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BeeL MCP server

BeeL MCP server

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by beel-es

beel_patch_member

Destructive

Change an account member's role between ADMIN and MEMBER to update access permissions. Use this to promote or demote members while leaving ownership unchanged.

Instructions

Changes a member's account_role between ADMIN and MEMBER.

  • OWNER: not an assignable value here. An account has exactly one owner, and ownership is handed over only through PUT /v1/accounts/{account_id}/owner, which promotes the new owner and steps the current one down in the same operation.

  • Last owner: the account's last OWNER cannot be demoted.

BeeL API endpoint: PATCH /v1/accounts/{account_id}/members/{member_id} (reference: https://docs.beel.es)

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "account_id": "<account_id>",
      "member_id": "<member_id>",
      "body": "<body>"
    },
    "name": "beel_patch_member"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyYes
member_idYesMembership unique UUID.
account_idYesYour own account, or an account you provisioned. It — not the credential — decides which account the operation acts on; a `403` is returned when you do not reach it, the same response an account that does not exist gets.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.10.0
    • addedInput schema / properties / body / type
      Added value: +"object"
  2. Changed3 schema fields changedv0.5.0
    • changedInput schema / $defs / AccountRole / description
      Previous value: -"Who administers the account. Independent of `access_level`, which says how much access someone has to a given company (NIF).\n\n`OWNER` — full control, including billing, API keys and transferring ownership. Exactly one per account, so it is never an accepted value when you SET a role (inviting a member or changing one's role): both reject it with `422 OWNER_ROLE_NOT_ASSIGNABLE`. Ownership moves only through `PUT /v1/accounts/{account_id}/owner`.\n`ADMIN` — everything an `OWNER` can do, except transferring ownership.\n`MEMBER` — no account administration. Access to each company is granted individually and reported as `access_level`; a member only sees the companies granted to them."New value: +"Who administers the account. Independent of `access_level`, which says how much access someone has to a given company.\n\n`OWNER` — full control, including billing, API keys and transferring ownership. Exactly one per account, so it is never an accepted value when you SET a role (inviting a member or changing one's role): both reject it with `422 OWNER_ROLE_NOT_ASSIGNABLE`. Ownership moves only through `PUT /v1/accounts/{account_id}/owner`.\n`ADMIN` — everything an `OWNER` can do, except transferring ownership.\n`MEMBER` — no account administration. Access to each company is granted individually and reported as `access_level`; a member only sees the companies granted to them."
    • addedInput schema / $defs / ChangeMemberRoleRequest / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
  3. First observedv0.3.1

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is known; the description adds real value on top by disclosing the 422 `OWNER_ROLE_NOT_ASSIGNABLE` rejection, the invariant that exactly one owner exists per account, and the last-owner demotion guard. It does not say who may perform the change (required privilege level) or whether the change takes effect immediately for active sessions, which keeps it below 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action is front-loaded in the first line, and the bullets are limited to the constraints that cause failures. Minor redundancy exists: the `OWNER` bullet repeats the rule already present in the schema's `AccountRole` description.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a three-parameter mutation with annotations and no output schema, the definition covers the action, the allowed value range, and the two failure conditions an agent would most likely hit. The notable gap is caller authorization — nothing states whether the invoking credential must be an owner or admin — though the schema's `account_id` description handles the 403 scoping case.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 67%, so most parameters are documented in the schema already, and the `AccountRole` definition itself explains that `OWNER` is never an accepted value. The description's role constraint therefore largely restates schema content rather than adding new meaning, and it says nothing about `account_id` or `member_id` beyond what the schema provides. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence gives a specific verb and resource plus the exact domain of the operation: it changes a member's `account_role` and only between `ADMIN` and `MEMBER`. It further delimits scope by explicitly excluding `OWNER` and naming the endpoint that handles ownership transfer, so an agent can distinguish this from other member-related siblings such as `beel_delete_member` or `beel_put_member_grant`.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states clearly when this tool applies (role changes within ADMIN/MEMBER) and when it does not (promoting or transferring `OWNER`), pointing at `PUT /v1/accounts/{account_id}/owner` as the alternative. It also flags the 'last owner cannot be demoted' guard. It stops short of routing to sibling tools for adjacent member operations like grants or invitations, which is why it is not a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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