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CyberQP MCP Server

CyberQP MCP Server

by WYRE-AI

CyberQP MCP Server

MCP server for CyberQP's (formerly QuickPass Cybersecurity) privileged access management (PAM) API - customer/account metadata, the tenant event log, and JIT (Just-In-Time) account status/policy visibility, for AI assistants and the WYRE Conduit gateway.

Authentication

CyberQP authenticates with OAuth2 authorization_code flow (offline_access scope, refresh_token-backed) - not client_credentials. This connector never performs the OAuth dance itself: the WYRE Conduit gateway owns the authorize/exchange/refresh legs, and this server only ever receives a live bearer access token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token> to CyberQP's API. In gateway mode the token arrives per-request via the X-CyberQP-Access-Token header; in local/stdio mode it's read once from CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN.

Related MCP server: Action1 MCP Server

Configuration

Copy .env.example and set the variables below. The stdio transport reads CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN and does not use CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET.

Env var

Description

CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN

OAuth2 access token issued by CyberQP. Required for stdio and for HTTP when AUTH_MODE=env. Gateway mode does not read it.

MCP_TRANSPORT

stdio (default) or http.

AUTH_MODE

env (default, reads the var above) or gateway (credential arrives per-request via the X-CyberQP-Access-Token header, injected by the Conduit gateway). The container image and Compose default to gateway.

CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET

Required for HTTP. HMAC secret checked against X-Gateway-S2S on every /mcp request. The process logs an error and exits non-zero when this is empty or a known placeholder (changeme, placeholder, secret, example, and similar public example values). Compose will not start when it is unset. Never commit a real value. Generate one with openssl rand -hex 32. The value is never logged.

MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV

Set to exactly 1 only for local development to start HTTP without CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET. The process logs a warning, does not enforce X-Gateway-S2S, and binds 127.0.0.1 only. A wider MCP_HTTP_HOST (including 0.0.0.0) is ignored and the override is logged. A known placeholder secret is still rejected.

MCP_HTTP_HOST

Bind address when MCP_TRANSPORT=http. Unset binds 127.0.0.1. A configured CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET honors this value (the container image sets 0.0.0.0). With no secret, the insecure-dev bypass forces 127.0.0.1.

MCP_HTTP_PORT

HTTP port. Defaults to 8080.

LOG_LEVEL

debug | info (default) | warn | error.

/health stays unauthenticated and does not read credentials.

HTTP authentication

With MCP_TRANSPORT=http and CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET set, every /mcp request must include X-Gateway-S2S:

t=<unix seconds>,v1=<hex hmac-sha256>

v1 is the lowercase hex HMAC-SHA256 of the ASCII message t=<unix seconds>, keyed by CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET. The timestamp must be within 300 seconds of the server clock. A missing or invalid header returns 401 before any vendor credential is read. The secret is never written to logs or error bodies.

In AUTH_MODE=gateway, /mcp also requires X-CyberQP-Access-Token. That header is the only credential source for the request. A missing token returns 401. The server does not fall back to CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN in the process environment.

X-Gateway-S2S: t=1710000000,v1=<hmac-sha256 of "t=1710000000">
X-CyberQP-Access-Token: <live bearer token>

Single-tenant HTTP (AUTH_MODE=env) still requires a valid X-Gateway-S2S header. The access token then comes from CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN.

Request limits

  • HTTP request bodies are capped at 256 KiB (262144 bytes). After the X-Gateway-S2S check (and, in AUTH_MODE=gateway, the X-CyberQP-Access-Token presence check) passes, a Content-Length above the cap returns 413 with a JSON-RPC error; bodies without Content-Length are capped by the MCP SDK transport. Unauthenticated requests still get 401 first.

  • tools/call arguments are capped at 10,000 elements (every array item and object key at any depth). Larger inputs return an isError tool result with a fixed message (the tool name is not echoed) and are never dispatched.

These limits address CVE-2026-111768 / GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453 (memory exhaustion during validation) and GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq (no request body / batch cap).

Tools

Customers

  • cyberqp_list_customers - list customers visible to the authenticated technician, filterable by directory type and name.

  • cyberqp_get_customer_accounts - list account metadata (id, username, type, status) for a customer.

  • cyberqp_get_customer_accounts_count - get per-account-type counts for a customer.

Events

  • cyberqp_get_events - get the tenant's event log, filterable by customer, account, event type, status, and date range.

  • cyberqp_get_event_types - get the full set of event-type values.

Tenant

  • cyberqp_get_tenant_company_data - get the authenticated tenant's own company profile.

JIT (Just-In-Time) - status and policy only

  • cyberqp_get_jit_policies - get the configured JIT policy (approval requirements, max duration) for a customer + account type.

  • cyberqp_get_customer_jit_status - get JIT account status for a specific customer.

  • cyberqp_check_jit_account_exists - check whether a JIT account exists for a customer + directory type.

  • cyberqp_get_tenant_jit_status - get JIT account status across the entire tenant.

