mcp-secrets-guard
Related Servers
Alternatives to mcp-secrets-guard
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI agents to scan code, staged changes, repositories, and text snippets for hardcoded secrets, returning redacted findings without exposing matched secret values to the model.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI assistants to scan source code for secrets like API keys and passwords locally without network requests.2Apache 2.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to scan and audit environment files for leaked secrets, sanitize them, encrypt/decrypt vaults, and run processes with zero-disk secret injection.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to scan code or text content for hardcoded API keys, passwords, tokens, and private keys, reporting each finding by type, confidence, key name, and position. Secret values are never returned, so credentials can be located and addressed without leaving the machine.1MIT
- AlicenseAqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI assistants to scan multiple services and local filesystems for leaked secrets using n0s1 secret-scanning capabilities.1338 PyPIGPL 3.0
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI assistants to audit and clean development workspaces safely by detecting reclaimable artifacts, exposed .env files, and potential secret leaks.6MIT
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
The two tools are differentiated by scope: check_env_for_secrets targets a single env file while scan_project_for_secrets recursively scans the whole project. However, the recursive scan likely also covers env files, creating partial overlap that an agent must reason about from the descriptions rather than from distinct purposes.
Both tools follow a clear, consistent verb_noun_for_secrets pattern (check_env_for_secrets, scan_project_for_secrets) with matching suffix semantics. The verb difference (check vs scan) also maps sensibly to single-file vs recursive scope.
Two tools is thin for a scanner/guard server; it sits at the borderline where the surface feels minimal. The split is defensible (file-level vs project-level), but there is little room for configuration, baselines, or reporting tools.
Detection coverage is reasonable for the domain, but the lifecycle is incomplete: there is no way to configure ignore rules/custom patterns, manage an allowlist or baseline, export reports, or receive remediation guidance. These are notable gaps for a 'guard' toolset, though agents can still perform the core detection workflow.