Run multi-source incident triage

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations, it discloses concurrent collection, partial reports with explicit coverage after source failures or deadline expiry, required authorization scopes, and stored-report replay for identical requests. It also precisely explains the write behavior: a local report is persisted while upstream systems are never changed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description front-loads the workflow and then presents failure behavior, selection context, side effects, authorization, and replay semantics in a logical order. Although dense, each sentence contributes distinct operational information without filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex workflow, it covers orchestration, degraded operation, persistence, upstream safety, authorization, and idempotency, while the output schema can define the report structure. Clearer parameter-level guidance and explicit routing to narrower sibling tools would make it fully complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With schema description coverage at only 14%, the description needed to compensate, but it mostly explains the workflow rather than individual arguments. References to identifiers, assets, CVE and package intelligence, and deadlines provide indirect cues, while incident_id's relationship to report reuse and asset_criticality's effect on scoring remain unexplained.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description specifies a concrete incident-triage workflow, including intelligence gathering, correlation, scoring, prioritized actions, and report persistence. Its end-to-end incident scope clearly distinguishes it from narrower siblings such as lookup_cve, scan_packages, and get_incident_report.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The explicit instruction to use it for a production incident affecting assets provides a clear selection context. It does not state when not to use it or direct agents to narrower siblings for simple CVE lookups, vulnerability searches, or package scans.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.