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beel_rotate_webhook_secret

DestructiveIdempotent

Rotate the HMAC signing secret for a webhook subscription to invalidate the old secret and obtain a new one, returned only once for immediate signature verification updates.

Instructions

Generates a new HMAC signing secret for a webhook subscription.

  • Old secret: immediately invalidated. Update your signature verification logic before rotating, to avoid missing events during the transition.

  • New secret: returned once, in this response only. It cannot be read again.

Endpoint: POST /v1/accounts/{account_id}/webhooks/{webhook_id}/secret

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
account_idYesYour own account, or an account you provisioned. It — not the credential, and not the `BeeL-Active-Company` header — decides which account the operation acts on. An account you do not reach answers `403`, and so does an account that does not exist, so the existence of somebody else's account is never disclosed.
webhook_idYesSubscription of the account in the path. A subscription of another account answers `404`, the same as one that does not exist: under the account resolved from `{account_id}` it simply is not there.
idempotency_keyNoOptional idempotency key for this operation. Omit it and one is derived from the request itself, which makes a blind retry safe but also collapses a SECOND, deliberately identical operation into the first for 24 hours. Set it — to an order id, or anything unique per intended operation — whenever you mean to create something that may look identical to what you just created.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.5.0
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
  2. First observedv0.3.1

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already mark this as destructive and non-read-only, and the description adds critical details beyond that: the old secret is immediately invalidated, the new secret is returned only once and cannot be read again. This gives the agent essential behavioral expectations for a destructive mutation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is short, front-loaded with the core operation, and uses two bullets to isolate the highest-risk behavioral facts. The endpoint line is useful and the whole definition has no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With a rich schema, destructive annotations, and no output schema, the description still covers the essential missing pieces: immediate invalidation, one-time secret return, and the transition warning. An agent has enough to call and interpret the operation safely.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the schema already provides rich semantics for account_id, webhook_id, and idempotency_key. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond the endpoint placeholders, so the schema-heavy baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb ('Generates') and identifies the exact resource ('a new HMAC signing secret for a webhook subscription'), which clearly differentiates it from webhook CRUD, testing, and delivery siblings. The endpoint string further pins down the operation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives useful operational context ('Update your signature verification logic before rotating') but never states when to choose this tool over alternatives or when not to use it. No sibling tool is named, so the usage guidance remains implied rather than explicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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