qrp-mcp

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scan_repo

Read-onlyIdempotent

Inventory cryptography in a local directory tree to locate quantum-vulnerable algorithms and post-quantum schemes, reporting each with file, line, and coverage count.

Instructions

Inventory the cryptography inside one local directory tree, file by file.

Reads source, configuration (nginx.conf, sshd_config, .ini, .toml), CI pipelines, Terraform and Kubernetes manifests under path. Returns each algorithm found with its file and line, the mathematical family and standing of every post-quantum scheme, and a coverage count.

Use this to answer what a specific project on this machine actually uses. Do not use it to ask whether this server knows a given algorithm, or to explain how one is classified without scanning anything -- list_algorithms answers that from the same table and reads no files. It is also the wrong tool for a network endpoint, a running host or a certificate store: it opens files on disk and nothing else.

Coverage is reported as a fraction with a base. files_scanned + unreadable_files + files_skipped_by_type == files_present. A file that could not be opened is listed, never counted as scanned, because no findings in a file nobody read is not the same as a file that is clean. Files skipped because this tool does not claim their type are counted by extension, so the reader can judge the boundary rather than assume past it.

Cost scales with the size of the tree, so a large monorepo takes proportionally longer; there is no cache and no partial mode.

Quoted lines are masked by default. Reading happens on this machine, but this result does not stay on it: it is returned to a model, which is a place the scanned line has not been before. A secret sharing a line with a finding -- a token in the call that names the cipher -- would travel with it. Masking keeps what a reader needs (the algorithm, the file, the line number, the shape of the call) and removes what nobody asked for. Pass level="full" when the line itself is the thing being examined.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`path`	Yes	Directory to scan, absolute or relative to the working directory: a checked-out repository, a service directory, a config tree. Vendored and build directories (.git, node_modules, vendor, dist, build, target) are excluded and do not count toward files_present.
`level`	No	How much of each matched line to return. `masked` (the default) keeps the characters that spell the algorithm and stars every other letter and digit; `full` returns the line as written; `trimmed` returns no line at all. File and line number are the same at every level.	masked
`profile`	No	Whose rules each `replacement` follows. `nist` (the default) is FIPS 203/204/205. The others read one national document each and say whom it addresses: us-cnsa2 (NSA, US National Security Systems), uk-ncsc, au-ism, ca-cccs, de-bsi, fr-anssi, nl-ncsc, eu-eccg (EU product certification), bg (no Bulgarian guidance found; EU roadmap dates). Detection is identical under every profile.	nist

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedv0.27.0Sep 30, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / profile

Added value: +{
+  "default": "nist",
+  "description": "Whose rules each `replacement` follows. `nist` (the default) is FIPS 203/204/205. The others read one national document each and say whom it addresses: us-cnsa2 (NSA, US National Security Systems), uk-ncsc, au-ism, ca-cccs, de-bsi, fr-anssi, nl-ncsc, eu-eccg (EU product certification), bg (no Bulgarian guidance found; EU roadmap dates). Detection is identical under every profile.",
+  "enum": [
+    "nist",
+    "us-cnsa2",
+    "uk-ncsc",
+    "au-ism",
+    "ca-cccs",
+    "de-bsi",
+    "fr-anssi",
+    "nl-ncsc",
+    "eu-eccg",
+    "bg"
+  ],
+  "title": "Profile",
+  "type": "string"
+}

Changed1 schema field changedv0.17.0Sep 22, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / level

Added value: +{
+  "default": "masked",
+  "description": "How much of each matched line to return. `masked` (the default) keeps the characters that spell the algorithm and stars every other letter and digit; `full` returns the line as written; `trimmed` returns no line at all. File and line number are the same at every level.",
+  "enum": [
+    "full",
+    "masked",
+    "trimmed"
+  ],
+  "title": "Level",
+  "type": "string"
+}

Changed1 schema field changedv0.6.0Sep 4, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / path / description

Added value: +"Directory to scan, absolute or relative to the working directory: a checked-out repository, a service directory, a config tree. Vendored and build directories (.git, node_modules, vendor, dist, build, target) are excluded and do not count toward files_present."

First observedv0.1.0Aug 11, 2026

TDQS

A4.8/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, non-open-world), but the description adds substantial context beyond them: default line masking and what it preserves/removes, the fact that results leave the machine to a model, coverage-count semantics with unreadable vs skipped files, and cost scaling with no cache or partial mode.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the core verb and resource, and each paragraph carries operational content. It is somewhat long-winded, particularly the masking-rationale paragraph, but no sentence is purely filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return values need no explanation; the description nevertheless covers scope, exclusions, masking behavior, cost, and privacy boundary. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds selection guidance beyond the schema by stating when to pass `level="full"` ('when the line itself is the thing being examined') and framing what the coverage fraction means. It complements rather than merely restates the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource with scope: 'Inventory the cryptography inside one local directory tree, file by file.' It explicitly names what it does not cover versus the sibling `list_algorithms`, so an agent can pick it apart without reading either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit when-to-use ('what a specific project on this machine actually uses') and when-not-to-use, naming the alternative `list_algorithms` and its condition, plus three wrong-context cases (network endpoint, running host, certificate store). Routing is fully determined.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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