Look up one CVE and score its risk

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare read-only, idempotent, open-world behavior, yet the description adds genuinely new operational context: untrusted external feed text that must not be treated as instructions, the aegis:read scope requirement, NVD rate limits, and brief caching. The determinism guarantee and per-factor breakdown also tell the agent what kind of result to expect beyond the annotation set.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four dense sentences, front-loaded with what the tool does, followed by usage, safety, scope, and rate-limit notes in that order. Every sentence carries actionable information with no restatement of the title or name.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter lookup with an output schema, the description covers purpose, security posture, scope, and operational constraints thoroughly, so return-value detail is rightly omitted. The one real hole is the undocumented asset_criticality input, which materially changes the score and is left entirely unexplained.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry parameter meaning, and it does not. asset_criticality is never mentioned at all, leaving the agent unaware that this input presumably weights the risk score, and cve_id gets only an indirect nod ('when the CVE id is already known') while the actual format constraint lives in the schema pattern.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Enrich a single CVE') and enumerates the exact data sources merged (NVD CVSS, FIRST EPSS, CISA KEV) plus the output (0-100 risk score with per-factor contributions). This clearly separates it from the sibling search_vulnerabilities, which implies multi-result discovery rather than a single-CVE enrichment.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

'Use when the CVE id is already known' gives an explicit precondition and implicitly routes discovery work elsewhere. It stops short of naming search_vulnerabilities as the alternative for the unknown-id case, so the routing is inferable rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.