ActSeal MCP
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@ActSeal MCPissue a signed receipt for my deploy with input hash 0xabc and output hash 0xdef"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
ActSeal MCP
stdio MCP server for ActSeal — Ed25519-signed receipts for agent actions.
Tool | Purpose |
|
|
|
|
Honesty: best-effort signed log. Not legal evidence, not SOC2, not custody, not e-sign. Free 100 receipts/API-key/UTC-day; Starter $19/mo in USDC/USDT/ETH at https://actseal.xyz/pay.
Env
Var | Required | Example |
| yes* |
|
| yes* | free key via https://actseal.xyz/get-key |
* Legacy ACTIONRECEIPT_BASE / ACTIONRECEIPT_API_KEY still accepted.
Related MCP server: actionproof
Run
pnpm install
export ACTSEAL_BASE=https://actseal.xyz
export ACTSEAL_API_KEY=as_…
pnpm startCursor / Claude Desktop
{
"mcpServers": {
"actseal": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["--yes", "tsx", "/ABSOLUTE/PATH/actseal-mcp/src/index.ts"],
"env": {
"ACTSEAL_BASE": "https://actseal.xyz",
"ACTSEAL_API_KEY": "YOUR_KEY"
}
}
}
}Links
Site: https://actseal.xyz
Docs: https://actseal.xyz/docs
OpenAPI: https://actseal.xyz/openapi.json
llms.txt: https://actseal.xyz/llms.txt
Docker / Glama
docker build -t actseal-mcp .
docker run -i --rm \
-e ACTSEAL_BASE=https://actseal.xyz \
-e ACTSEAL_API_KEY=YOUR_KEY \
actseal-mcpGlama listing: https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/arults/actseal-mcp (after submit + score).
glama.json lists maintainer arults.
Available Tools
2 toolsissue_receiptIssue ActSealA
Issue an Ed25519-signed ActSeal receipt for a tool action. Pass SHA-256 hex hashes of inputs/outputs — never raw secrets. Optional Idempotency-Key. Free tier only; x402 not live.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | Short action name, e.g. tools.web_search | |
| policy_id | No | Optional policy / run id label | |
| inputs_hash | Yes | SHA-256 of canonical inputs JSON | |
| outputs_hash | Yes | SHA-256 of canonical outputs JSON | |
| idempotency_key | No | Optional Idempotency-Key (24h TTL on server) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations only say readOnlyHint=false and openWorldHint=true; the description adds that the receipt is Ed25519-signed, that billing is free-tier-only with x402 not yet live, and that an Idempotency-Key is supported. It stops short of describing auth requirements or what the signed receipt contains, but contributes meaningful context beyond the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, front-loaded with the core action, then the key call constraint, then availability. No filler and nothing buried.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 5-param mutation tool with no output schema, the definition covers the critical do-not-do (raw secrets), idempotency, and availability. The remaining gap is that it never indicates what comes back from issuing — a receipt id/object — which would help an agent chain into verify_receipt.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is already 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description earns a bump by adding the safety-critical semantic that hashes must be of canonical inputs/outputs and never raw secrets, which is guidance the schema's pattern alone doesn't convey.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: 'Issue an Ed25519-signed ActSeal receipt for a tool action.' The issue-vs-verify split against the sibling verify_receipt is obvious from the verb, but the description never names or contrasts the sibling explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
'Pass SHA-256 hex hashes of inputs/outputs — never raw secrets' gives a real usage constraint, and 'Free tier only; x402 not live' signals availability. However, it doesn't say when to reach for this versus verify_receipt, nor any prerequisite/auth conditions for calling it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
verify_receiptVerify ActSealARead-only
Verify a receipt by id (public). Returns valid/invalid, receipt payload, and issuer public key.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | Receipt id from issue_receipt |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, so the description's added value is disclosing the response contents (valid/invalid, receipt payload, issuer public key) and the public/no-auth access condition. It stops short of explaining what an invalid verdict implies or how verification is performed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences with zero filler; the operation and its access scope come first, followed by the expected outputs.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single-parameter read-only tool with no output schema, the description covers the operation, access model, and return contents. It could say more about the shape or meaning of the payload field, but an agent has enough to call it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% and already documents the id pattern and its origin in issue_receipt. The description only restates 'by id' without adding format or constraint detail beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource (verify a receipt by id), and 'verify' contrasts naturally with the sibling issue_receipt. It does not explicitly name the sibling or spell out the boundary, so it falls short of a 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
'(public)' implies no authentication is needed, which is useful context, but there is no explicit statement of when to use this versus issue_receipt or any other verification path. Usage is inferable rather than stated.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
2 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
issue_receipt - First observed
verify_receipt
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
issue_receipt and verify_receipt have clearly opposite, non-overlapping purposes (creation vs. validation), and the descriptions reinforce the distinction. An agent can select between them with no ambiguity.
Both tools follow the same snake_case verb_noun pattern (issue_receipt, verify_receipt). The naming is fully predictable and symmetric.
Two tools is thin for a general-purpose server, but for the narrow domain of issuing and verifying signed receipts the pair is reasonably scoped. It sits just under the typical comfortable range rather than being an extreme mismatch.
The core lifecycle (issue then verify) is fully covered with no dead ends for the primary workflow. Minor gaps exist, such as listing receipts or revoking/invalidating one, which agents would have to work around.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Issue & verify signed (ed25519), hash-chained, timestamped provenance receipts for agent actions.
Post-quantum, tamper-evident receipts for agent actions. Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, offline verify.
Issue signed receipts for AI agent actions; verify any receipt offline - free, no account.
Governed AI actions with signed, verifiable receipts: free keyless reads, human-approved writes.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to sign and verify actions with ML-DSA-65 digital signatures, providing tamper-proof receipts that can be verified offline without any secrets.MIT
- AlicenseAqualityDmaintenanceGives AI agents verifiable, tamper-evident receipts for their actions — attest_action signs a cryptographic receipt for what the agent did (email sent, payment made, form filed), verify_receipt checks it offline, get_identity returns the agent's did:key. Sign locally, verify anywhere, zero backend.329 npmMIT
- AlicenseAqualityCmaintenanceProvides tools to issue, verify, and export cryptographically signed receipts for AI agent actions, enabling tamper-proof audit trails for compliance with regulations like the EU AI Act.435 npm1MIT
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to validate deliverables (JSON, ZIP, PDF, DOCX) against signed contracts, generating verifiable receipts with Ed25519 signatures.-