list_webhooks

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description takes on the disclosure burden; it adds one useful behavioral guarantee: signing secrets are never returned. It does not disclose pagination, ordering, or output shape, so it covers only part of the behavior an agent might need to anticipate.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single sentence leads with the action and object, then adds a relevant caveat in parentheses. Every word earns its place; nothing is redundant or missing for a tool this simple.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple zero-parameter list operation, the description conveys the primary purpose and a key security-relevant caveat without an output schema. It could mention pagination or response fields, but the tool's low complexity makes the current description reasonably complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The tool has zero parameters, so the schema already fully defines the input surface; the description adds no parameter-specific details, and the baseline for a no-parameter tool is 4. Nothing further is required here.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific action ("List") and a precise resource ("the workspace's webhook endpoints"), and the parenthetical about signing secrets distinguishes this endpoint-listing tool from sibling tools like list_webhook_deliveries or list_webhook_event_types.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The clear context of listing webhook endpoints implies the primary use case, and the resource qualifier distinguishes it from related lists of deliveries or event types. It does not explicitly state when not to use it or name alternatives, but the context is unambiguous for a zero-parameter list operation.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.