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pdpa-audit-mcp

pdpa-audit-mcp

by Sadeep78
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
Python
Local

Detect Third Party Transfers

detect_third_party_transfers

Detect third-party analytics, tracking, and payment domains plus cross-border data disclosures on sites you own or are authorized to audit, supporting PDPA compliance checks.

Instructions

Detect third-party analytics/tracking/payment domains and cross-border disclosures. Use only on sites/projects you own or are authorised to audit. Defensive use only. Use this tool only on websites, endpoints, or local projects that you own or have explicit written authorization to audit.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "url": "<url>"
    },
    "name": "detect_third_party_transfers"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYes
policy_textNo

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations exist, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It discloses an important authorization/safety constraint and defensive-only intent, but says nothing about what detection means, whether the URL is fetched live, rate limits, or how results are structured. With an output schema present, return-value disclosure is not required, but operational behavior remains unexplained.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence and the rest is a safety constraint. However, the authorization caveat is stated three times in near-identical wording, which is redundant bulk that could be one sentence.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained. But for a two-parameter detection tool with zero schema coverage and no annotations, the description omits how policy_text interacts with url and what the detection scope covers, leaving the agent to guess at invocation details.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% for both parameters, so the description must compensate: it implies the target URL is the site being audited but never clarifies format (full URL vs domain) or that policy_text is optional supplied policy content used for cross-border disclosure matching. That leaves a real semantic gap on the second parameter.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource set: detect third-party analytics/tracking/payment domains and cross-border disclosures. It is distinguishable from siblings like scan_privacy_policy or detect_cookie_consent, though it never explicitly contrasts itself with them.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is framed as an authorization constraint (only sites you own or are authorised to audit; defensive use only) rather than a workflow choice. It gives no guidance on when to pick this over scan_privacy_policy or detect_cookie_consent, nor whether a policy_text input changes the workflow.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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