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DNS Doctor

by dnsdoctor
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
TypeScript

Build Parked Domain Records

build_parked_domain_records
Read-onlyIdempotent

Use this when the user asks how to protect a domain that sends no email from being spoofed. Build the three-record hardening pack that makes a NON-SENDING domain unusable for spoofing: a Null MX, a hard-fail SPF record, and a p=reject…

Instructions

Use this when the user asks how to protect a domain that sends no email from being spoofed. Build the three-record hardening pack that makes a NON-SENDING domain unusable for spoofing: a Null MX, a hard-fail SPF record, and a p=reject; np=reject DMARC record. For parked, redirect and brand-defensive domains only — NEVER for a domain that sends any mail, including transactional or one legacy system. Ask the domain's owner whether it sends any email BEFORE calling, then call with the bare domain (e.g. example.com) and confirm_no_mail: true only if they said it sends none — a call without it is always refused. Never set the flag on your own judgment or because a scan looked quiet. That flag unlocks the question, not the answer — the server re-checks DNS itself (existence, MX, SPF, DKIM selectors) and returns records: null with a rationale when it finds evidence of mail; relay that rationale rather than retrying. A lookup failure is reported as a failure, never as a pack. Publishing is the human's decision: present the records verbatim, in the order given, and let them approve each one.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
domainYesThe domain to check, e.g. example.com. Bare registrable names and subdomains both work; scheme, path or port do not belong here. Unicode names are accepted and normalized to punycode.
rua_emailNoMailbox to receive DMARC aggregate (RUA) reports, as a plain address like dmarc@example.com. Strongly recommended: without it nobody can see who sends as the domain.
confirm_no_mailNoSend true only after the HUMAN who owns the domain has told you it sends no email at all; false or omitted is always refused, so ask them first instead of calling. Never set it on your own judgment or because a scan looked quiet. It unlocks the question only; the server independently re-checks DNS for evidence of mail and refuses when it finds any.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changedv1.14.0
    • addedInput schema / properties / confirm_no_mail / default
      Added value: +false
    • changedInput schema / properties / confirm_no_mail / description
      Previous value: -"Must be true, and only the HUMAN who owns the domain may decide it: it records their confirmation that this domain sends no email at all. Never set it on your own judgment or because a scan looked quiet — ask them. It unlocks the question only; the server independently re-checks DNS for evidence of mail and refuses when it finds any."New value: +"Send true only after the HUMAN who owns the domain has told you it sends no email at all; false or omitted is always refused, so ask them first instead of calling. Never set it on your own judgment or because a scan looked quiet. It unlocks the question only; the server independently re-checks DNS for evidence of mail and refuses when it finds any."
    • changedInput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
-  "domain",
-  "confirm_no_mail"
-]New value: +[
+  "domain"
+]
  2. Addedv1.3.0

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Adds substantial behavior beyond the annotations: the server independently re-checks DNS (existence, MX, SPF, DKIM selectors), returns records: null with a rationale on evidence of mail, reports lookup failure as failure rather than an empty pack, and expects the agent to relay rather than retry. This is consistent with readOnlyHint=true — the tool only builds records and leaves publishing to the human.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the trigger and the output artifact before the safety warnings, and every clause carries weight for a gated, easy-to-misuse tool. It runs long and repeats the "never set the flag on your own judgment" instruction already present in the schema, costing it the top score.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description still covers the return shape (the three records in order, or null with a rationale, or a reported failure) and the terminal workflow (present verbatim, human approves each). Nothing needed to call it safely is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description goes modestly further by framing confirm_no_mail as "unlocks the question, not the answer" and clarifying that a call without it is always refused, which explains the parameter's gate role rather than restating its type. It also reinforces the bare-domain format for the domain parameter, though much of the confirm_no_mail wording overlaps the schema text.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a concrete verb and artifact — "Build the three-record hardening pack" — and names the exact records produced (Null MX, hard-fail SPF, p=reject DMARC). It also scopes the resource precisely: NON-SENDING parked/redirect/brand-defensive domains, which cleanly separates it from generate_dmarc_record and build_dmarc_upgrade.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit trigger (user asks how to protect a domain that sends no email), an explicit exclusion ("NEVER for a domain that sends any mail, including transactional or one legacy system"), and a required pre-call step (ask the owner, then set confirm_no_mail). It even warns against the tempting wrong path — inferring no-mail from a quiet scan.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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