SecureAgentServer
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@SecureAgentServerSearch tickets for 'billing' and show the customer account for TICKET-2041."
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Secure MCP-Based Agent System
A support-ticket + customer-account MCP server and client, built and secured end to end: signed-token authentication, two independent guardrails against prompt injection and tool poisoning, a documented threat model, and a human-in-the-loop gate on the one destructive tool call. Built for the "Secure an MCP-Based Agent System" lab.
Architecture
flowchart TD
HOST["Host application"] --> CLIENT["client.py\n(fastmcp.Client + elicitation_handler)"]
CLIENT <-->|"Streamable HTTP\nAuthorization: Bearer <signed JWT>"| SERVER
subgraph Server["server.py — FastMCP('SecureAgentServer')"]
AUTH["JWTVerifier (HS256)\nissuer + audience + signature checked"]
G1["Guardrail 1: sanitize_untrusted_text()\napplied to ticket body/subject"]
G2["Guardrail 2: verify_tool_manifest()\nchecked at startup, refuses to start on mismatch"]
TOOLS["Tools: search_tickets, lookup_customer_account,\nclose_ticket (elicitation-gated)"]
AUTH --> TOOLS
TOOLS --> G1
end
G2 -.->|startup check| SERVER
TOOLS --> TICKETS[("data/tickets.json\n(untrusted customer text)")]
TOOLS --> CUSTOMERS[("data/customers.json\n('internal API')")]Related MCP server: permitd MCP Server
Setup
pip install -r requirements.txt
# 1. Set the JWT signing secret (never commit the real value; see .env.example)
export MCP_JWT_SECRET="a-long-random-secret-at-least-32-characters"
# 2. Generate the pinned tool-integrity manifest (a deliberate, manual step —
# see docs/threat-model.md Risk #2)
python generate_manifest.py
# 3. Run the server
python server.py
# 4. In another terminal (same MCP_JWT_SECRET exported)
python client.py --auto-confirm # non-interactive demo
python client.py # interactive: real yes/no confirmation promptsReproducing the security controls
Control | How to verify it |
Signed-JWT authentication |
|
Guardrail 1: prompt-injection sanitization | Run the client and look at the |
Guardrail 2: tool-poisoning detection |
|
Human-in-the-loop on destructive actions |
|
Least-privilege scoping |
|
Threat model
Full write-up, including 5 identified risks with mitigations and residual-risk notes
stated explicitly rather than glossed over: docs/threat-model.md.
What's deliberately out of scope, stated plainly
mint_token.pystands in for a real OAuth 2.1 identity provider — a production deployment needs real token issuance/rotation/revocation, not a local minting script.No rate limiting or network-layer hardening (TLS termination, WAF) — this is an application-layer security demo, not a full deployment hardening guide.
The regex-based half of Guardrail 1 is explicitly a secondary, best-effort layer — see
docs/threat-model.mdRisk #1 for why the delimiter-wrapping is the control actually relied upon.
No secrets committed
MCP_JWT_SECRET is read from the environment (see .env.example) and is never
hardcoded or committed. tool_manifest.json is committed deliberately — it's a pinned
hash manifest (like a lockfile), not a secret.
This server cannot be installed
Maintenance
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