Scope

This is a deliberately narrow, read-only, non-credential-exposing v1 surface. CyberQP is a PAM product - several of its real endpoints return live plaintext passwords and OTP codes, or mutate/provision privileged access. None of those are implemented here, by design, not by oversight:

Hard-excluded (credential-exposing) - never implemented:

  • GET /api/v1/account/{accountId}/password (AccountController_getAccountPassword_v1)

  • GET /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/password (JitController_getJitAccountPassword_v1)

  • GET /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/otp (JitController_getJitAccountOTP_v1)

  • POST /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/otp (JitController_saveJitAccountOtpSecret_v1)

  • DELETE /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/otp (JitController_deleteJitAccountOtpSecret_v1)

Hard-excluded (provisioning/mutation) - never implemented:

  • PATCH /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/enable (JitController_enableJitAccount_v1)

  • PATCH /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId}/disable (JitController_disableJitAccount_v1)

  • DELETE /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account/{accountId} (JitController_deleteJitAccount_v1)

  • POST /api/v1/jit/customer/{customerId}/account (JitController_createJitAccount_v1)

Out of v1 scope (not credential/provisioning, just not part of this connector's metadata-visibility surface - could be added later as a deliberate follow-up):

  • GET /api/v1/customers/installer (CustomerController_downloadAgent_v1) - returns a binary installer, not structured data.

  • GET /api/v1/tenants/install-token (TenantController_getInstallToken_v1) - returns an installation token.

  • GET /api/v1/auth/login, GET /api/v1/auth/status, POST /api/v1/auth/refresh-token, POST /api/v1/auth/revoke-token, POST /api/v1/auth/notification-engine-token - OAuth/session plumbing the gateway already owns, not tool-shaped.

  • POST /api/v1/event (EventController_processGenericEvent_v1) - a write.

  • POST /api/v1/identity-verification/self-serve-notification (IdentityVerificationController_triggerSelfServePushIdentityVerification_v1) - a write/notification trigger.

They can be added as a follow-up if there's demand, after a deliberate scope decision - not by default.

Development

npm install
npm run build
npm test
npm run lint   # tsc --noEmit

Docker

The image listens on 0.0.0.0 inside the container (MCP_HTTP_HOST) and defaults to AUTH_MODE=gateway. Publish the port on loopback and pass the S2S secret. In gateway mode the access token arrives on each request as X-CyberQP-Access-Token. It is not read from the environment.

docker build -t cyberqp-mcp .
docker run \
  -e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
  cyberqp-mcp

Compose refuses to start when CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET is unset, defaults AUTH_MODE to gateway, publishes 127.0.0.1:8080:8080, and does not set CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN or env_file:

CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" docker compose up

Single-tenant HTTP (AUTH_MODE=env) still requires the S2S secret, then uses CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN:

docker run \
  -e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" \
  -e AUTH_MODE=env \
  -e CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN="$CYBERQP_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
  cyberqp-mcp

Local HTTP without a secret is development-only. It binds 127.0.0.1 even when MCP_HTTP_HOST is 0.0.0.0, and logs a warning:

MCP_TRANSPORT=http MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1 npm run start:http

Available Tools

10 tools
cyberqp_check_jit_account_existsA

Check whether a JIT account exists for a customer + directory type (existence check only - returns account metadata if present, never a password or OTP code).

Inputs: userType (required), customerId (required), agentId.

cyberqp_get_customer_accountsA

List account METADATA for a customer (id, username, type, status) - never returns passwords or OTP codes. Optionally filter by account type (enduser/admin/service/jit).

Inputs: id (required), page, limit, cursor, +1 more.

cyberqp_get_customer_accounts_countB

Get counts of each account type (enduser/admin/service/jit) for a customer.

Inputs: id (required).

cyberqp_get_customer_jit_statusA

Get JIT account status (existence, enabled/disabled state, metadata) for a specific customer. Never returns a password or OTP code - use this to check the current state of JIT accounts, not to retrieve credentials.

Inputs: customerId (required), page, limit, searchText.

cyberqp_get_eventsA

Get the tenant's event log (technician/account activity, e.g. self-serve resets, admin actions), filterable by customer, account, event type, status, and date range. Never returns account passwords or OTP codes.

Inputs: page, limit, cursor, status, +5 more.

cyberqp_get_event_typesA

Get the full set of event-type values usable in cyberqp_get_events' eventType filter.

Inputs: no named parameters.

cyberqp_get_jit_policiesB

Get the configured JIT policy (approval requirements, max session duration) for a customer + account type. Policy configuration only - never returns credential material.

Inputs: customerId (required), accountType (required).

cyberqp_get_tenant_company_dataA

Get the authenticated tenant's own company profile (name, address, timezone, contact phone).

Inputs: no named parameters.

cyberqp_get_tenant_jit_statusA

Get JIT account status (existence, enabled/disabled state, metadata) across the entire tenant. Never returns a password or OTP code.

Inputs: page, limit, searchText.

cyberqp_list_customersA

List customers visible to the authenticated CyberQP technician account, filterable by directory type and name. Metadata only (customer id, name, attributes) - never returns account passwords or OTP codes.

Inputs: directoryType (required), name, page, limit.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    A3.9/5.0

    Scored across 10 tools

    Disambiguation4/5

    Most tools cleanly map to distinct resources and actions: customers, accounts, event logs, JIT policies, and tenant profile. The only possible confusion is among the JIT status/existence tools, especially get_customer_jit_status and check_jit_account_exists, but their descriptions sufficiently differentiate scope.

    Naming Consistency5/5

    All tools share the cyberqp_ prefix, use snake_case, and follow a clear verb_noun pattern such as list_customers, get_events, and check_jit_account_exists. The naming is consistent and predictable.

    Tool Count5/5

    Ten tools is well within the ideal range for a focused read-only utility server. Each tool covers a meaningful slice of the domain, and none feels redundant or unnecessary.

    Completeness4/5

    For a read-only visibility/verification server, the surface is fairly complete: customer listing, account metadata and counts, event logs, tenant profile, and JIT policy/status checks. Minor gaps exist, such as lack of a single-customer detail endpoint or pagination tooling, but agents can complete typical monitoring and verification workflows.

    Maintenance

    ActivityNo data
    ResponsivenessOutdated data

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