Transfers ownership of a library to another user by email, removing the current owner's access; this irreversible action cannot be undone by the server.
Transfer ownership of a library to another user. The current owner loses ownership and this server cannot undo it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | Email of new owner | ||
| library_id | Yes | Library identifier | |
| response_format | No | markdown |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v1.3.0Input schema / $schemaAdded value: +"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"Input schema / properties / email / formatAdded value: +"email"Input schema / properties / email / patternAdded value: +"^(?!\\.)(?!.*\\.\\.)([A-Za-z0-9_'+\\-\\.]*)[A-Za-z0-9_+-]@([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9\\-]*\\.)+[A-Za-z]{2,}$"Input schema / properties / library_id / minLengthAdded value: +1v1.0.14Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, so the bar is lower, yet the description still adds real value by naming the specific consequence: the current owner loses ownership. It also states the server cannot undo the change, which sharpens the destructiveness beyond the boolean hint. Missing: whether the target user must already exist and any permission requirements.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, zero filler, with the action front-loaded and the irreversible consequence immediately after. Every clause earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a destructive mutation with no output schema, the description covers the key behavioral risk (ownership loss, no undo) and annotations cover the rest of the safety profile. It falls short only on prerequisites such as target-user existence and required permissions.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67%: email and library_id carry descriptions while response_format is undocumented in both places. The description's 'to another user' loosely maps to the email parameter but adds no format or validation detail beyond the schema's email pattern, so it lands at the baseline.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (transfer) and resource (ownership of a library) plus the recipient, so the operation is unambiguous. It does not, however, distinguish itself from potentially confusable siblings like update_permissions or edit_library, so an agent must infer the boundary.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is implied by the irreversible framing ('the current owner loses ownership'), which tells the agent this is a deliberate hand-off rather than a routine edit. No explicit when-not or alternative tool (e.g., update_permissions for access changes) is named, leaving routing to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.