sec-graph
# sec-graph
**An interactive security map + local‑LLM triage layer over *any* SAST.**
sec-graph is **not another taint engine.** It takes the findings your existing static analyzer already
produces — **CodeQL, Semgrep, Bandit, anything that emits SARIF** — binds them to a code map, **enriches
them with two layers no engine ships** (a *credentials / PII* layer and an *auth / unguarded* verdict),
and hands each finding to **your own local LLM over MCP** as a minimal, hash‑verified source→sink slice
for triage. Everything runs locally and deterministically; no finding data leaves your machine.
Built on [graphify](https://github.com/safishamsi/graphify) (MIT). A small built‑in Python taint engine
is kept as the **fallback** for when you don't have a SARIF report — it is not the product.

*The layer no SAST ships: **red glow = a dangerous sink reachable with no auth barrier** (triage these
first) · **green ring = the same sink behind a real auth check**. Colour = data layer; the right‑hand
sidebar carries each finding's CWE + the hash‑verified source→sink slice an LLM triage call receives.*
## Why
Mature SAST engines are very good at *finding* data‑flows and very bad at two things a human (or an LLM)
actually needs to triage them: **"is this reachable without authentication?"** and **"does this path
touch a credential/PII?"** — plus they dump raw findings with no cheap way to feed just the relevant code
to a model. sec-graph adds exactly those, on top of whatever engine you already run.
## Does it actually help? (an honest benchmark)
We pre‑registered and ran a control‑vs‑treatment benchmark — a local **Gemma 3n E4B** triaging the same
66 CodeQL findings on three deliberately‑vulnerable Python apps, **whole‑file context vs sec-graph's MCP
slices**, scored against hand‑labelled, independently‑audited ground truth. The honest result:
- **The robust win is efficiency** — sec-graph's minimal slices matched whole‑file triage quality at
**~1/7th the prompt tokens** and **~half the wall‑time** (12× fewer tokens per finding on large files).
That's what makes per‑finding triage cheap enough to run on a local model.
- **Accuracy: a small, statistically‑inconclusive, repo‑dependent edge** (real/FP +6 pts pooled, not
significant) — reported as a signal, not a result.
- **The self‑audit is honest about a limitation.** sec-graph's `unguarded` verdict over‑reports (56%
precision) when an app uses a *custom* auth decorator/callable not in the default barrier list, or a
guard in a *calling* function — though it *never* falsely claims `guarded` (100%). That's
configuration + a future interprocedural improvement, published, not buried.
Full methodology, numbers, and a "when it helps / when it doesn't" table: **[benchmark/BENCHMARK.md](benchmark/BENCHMARK.md)** ·
pre‑registration: **[benchmark/PROTOCOL.md](benchmark/PROTOCOL.md)**.

*On a real repo (PyGoat + CodeQL's 40 findings): most web‑app findings are intra‑function, so the map is
a constellation of `unguarded` hotspots rather than long routes — the enriched sidebar is the workhorse
there, and the graph earns its keep on cross‑function/cross‑file data‑flow. Honest by design.*
## Install
```bash
pip install -e . # or: uv pip install -e .
secgraph --version
```
Requires Python ≥ 3.11. Pulls `graphify`, `tree-sitter`, `mcp`, `typer`, `pyyaml`.
## Quickstart
```bash
# 1. run your SAST and export SARIF
codeql database create db --language=python && \
codeql database analyze db --format=sarif-latest -o findings.sarif \
codeql/python-queries:codeql-suites/python-security-extended.qls
# (or) semgrep scan --sarif -o findings.sarif
# 2. bind + enrich + map
secgraph analyze ./my-app --sarif findings.sarif # -> graph.json, taint.json, secgraph.html
secgraph view # open the interactive layered map
# 3. triage with your own LLM over MCP
secgraph serve # read-only MCP server (stdio)
```
No SARIF? `secgraph analyze ./my-app` runs the built‑in Python fallback engine instead.
## How it works
1. **Ingest** — parse SARIF (`results` + `codeFlows`) or Semgrep JSON into one normalized finding, bound
to the code graph *structurally* (by `(file, def‑line)` span, never by name).
2. **Enrich** — add, per finding: **sensitive‑data layers** (credentials/PII identifiers & secret
patterns on the tool‑verified flow lines) and, for Python sinks, an **auth/unguarded verdict** from a
structural guard analysis, with an honest tri‑state (`analyzed` / `unknown` — never a false "guarded").
3. **Map** — a self‑contained, deterministic force‑directed HTML map: colour = data layer, red glow =
`unguarded`, a one‑click "Critical paths" preset.
4. **Triage over MCP** — `secgraph serve` exposes read‑only tools (`list_paths`, `get_path_slice`,
`find_unguarded_sinks`, `explain_layer`, `get_function_taint`) that hand your LLM the **minimal,
hash‑verified** code windows for a path — never the whole repo. Run it alongside `graphify --mcp`
(entity‑level questions stay with graphify; data‑flow paths are ours).

*Enrichment in action (`credentials` + `untrusted-input` layers): a hard‑coded `secret:aws-access-key-id`
and `credentials`‑tagged data‑flows in amber — surfaced from the same findings, with tags no engine emits.*
The analysis core is deterministic — **no LLM on the critical path**; `analyze` twice is byte‑identical.
## Scope & honest limits
sec-graph is **bounded by your upstream SAST's recall** — it adds no findings the engine missed. The
enrichment is *lexical* (identifier/secret patterns on a proven flow), stronger than grep but weaker than
value‑tracking taint. The auth verdict and the built‑in engine are **Python‑only**; other languages get
the map + slices but a `guard_status: unknown`. See BENCHMARK.md for the measured weaknesses (including a
current guard‑analysis bug); the licence/scope notes for each engine are in `docs/`.
## Development
```bash
uv pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest # 121 tests
pytest tests/contract # the graphify contract test
```
Architecture: `docs/architecture.md` · contributing: `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## License & credits
**MIT** (see `LICENSE`). Built on **graphify** (MIT); parses **CodeQL** / **Semgrep** SARIF; uses
**tree-sitter**. sec-graph ships no third‑party code — those are runtime dependencies / input formats.
## Responsible use
Defensive and static only — sec-graph exploits nothing and ships no exploit code; the MCP triage prompts
enforce a defensive framing. Audit code you own or are authorized to review, and practice coordinated
disclosure. Do not use it to mass‑scan third‑party code and publish 0‑days.
TDQS
Scored across 10 tools
Each tool has a distinct purpose: graph exploration tools (get_community, god_nodes, graph_stats, shortest_path, query_graph, get_node, get_neighbors) and PR impact tools (list_prs, get_pr_impact, triage_prs) are clearly separated with no overlap.
Most tools follow verb_noun pattern (get_community, graph_stats, list_prs, etc.), but 'god_nodes' breaks the pattern with an unclear verb. Otherwise consistent.
10 tools cover both graph querying and PR impact analysis without being excessive. Each tool earns its place for a knowledge graph with CI integration.
Graph operations are well-covered (nodes, communities, paths, stats, neighbors) and PR impact analysis is thorough. Minor gaps: no tool to update/close PRs, but triage_prs covers review priority.