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@yawlabs/tailscale-mcp

@yawlabs/tailscale-mcp

by YawLabs

Delete key

tailscale_delete_key
DestructiveIdempotent

Permanently delete a Tailscale auth key, API token, OAuth client, or federated identity; use to revoke access, noting deletion is irreversible and immediately cuts off integrations.

Instructions

Delete a key (auth key, API access token, OAuth client, or federated identity). This is irreversible. For auth keys, devices already authenticated are unaffected but no new devices can use it. For OAuth clients and federated identities, any integrations using them lose access immediately. API access tokens are deletable here too: if keyId is the token this server authenticates with -- it shows up in tailscale_list_keys under API-key auth -- the server revokes its own credential and every later call fails with 401 until it is reconfigured.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "keyId": "<keyId>"
    },
    "name": "tailscale_delete_key"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
keyIdYesThe key ID to delete (auth key, API access token, OAuth client, or federated identity)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.23.1
    • addedInput schema / properties / keyId / minLength
      Added value: +1
  2. Changed1 schema field changedv0.21.0
    • changedInput schema / properties / keyId / description
      Previous value: -"The key ID to delete (auth key, OAuth client, or federated identity)"New value: +"The key ID to delete (auth key, API access token, OAuth client, or federated identity)"
  3. First observedv0.13.3

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is known. The description goes well beyond that by spelling out per-type consequences: existing authenticated devices survive auth-key deletion but new ones cannot connect, OAuth/federated integrations lose access immediately, and deleting the server's own API token causes every subsequent call to fail with 401 until reconfiguration.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Sentences are front-loaded with the verb and the irreversibility warning, then proceed to per-type consequences. The final sentence is long and slightly convoluted, and the key-type enumeration duplicates the schema, but nothing is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With one required parameter, no output schema, and annotations covering the safety hints, the description supplies everything an agent needs, including the non-obvious self-lockout failure mode that no structured field conveys.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the keyId property description already lists the four key types, so baseline would be 3. The description adds marginal but real meaning by clarifying that one of those types can be the credential the server itself uses, which changes the risk profile of the call.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (delete) and resource (key) and enumerates the four key types covered: auth key, API access token, OAuth client, federated identity. It is clearly distinguishable from siblings like tailscale_update_key, tailscale_get_key, and tailscale_create_key.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context for when this operation applies and implicitly warns the agent to be certain before calling, plus it references tailscale_list_keys as how a self-referencing API token would be identified. It stops short of naming explicit alternatives (e.g., use tailscale_update_key to modify rather than delete), so it is not a full when/when-not routing statement.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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