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cipp-mcp

by WYRE-AI
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TypeScript
Remote

cipp_reset_password

DestructiveIdempotent

⚠ HIGH-IMPACT. Resets a user's password, invalidating their current password. CIPP always generates the new password itself (a caller cannot choose one) and returns it in the response, or a PWPush link if PWPush is enabled in CIPP, so…

Instructions

⚠ HIGH-IMPACT. Resets a user's password, invalidating their current password. CIPP always generates the new password itself (a caller cannot choose one) and returns it in the response, or a PWPush link if PWPush is enabled in CIPP, so treat the response as a secret. The previous password cannot be restored; resetting again issues another new one. Confirm with the user before invoking.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
userIdYesThe target user's Azure AD object ID or User Principal Name (UPN, e.g. alice@contoso.com).
tenantFilterYesTenant domain name or ID to scope the operation. Use 'allTenants' to target every managed tenant.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv1.11.1
    • removedInput schema / properties / newPassword
      Removed value: -{
-  "description": "The replacement password to set. If omitted, a random password is generated and returned in the response.",
-  "type": "string"
-}
  2. Addedv1.7.0
  3. Removedv1.5.4
  4. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior1/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Although the description discloses rich behavior—CIPP generates the password, returns it as a secret or PWPush link, and the old password cannot be restored—it contradicts the annotations. The idempotentHint=true claim conflicts with 'resetting again issues another new one,' and the annotation title 'Reset password (reversible)' conflicts with 'The previous password cannot be restored.' This is a serious annotation contradiction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The warning is front-loaded, and every sentence adds necessary operational or safety information. There is no redundant filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a high-impact mutation with no output schema, the description explains the return value (generated password or PWPush link), the secret-handling requirement, and irreversibility. It is nearly complete, though it does not mention permission requirements or tenant-scoping caveats.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so userId and tenantFilter are already well documented. The description adds one useful parameter-related constraint—callers cannot choose the new password—but does not add meaning about the two actual input parameters beyond what the schema provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource—resetting a user's password—and immediately explains the core effect: invalidating the current password. It is clearly distinguishable from siblings such as cipp_reset_mfa, cipp_disable_user, and cipp_revoke_sessions.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives clear operational context and an explicit safety instruction: 'Confirm with the user before invoking.' It does not name alternative tools or exclusion cases, but the high-impact warning makes the intended use clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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