CyberQP MCP Server
A deliberately narrow, read-only MCP server for CyberQP's PAM API that exposes customer, event-log, tenant, and JIT status/policy metadata — never passwords, OTP codes, or provisioning actions.
Customers: list customers (filter by directory type AD/OFFICE/LOCAL and name), list account metadata for a customer (id, username, type, status; filter by enduser/admin/service/jit), and get per-account-type counts.
Events: retrieve the tenant event log filtered by customer, account, event type, status, and ISO 8601 date range, plus fetch the full set of valid event-type values.
Tenant: get the authenticated tenant's own company profile (name, address, timezone, phone).
JIT visibility: fetch configured JIT policy (approval requirements, max duration) per customer + account type, get JIT account status for a customer or across the whole tenant, and check whether a JIT account exists for a customer + directory type.
Safety by design: no endpoints for passwords, OTP secrets, JIT enable/disable/delete/create, installers, install tokens, auth plumbing, or write/notification triggers.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@CyberQP MCP Server Does Acme Corp have a JIT account set up?"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
CyberQP MCP Server
MCP server for CyberQP's (formerly QuickPass Cybersecurity) privileged access management (PAM) API - customer/account metadata, the tenant event log, and JIT (Just-In-Time) account status/policy visibility, for AI assistants and the WYRE Conduit gateway.
Authentication
CyberQP authenticates with OAuth2 authorization_code flow (offline_access scope, refresh_token-backed) - not client_credentials. This connector never performs the OAuth dance itself: the WYRE Conduit gateway owns the authorize/exchange/refresh legs, and this server only ever receives a live bearer access token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token> to CyberQP's API. In gateway mode the token arrives per-request via the X-CyberQP-Access-Token header; in local/stdio mode it's read once from CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN.
Related MCP server: Action1 MCP Server
Configuration
Copy .env.example and set the variables below. The stdio transport reads CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN and does not use CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET.
Env var | Description |
| OAuth2 access token issued by CyberQP. Required for stdio and for HTTP when |
|
|
|
|
| Required for HTTP. HMAC secret checked against |
| Set to exactly |
| Bind address when |
| HTTP port. Defaults to |
|
|
/health stays unauthenticated and does not read credentials.
HTTP authentication
With MCP_TRANSPORT=http and CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET set, every /mcp request must include X-Gateway-S2S:
t=<unix seconds>,v1=<hex hmac-sha256>v1 is the lowercase hex HMAC-SHA256 of the ASCII message t=<unix seconds>, keyed by CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET. The timestamp must be within 300 seconds of the server clock. A missing or invalid header returns 401 before any vendor credential is read. The secret is never written to logs or error bodies.
In AUTH_MODE=gateway, /mcp also requires X-CyberQP-Access-Token. That header is the only credential source for the request. A missing token returns 401. The server does not fall back to CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN in the process environment.
X-Gateway-S2S: t=1710000000,v1=<hmac-sha256 of "t=1710000000">
X-CyberQP-Access-Token: <live bearer token>Single-tenant HTTP (AUTH_MODE=env) still requires a valid X-Gateway-S2S header. The access token then comes from CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN.
Request limits
HTTP request bodies are capped at 256 KiB (262144 bytes). After the
X-Gateway-S2Scheck (and, inAUTH_MODE=gateway, theX-CyberQP-Access-Tokenpresence check) passes, aContent-Lengthabove the cap returns 413 with a JSON-RPC error; bodies withoutContent-Lengthare capped by the MCP SDK transport. Unauthenticated requests still get 401 first.tools/callarguments are capped at 10,000 elements (every array item and object key at any depth). Larger inputs return anisErrortool result with a fixed message (the tool name is not echoed) and are never dispatched.
These limits address CVE-2026-111768 / GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453 (memory exhaustion during validation) and GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq (no request body / batch cap).
Tools
Customers
cyberqp_list_customers- list customers visible to the authenticated technician, filterable by directory type and name.cyberqp_get_customer_accounts- list account metadata (id, username, type, status) for a customer.cyberqp_get_customer_accounts_count- get per-account-type counts for a customer.
Events
cyberqp_get_events- get the tenant's event log, filterable by customer, account, event type, status, and date range.cyberqp_get_event_types- get the full set of event-type values.
Tenant
cyberqp_get_tenant_company_data- get the authenticated tenant's own company profile.
JIT (Just-In-Time) - status and policy only
cyberqp_get_jit_policies- get the configured JIT policy (approval requirements, max duration) for a customer + account type.cyberqp_get_customer_jit_status- get JIT account status for a specific customer.cyberqp_check_jit_account_exists- check whether a JIT account exists for a customer + directory type.cyberqp_get_tenant_jit_status- get JIT account status across the entire tenant.
