Mcp-Warden
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TDQS
Scored across 6 tools
Each tool targets a distinct channel or resource: preset discovery (list_presets), HTTP (proxy_http), SSH command exec (ssh_exec), file transfer (sftp_transfer), named DB queries (db_query), and raw secret exposure (get_secret_for_env). The descriptions even explicitly steer callers (e.g., prefer proxy_http over get_secret_for_env), leaving little room for misselection despite shared 'preset' framing.
All names are snake_case and readable, but conventions are mixed: two verb-first names (get_secret_for_env, list_presets) versus four resource/channel-first names (proxy_http, db_query, ssh_exec, sftp_transfer). The inconsistency is mild but predictable patterns are absent.
Six tools map cleanly onto the server's scope: one discovery tool, four execution channels (HTTP, SSH, SFTP, DB), and one escape-hatch secret reader. Nothing feels padded or missing at the count level.
The execution surface is solid, but several referenced concepts have no corresponding tools: the audit log is written to on every call yet unreadable, and time-boxed approval windows are described but cannot be requested or inspected. Preset creation/editing is arguably omitted by design, but the observability gaps are notable dead ends.