vaultguard

The problem

Your AI agents are powerful. They ship code, run commands, and one day they will ask: "give me the database URL."

You hand it over. Now that value lives in every transcript, log, checkpoint, and backup of your conversations. Rotate it a month later — a year later — and the old one is still out there.

The vault itself — Obsidian — is encrypted only if you make it so, and your agent reading your notes means your agent reading your secrets.

Related MCP server: agent-vault

What vaultguard does

Secrets live in your Obsidian vault as AES-256-GCM ciphertext. Your agents get them by name over MCP — they run commands with the values injected into the environment and never see them, while every access is audited.

• You own the data. No cloud, no SaaS, no server. The encrypted blocks are plain markdown.

• Readable in Obsidian. Encrypted blocks look like notes; reveal them with one click.

• Tell your agent to run things using secrets — values never surface in transcripts.

• Zero npm dependencies. Pure Node ≥ 18. Windows / macOS / Linux.

Quickstart

1 · Install

npm install -g @ashishrao-4/vaultguard

2 · Point it at your vault

vaultguard init --vault "C:\Users\you\Documents\Obsidian Vault"

It asks for a passphrase — the key that encrypts and decrypts every block in this vault. Then it:

• creates Secrets.md in your vault,

• installs the Inline Secret Block plugin into the vault automatically,

• writes ~/.vaultguard/config.json — without the passphrase (you provide it via VAULTGUARD_PASSPHRASE).

Restart Obsidian and enable the plugin: Settings → Community plugins → Inline Secret Block → Enable.

The passphrase is never written to disk by default. Prefer env vars: VAULTGUARD_PASSPHRASE (or DOORMAN_PASSPHRASE). If you want it conveniently stored anyway — at the cost of weaker security — run vaultguard init --store-passphrase instead (see Threat model).

3 · Add your first secret — the Obsidian way

In Obsidian, open Secrets.md and add a plaintext block:

```secret DATABASE-URL
Mydatabaseurl@postgres
```

Click Show — the plugin instantly replaces it with an encrypted secret-lock block. Your raw value is gone; what remains:

```secret-lock DATABASE-URL
Nx60U4Ph/+1CO+58Zr00HXhEW9GZ6voHlpS+bEXPpP69avbJaSfafZCC2dpPn6UgdMN+3PJUd+UPm39YAXhFTbHvLUpHDndzbODsL8fOm7IMWC16zjSQCW7CbRWklmUxOGl0lX2qpQ==
```

That's it. Same value, later, forever: click Show again.

No Obsidian? Use the CLI instead:

vaultguard add DB_URL     # hidden prompt
vaultguard set DB_URL     # rotate in place

4 · Connect your agent

vaultguard mcp

prints ready-made config for your harness:

opencode — in opencode.json (or globally via the app):

{
  "mcp": {
    "vaultguard": {
      "type": "local",
      "command": ["node", "C:/path/to/vaultguard/src/server.mjs"],
      "environment": { "VAULTGUARD_PASSPHRASE": "your-passphrase" }
    }
  }
}

Claude Code:

claude mcp add vaultguard -e VAULTGUARD_PASSPHRASE=your-passphrase -- node C:/path/to/vaultguard/src/server.mjs

Cursor: add the same server to your project's .cursor/mcp.json (or the MCP settings tab):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vaultguard": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["C:/path/to/vaultguard/src/server.mjs"],
      "env": { "VAULTGUARD_PASSPHRASE": "your-passphrase" }
    }
  }
}

5 · Use it

you : "run a quick sanity check against DB_URL"
agent: run_with_secret(command: "psql $DB_URL -c 'SELECT 1'", secrets: ["DB_URL"])
you :  ✔ exit 0  ·  audit entry written  ·  no secret leaked

• run_with_secret — secrets injected into the command's environment only.

• Output is scrubbed — any accidental echo of a secret is replaced with [REDACTED:NAME].

• get_secret — disabled by default so values never reach the agent; opt in with allowGetSecret: true in the config if a tool insists on the raw value.

Security model

Configuration

Edit ~/.vaultguard/config.json:

{
  "vaultPath": "C:/Users/you/Documents/Obsidian Vault",
  // passphrase is NOT stored here by default — provide VAULTGUARD_PASSPHRASE instead
  "allowlist": { "hosts": [], "commands": ["psql", "node"] },
  "requireApproval": false,          // true (default) = gate run_with_secret
  "audit": true,
  "allowGetSecret": false            // false (default) = values never reach the agent
}

The only way the passphrase lands in this file is vaultguard init --store-passphrase, which sets "storePassphraseOnDisk": true and includes "passphrase". Everything else reads the passphrase from the VAULTGUARD_PASSPHRASE env var or the CLI prompt.

Passphrase hygiene: vaultguard never writes the passphrase to disk unless you opt in (init --store-passphrase). Supply VAULTGUARD_PASSPHRASE in each harness config (see step 4) and protect ~/.vaultguard like an SSH key. Changed passphrase? vaultguard rekey re-encrypts every block, then update the env var wherever you set it.

CLI reference

Threat model — and when NOT to use it

vaultguard is a thin convenience layer, not a secrets manager. Its job is to keep secret values out of your AI-agent transcripts, logs, and checkpoints.

What it does NOT protect against:

• A compromised machine or harness. The passphrase (or an opted-in stored config) lives on your disk. Any process running as you — a backup tool, ransomware, a compromised plugin, your IDE — can read your files and decrypt the vault.

• A hostile agent. The entire idea is that the agent runs commands with secrets in the environment. Treat that as "the agent is you." Start with command allowlists and review vaultguard audit; don't grant access you wouldn't grant yourself.

• Weak passphrases. AES-256-GCM + PBKDF2 is only as strong as the passphrase. Use a long random one (your password manager can generate and store it).

• Exfiltration through legitimate channels. A determined agent can copy ciphertext or raw values anywhere that's reachable. vaultguard is a barrier, not a boundary.

• Plugin supply chain. vaultguard init downloads the Inline Secret Block plugin from its GitHub releases. A malicious plugin that knows your passphrase can decrypt everything — pin/verify it if you care.

Use it when: you want "agents run things with secrets without me pasting values into the chat" and the residual risks above are acceptable to you.

Don't use it when: you need real secrets-management guarantees — rotation policy, hardware-backed keys, no procedure that makes plaintext reachable to a native plugin — when your threat model includes a hostile agent on a shared or CI machine, or when the vault itself needs encryption at rest (Obsidian's own vault encryption, or an encrypted volume, is the answer there).

FAQ

Is my vault git-safe? The encrypted blocks are plain markdown — safe to commit, sync, or put anywhere Obsidian works. Since the passphrase no longer lives in ~/.vaultguard/config.json by default, committing that file leaks your vault path and settings but not your key.

What if I forget the passphrase? The blocks are AES-256-GCM. It cannot be recovered — that's the point.

Which Obsidian plugin? Inline Secret Block — vaultguard init installs it for you.

Do I need a server? No. It's a local stdio MCP server (node src/server.mjs). Nothing listens on a port.

License

MIT © vaultguard contributors.

The bundle installs the Inline Secret Block plugin (also MIT), downloaded at init time from the plugin's official releases — it is not vendored into this package. This project uses Node.js built-ins only (crypto), so there are no dependency licenses to track.

Guard your vault. Let your agents work.