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mcp-secrets-guard

An MCP server that lets AI assistants check your project for exposed secrets without the secret values ever entering the model's context.

Instead of letting an assistant cat .env (and leak your keys into a chat log), the assistant calls a tool. The tool reads the file locally and returns only a sanitized report:

.env: Found 3 potential secrets: 1 AWS access key ID, 1 Stripe live secret key, 1 High-entropy secret value.
  - line 2: AWS access key ID [high] (variable AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID)
  - line 3: Stripe live secret key [high] (variable STRIPE_SECRET_KEY)
  - line 4: High-entropy secret value [medium] (variable SESSION_SECRET)
  ! This env file does not appear to be covered by .gitignore.
Secret values are never included in this report.

No value, prefix, suffix or masked fragment is ever returned. The test suite asserts this against the real MCP protocol.

Install

Claude Desktop — add to claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "secrets-guard": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-secrets-guard"],
      "env": { "MCP_SECRETS_GUARD_ROOT": "/absolute/path/to/your/project" }
    }
  }
}

Claude Code:

claude mcp add secrets-guard -- npx -y mcp-secrets-guard

(Claude Code launches servers in your project directory, so the root defaults to it.)

Related MCP server: trestle

Tools

Tool

What it does

check_env_for_secrets

Scans one env file (default .env). Reports line numbers, secret types, variable names, and whether the file looks covered by .gitignore.

scan_project_for_secrets

Recursively scans the project (skips node_modules, .git, build output, lockfiles, binaries, files over 1 MB) for hard-coded secrets.

What it detects

Anthropic, OpenAI, AWS access key IDs, Stripe (live/test/webhook), GitHub (classic and fine-grained), Slack tokens and webhooks, Google API keys, SendGrid, Twilio, npm tokens, private key blocks, JWTs, passwords in connection strings (postgres://user:pass@host), plus a generic entropy check for values under names like *_SECRET, *_TOKEN, *PASSWORD*, *API_KEY*. Placeholders (your_key_here, ${VAR}, changeme, <...>) are ignored.

This is a fast heuristic scanner, not a replacement for tools like gitleaks or trufflehog in CI. Expect some false negatives (and the occasional false positive).

Safety model

  • Read-only. Nothing is written, deleted or sent anywhere. No network access.

  • Root-confined. Paths are resolved (including symlinks) and must stay inside the project root (MCP_SECRETS_GUARD_ROOT, default: current directory). ../ and symlink escapes are refused.

  • Errors never echo file contents.

  • One dependency: the official @modelcontextprotocol/sdk.

A note on trust: this protects the secret values from the model. It cannot stop an assistant that also has a general file-read tool from reading .env anyway. Pair it with your client's permission rules (e.g. deny reads of .env*) so the guarded tool is the only path.

CLI

npx mcp-secrets-guard --scan          # scan the project, exit code 1 if anything is found
npx mcp-secrets-guard --scan .env

Handy as a pre-commit hook or CI step.

Develop

npm install
npm test

License

MIT

Available Tools

2 tools
check_env_for_secretsA
Read-only

Check a local env file (default: .env) for exposed secrets such as API keys, tokens, private keys and passwords. Returns only a sanitized report (line numbers, secret types, variable names). Secret values are NEVER returned, so it is safe to call. Do not try to read the env file directly.

Inputs: path.

scan_project_for_secretsA
Read-only

Recursively scan the project (skipping node_modules, .git, build output and binaries) for hard-coded secrets and env files that may be committed. Returns only file paths, line numbers and secret types. Secret values are NEVER returned.

Inputs: path, max_files.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    A3.9/5.0

    Scored across 2 tools

    Disambiguation4/5

    The two tools are differentiated by scope: check_env_for_secrets targets a single env file while scan_project_for_secrets recursively scans the whole project. However, the recursive scan likely also covers env files, creating partial overlap that an agent must reason about from the descriptions rather than from distinct purposes.

    Naming Consistency5/5

    Both tools follow a clear, consistent verb_noun_for_secrets pattern (check_env_for_secrets, scan_project_for_secrets) with matching suffix semantics. The verb difference (check vs scan) also maps sensibly to single-file vs recursive scope.

    Tool Count3/5

    Two tools is thin for a scanner/guard server; it sits at the borderline where the surface feels minimal. The split is defensible (file-level vs project-level), but there is little room for configuration, baselines, or reporting tools.

    Completeness3/5

    Detection coverage is reasonable for the domain, but the lifecycle is incomplete: there is no way to configure ignore rules/custom patterns, manage an allowlist or baseline, export reports, or receive remediation guidance. These are notable gaps for a 'guard' toolset, though agents can still perform the core detection workflow.

    Maintenance

    ActivityMaintained
    ResponsivenessNo recent community issues

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