Scope
This is a deliberately narrow, read-only, non-credential-exposing v1 surface. CyberQP is a PAM product - several of its real endpoints return live plaintext passwords and OTP codes, or mutate/provision privileged access. None of those are implemented here, by design, not by oversight:
Hard-excluded (credential-exposing) - never implemented:
GET /api/v1/account/{accountId}/password(AccountController_getAccountPassword_v1)GET /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/password(JitController_getJitAccountPassword_v1)GET /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/otp(JitController_getJitAccountOTP_v1)POST /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/otp(JitController_saveJitAccountOtpSecret_v1)DELETE /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/otp(JitController_deleteJitAccountOtpSecret_v1)
Hard-excluded (provisioning/mutation) - never implemented:
PATCH /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/enable(JitController_enableJitAccount_v1)PATCH /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/disable(JitController_disableJitAccount_v1)DELETE /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}(JitController_deleteJitAccount_v1)POST /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account(JitController_createJitAccount_v1)
Out of v1 scope (not credential/provisioning, just not part of this connector's metadata-visibility surface - could be added later as a deliberate follow-up):
GET /api/v1/customers/installer(CustomerController_downloadAgent_v1) - returns a binary installer, not structured data.GET /api/v1/tenants/install-token(TenantController_getInstallToken_v1) - returns an installation token.GET /api/v1/auth/login,GET /api/v1/auth/status,POST /api/v1/auth/refresh-token,POST /api/v1/auth/revoke-token,POST /api/v1/auth/notification-engine-token- OAuth/session plumbing the gateway already owns, not tool-shaped.POST /api/v1/event(EventController_processGenericEvent_v1) - a write.POST /api/v1/identity-verification/self-serve-notification(IdentityVerificationController_triggerSelfServePushIdentityVerification_v1) - a write/notification trigger.
They can be added as a follow-up if there's demand, after a deliberate scope decision - not by default.
Development
npm install
npm run build
npm test
npm run lint # tsc --noEmitDocker
The image listens on 0.0.0.0 inside the container (MCP_HTTP_HOST) and defaults to AUTH_MODE=gateway. Publish the port on loopback and pass the S2S secret. In gateway mode the access token arrives on each request as X-CyberQP-Access-Token. It is not read from the environment.
docker build -t cyberqp-mcp .
docker run \
-e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" \
-p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
cyberqp-mcpCompose refuses to start when CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET is unset, defaults AUTH_MODE to gateway, publishes 127.0.0.1:8080:8080, and does not set CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN or env_file:
CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" docker compose upSingle-tenant HTTP (AUTH_MODE=env) still requires the S2S secret, then uses CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN:
docker run \
-e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" \
-e AUTH_MODE=env \
-e CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN="$CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
-p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
cyberqp-mcpLocal HTTP without a secret is development-only. It binds 127.0.0.1 even when MCP_HTTP_HOST is 0.0.0.0, and logs a warning:
MCP_TRANSPORT=http MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1 npm run start:httpAvailable Tools
10 toolscyberqp_check_jit_account_existsA
Check whether a JIT account exists for a customer + directory type (existence check only - returns account metadata if present, never a password or OTP code).
Inputs: userType (required), customerId (required), agentId.
cyberqp_get_customer_accountsA
List account METADATA for a customer (id, username, type, status) - never returns passwords or OTP codes. Optionally filter by account type (enduser/admin/service/jit).
Inputs: id (required), page, limit, cursor, +1 more.
cyberqp_get_customer_accounts_countB
Get counts of each account type (enduser/admin/service/jit) for a customer.
Inputs: id (required).
cyberqp_get_customer_jit_statusA
Get JIT account status (existence, enabled/disabled state, metadata) for a specific customer. Never returns a password or OTP code - use this to check the current state of JIT accounts, not to retrieve credentials.
Inputs: customerId (required), page, limit, searchText.
cyberqp_get_eventsA
Get the tenant's event log (technician/account activity, e.g. self-serve resets, admin actions), filterable by customer, account, event type, status, and date range. Never returns account passwords or OTP codes.
Inputs: page, limit, cursor, status, +5 more.
cyberqp_get_event_typesA
Get the full set of event-type values usable in cyberqp_get_events' eventType filter.
Inputs: no named parameters.
cyberqp_get_jit_policiesB
Get the configured JIT policy (approval requirements, max session duration) for a customer + account type. Policy configuration only - never returns credential material.
Inputs: customerId (required), accountType (required).
cyberqp_get_tenant_company_dataA
Get the authenticated tenant's own company profile (name, address, timezone, contact phone).
Inputs: no named parameters.
cyberqp_get_tenant_jit_statusA
Get JIT account status (existence, enabled/disabled state, metadata) across the entire tenant. Never returns a password or OTP code.
Inputs: page, limit, searchText.
cyberqp_list_customersA
List customers visible to the authenticated CyberQP technician account, filterable by directory type and name. Metadata only (customer id, name, attributes) - never returns account passwords or OTP codes.
Inputs: directoryType (required), name, page, limit.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 10 tools
Most tools cleanly map to distinct resources and actions: customers, accounts, event logs, JIT policies, and tenant profile. The only possible confusion is among the JIT status/existence tools, especially get_customer_jit_status and check_jit_account_exists, but their descriptions sufficiently differentiate scope.
All tools share the cyberqp_ prefix, use snake_case, and follow a clear verb_noun pattern such as list_customers, get_events, and check_jit_account_exists. The naming is consistent and predictable.
Ten tools is well within the ideal range for a focused read-only utility server. Each tool covers a meaningful slice of the domain, and none feels redundant or unnecessary.
For a read-only visibility/verification server, the surface is fairly complete: customer listing, account metadata and counts, event logs, tenant profile, and JIT policy/status checks. Minor gaps exist, such as lack of a single-customer detail endpoint or pagination tooling, but agents can complete typical monitoring and verification workflows.
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