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security_audit

security_audit

Audit code for exploitable security issues: injection, auth gaps, secrets, SSRF, path traversal, races, client input trust. Use on auth, payments, user input, file paths, shell commands. Read-only.

Instructions

Exploitable issues: injection, authorization gaps, secrets, SSRF, path traversal, races, trust of client input. Use on auth, payments, user input, file paths, shell commands. Read-only.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
diffNoUnified diff, when the question is about a change.
tierNolight: fast, cheap model for small ordinary questions. standard: normal reviews. deep: flagship models, for security, money, concurrency, production or a hard bug. auto: decided from the size and subject of the packet. Pick the cheapest tier that can do the job.
modelNoPin a model for the first attempt. Usually leave unset and pick a tier.
pathsNoProject-relative files to include. Keep the list short.
checksNoSpecific checks, e.g. "does the retry loop stop on a 429".
effortNoCodex reasoning effort override. Usually leave unset.
noCacheNoSkip the result cache.
workdirYesAbsolute path of the project. The specialist reads nothing above it and writes nothing at all.
objectiveYesWhat you want decided or found, in one or two sentences. This is the whole task the specialist sees.
timeoutMsNoTime budget per attempt.
constraintsNoRules or context to respect: framework version, invariants, what is out of scope.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses one important trait, 'Read-only', but says nothing about cost/model spend, caching, per-attempt time budget, or the shape of the result. The schema's workdir description also states it reads nothing above the root and writes nothing, so 'Read-only' is partly redundant with structured data; the description adds a little but leaves the behavioral picture thin for an 11-parameter tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short telegraphic sentences: what it finds, where to use it, and the read-only guarantee, with the issue classes front-loaded. There is no filler. The fragmented list style trades a little readability for density, which keeps it just under a 5.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex 11-parameter tool with 100% schema coverage and no output schema, the description covers purpose and when-to-use but omits anything about how it differs operationally from codex_review/gemini_review or what the agent gets back. Given the schema covers parameters fully and no output schema exists, the remaining gap is sibling differentiation, so an adequate-but-not-complete 3.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all 11 parameters thoroughly (tier semantics, workdir sandboxing, objective, checks). The description adds no syntax, format, or defaults beyond that. Baseline 3 is correct when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

It states a specific domain: finding exploitable security issues, and enumerates the classes it covers (injection, authz gaps, secrets, SSRF, path traversal, races, client-input trust). That is enough to distinguish it from the generic review siblings (codex_review, gemini_review) and the structural siblings (edge_cases, plan_critique) without naming them. It is a noun-phrase list rather than a clean verb+resource, but the purpose is unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives concrete triggers: use on auth, payments, user input, file paths, shell commands. That is a clear context-of-use. It stops short of explicit exclusions or naming the sibling to pick instead when the question is not security-relevant, so it is not a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.