oceanalt-aml-mcp
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AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceEnables blockchain AML screening of addresses in plain language inside any MCP client, covering sanctions and freeze checks, risk scoring, fund tracing, and counterparty classification across bitcoin, ethereum, bsc, and tron. Works without an account, with an optional API key that lifts rate limits and unlocks outgoing tracing.354 npmMIT- AlicenseNot gradedqualityFmaintenanceArchived and no longer maintained. Tools and prices shown here are out of date. Use the maintained server: glama.ai/mcp/servers/OceanAlt666/oceanalt-aml-mcp (GitHub: OceanAlt666/oceanalt-aml-mcp).115 npmMIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceRoutes blockchain address screening to third-party KYC/AML providers and checks public sanctions lists, serving as a clean-money gate primitive for MCP-compatible agents.MIT
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityFmaintenanceProvides counterparty risk checks for any EVM address, returning malicious-history flags, tiered risk scoring, and plain-language summaries via x402 payment.-
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI agents to run pre-sign risk checks on transactions, approvals, EIP-712 signatures, token addresses, wallet approvals, sanctions screening, and prompt-injection texts, returning green/orange/red verdicts with machine-readable reason codes before signing.1AGPL 3.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI agents and MCP clients to vet on-chain tokens before trading by running a single check_address call that detects honeypots and rug patterns and returns a PASS/WARN/BLOCK verdict with risk score and reasons across Ethereum, BSC, and Solana. Verdicts come from four parallel sources covering honeypot flags, contract audits, liquidity structure, and simulated buy-sell behavior, with graceful degradation flags when a source is unavailable.230 npmMIT
TDQS
Scored across 15 tools
Descriptions work hard to separate tools (e.g. 'Answers a different question from address screening'), but real overlaps remain: payment_decision and compliance_decision both return allow|review|decline and differ mainly by paid/free settlement, while screen_address, batch_screen, deep_trace, evidence_bundle and compliance_decision all touch AML screening of addresses. The three control-baseline tools (baseline_controls, counterparty_control_baseline, attest_control_baseline) are also easy to confuse at a glance.
All names use snake_case, which is good, but the grammatical pattern is mixed: verb_noun tools (screen_address, verify_payment_requirements, attest_control_baseline, resolve_agent_identity) sit alongside noun-phrase tools (baseline_controls, payment_decision, compliance_decision, evidence_bundle, recent_flagged) and an awkward noun_verb (payee_decide). Readable in practice but not a predictable single convention.
15 tools is at the upper edge of the comfortable range but is justified by the genuinely broad domain: address/endpoint/batch screening, tracing, decisioning, agent identity, control attestation, calldata decoding, and requirement verification. Each tool maps to a distinct operational step rather than padding.
The surface covers the full payment-safety lifecycle: pre-payment screening, endpoint screening, tracing, decisioning, identity resolution, control baselines (read/file/counterparty), calldata intent, signed-requirement verification, and signed evidence. Minor gaps exist (e.g. no explicit tool for retrieving a named agent's full published mandate or a general list-pagination beyond recent_flagged), but agents can work around them.