Approve user

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare the safety profile (not read-only, idempotent, non-destructive, open-world), lowering the bar. The description adds the meaningful effect 'granting them access to the tailnet,' but says nothing about permissions required, reversibility, or what happens to already-approved users.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence with the action first and the effect second; no filler or redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter, non-destructive, idempotent operation with no output schema, the description conveys both purpose and outcome, which is close to sufficient. Only the precondition detail (how a user becomes 'pending') and any auth requirement are left unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With a single parameter and 100% schema description coverage, the schema fully documents userId. The description adds no format, source, or constraint detail beyond what the schema already provides, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (approve) and resource (user) with a qualifying scope (pending) and the resulting effect (tailnet access). It implicitly separates itself from restore_user/suspend_user via the 'pending' state, but never names an alternative, so it stops short of full sibling differentiation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The word 'pending' implies the precondition (the user must be in a pending state) and thus gives a hint of when the tool applies. However, no explicit when-to-use guidance, prerequisites, or alternatives (e.g., restore_user, authorize_device) are provided.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.