_http, db_query, ssh_exec, sftp_transfer). The inconsistency is mild but predictable patterns are absent.
Six tools map cleanly onto the server's scope: one discovery tool, four execution channels (HTTP, SSH, SFTP, DB), and one escape-hatch secret reader. Nothing feels padded or missing at the count level.
The execution surface is solid, but several referenced concepts have no corresponding tools: the audit log is written to on every call yet unreadable, and time-boxed approval windows are described but cannot be requested or inspected. Preset creation/editing is arguably omitted by design, but the observability gaps are notable dead ends.