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Check a counterparty's control baseline before paying (free)

counterparty_control_baseline
Read-onlyIdempotent

Assess a payment counterparty's agent controls against the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline, returning gateway-verified safeguards and self-claimed limits like spending ceilings or payee restrictions.

Instructions

Answers a different question from address screening. Screening asks whether an address is risky; this asks how much damage the agent on the other side could do if it were talked into something — whether a spending ceiling exists, whether payees are restricted, whether its credential can be revoked. It returns that party's self-attestation against the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline, split into two sets that must NOT be conflated: verified_by_oceanalt (controls the gateway enforces on every payment — provable) and self_claimed (what the party states about its own side — NOT verified by OceanAlt). IMPORTANT: most parties have not attested. A result of found:false means no information, not a bad signal — never decline a payment on that basis alone. Free, no API key.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
entityNoThe counterparty's entity name, e.g. "Acme Robotics Ltd".
agentIdNoTheir agent id, if you have it instead of an entity name.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.1

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only cover readOnly/idempotent/openWorld; the description goes well beyond by disclosing the free/no-API-key terms, the critical found:false semantics ('no information, not a bad signal'), and that results split into verified_by_oceanalt versus self_claimed with the latter unverified. These are exactly the behavioral traits an agent needs to interpret the result correctly.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense but every sentence carries load: positioning, control enumeration, verified vs. self-claimed split, and the found:false caveat. The opening 'Answers a different question from address screening' front-loads the differentiator, though the paragraph is long enough that the found:false warning arrives late.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, so the description must explain return values, and it does: verified_by_oceanalt, self_claimed, and a found flag with interpreted meaning. For a read-only lookup with no required parameters, nothing an agent needs to call and correctly interpret it is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and both parameters (entity, agentId) are documented in the schema itself. The description adds no lookup syntax, precedence, or fallback guidance beyond what the schema provides, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a precise resource and the exact question it answers: a counterparty's self-attestation against the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline, including what controls are checked (spending ceiling, payee restriction, credential revocation). It explicitly distinguishes itself from the sibling screen_address by framing screening vs. control-baseline as different questions.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear usage context (checking controllable damage exposure before paying) and an explicit when-not rule: a found:false result is not a bad signal and must not be the sole basis for declining a payment. It does not name the write-side sibling attest_control_baseline or clarify entity vs. agentId lookup preference, so it stops short of full alternative routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.