Inspect TLS certificate

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (read-only, idempotent, non-destructive), so the description goes beyond them by disclosing exactly what protocol work is performed, that no application data is sent, and by surfacing the untrusted-data/instruction-injection caution for probed site content, which no annotation expresses.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the action and return payload, then use cases, then boundaries, then a security caveat. Four compact sentences with no filler; every clause carries operational information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, yet the description enumerates the returned fields (chain, expiry, host-name match, trust, key strength, negotiated protocol, accepted TLS versions), covers the scope boundary, and includes the prompt-injection warning. For a 3-parameter read tool this is complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, with host/port/check_protocols fully documented in the schema itself. The description adds only a light gloss: the handshake context and that protocol probing is optional, which is already implied by the schema default of false. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (performs a TLS handshake) against a specific resource (host:port) and enumerates exactly what is reported: chain, expiry, host-name match, trust, key strength, negotiated protocol. An agent can distinguish it from siblings like cert_expiry and http_probe without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly names the triggering scenarios: expired or soon-to-expire certificates, 'certificate not trusted' errors, incomplete chains, and legacy protocol audits. It also draws the boundary against application-level probes with 'Only the handshake happens; no application data is sent,' which routes the agent away from http_probe when only TLS metadata is wanted.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.