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pkinative-mcp

by Nizoka
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Inspect PKCS#12 (MAC kind, SafeContents, bags; optional MAC check and opening, no key byte)

inspect_pkcs12
Read-onlyIdempotent

Describe a PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) file without its password—version, MAC, encryption schemes, and bag metadata—or supply the password to verify the MAC and open SafeContents, with no key bytes returned.

Instructions

Describe a PKCS#12 (.p12 / .pfx) WITHOUT its password: version, the MAC construction (kind 'pbmac1' RFC 9579 with its PBKDF2 / HMAC parameters, or 'pkcs12-kdf' — the RFC 7292 Appendix B MAC pkinative never verifies; null when the file has none), every SafeContents with its encryption scheme (PBES2 parameters, or the name of a legacy RC2 / 3DES scheme pkinative refuses), and the bags of the unencrypted SafeContents. With password (or PKINATIVE_MCP_PASSWORD): macVerified (true / false — a wrong password or an altered file is a REPORT, not an error; null without a MAC) and opened: every SafeContents opened, each bag as an allow-list view — a certBag by subject / issuer / serial, a keyBag or pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag by its algorithm, curve and encryption parameters, a crlBag by size. No result ever carries a key byte, a bag value or the password, not even from an unencrypted keyBag. Refusals: a wrong password on an ENCRYPTED SafeContents is PKI_CRYPTO_DECRYPTION_FAILED; a legacy MAC PKI_KEY_MAC_UNSUPPORTED and a legacy cipher PKI_KEY_ENCRYPTION_UNSUPPORTED (only when a password asks for them), each with the OpenSSL 3.4 conversion remedy; a public-key integrity-mode file PKI_KEY_MAC_UNSUPPORTED at parse. Nothing is imported here: open_pkcs12 is the one-call verdict with non-extractable key import. limits.maxPkcs12Bags and maxPkcs12KdfIterations bound the file's declared cost. Token-frugal: verbosity:'summary' (macKind, macVerified, contentCount, bagCount, bagKinds).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
fieldsNoDot-paths to keep after verbosity (arrays map over elements); unmatched paths land in _meta.unmatchedFields.
limitsNoRaise pkinative's 22 named security bounds for this call (trusted input only; absent keys keep the engine defaults). A value above an operator ceiling (PKINATIVE_MCP_MAX_INPUT_BYTES, PKINATIVE_MCP_MAX_KDF_ITERATIONS, PKINATIVE_MCP_MAX_PATHS_EXPLORED) is LIMIT_CEILING_EXCEEDED; describe_engine lists the defaults and the ceilings.
pkcs12YesThe PKCS#12 file (.p12 / .pfx; DER, or BER with encodingRules:'ber' for a Windows-written PFX): exactly one of pem / derBase64 / path.
strictNoEscalate the first engine warning to a PKI_STRICT_DIAGNOSTIC error instead of listing it in diagnostics[].
pemModeNo'strict' (RFC 7468 exactly, default) or 'lax' (tolerates whitespace, line length and RFC 1421 headers).strict
passwordNoThe password of an encrypted PKCS#8 key or a PKCS#12 file (UTF-8). Never echoed, logged or cached. Alternatively set PKINATIVE_MCP_PASSWORD in the server environment and omit this input (never both) — the variable keeps the secret out of the model transcript.
verbosityNo'summary' keeps the scalar fields only (token-frugal).full
encodingRulesNo'der' (strict X.690 DER, default) or 'ber' (indefinite / non-minimal lengths and constructed strings, as legacy CMS producers write).der

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
macNoThe MacData, or null when the file carries none (its integrity cannot be verified).
openedNoWith password: every SafeContents opened (the encrypted ones decrypted), its bags as allow-list views.
macKindNo
versionNo
bagCountNoBags listed: those of `opened` when a password was given, else those of the plain SafeContents.
bagKindsNo
contentsNoThe AuthenticatedSafe entries, in encoded order.
sizeBytesNo
diagnosticsNoNon-fatal concerns the engine raised (PKI_DIAG_*, de-duplicated, at most 200; explain_code explains one).
macVerifiedNoWith password: true when the PBMAC1 MAC matches, false for a wrong password or an altered file (a report, not an error); null when the file has no MAC.
contentCountNo
diagnosticCountNo
diagnosticCountsNoOccurrences per diagnostic code.
diagnosticsTruncatedNotrue when distinct diagnostics beyond the 200 listed were dropped.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly/idempotent/non-destructive, but the description adds critical behavior beyond them: no key byte or bag value is ever returned, a wrong password on a MAC is a report rather than an error, refusals map to specific PKI_* codes, and limits bound declared cost. This is unusually rich behavioral disclosure.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose and no-key-byte constraint are front-loaded, and the density is justified for a complex tool. However, the long parenthetical clauses and multi-error-code listing make some sentences run on, slightly reducing readability despite high information density.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given an output schema exists, the description need not explain return values, yet it still covers both modes, refusal codes, limits, and the summary mode. Nothing material is missing for an agent to select and call it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema baseline is 3, but the description adds meaning: password can come from PKINATIVE_MCP_PASSWORD instead, verbosity:'summary' returns a named set of scalar fields, and limits.maxPkcs12Bags / maxPkcs12KdfIterations bound cost. It does not fully re-explain the nested pkcs12 input shape or encodingRules beyond brief context.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Describe a PKCS#12 (.p12 / .pfx)') and enumerates exactly what is reported: version, MAC construction, SafeContents encryption, bags. It explicitly distinguishes itself from open_pkcs12 by noting it never imports and that open_pkcs12 is the one-call verdict with non-extractable key import.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clearly partitions usage into password-less inspection versus opening with `password` or PKINATIVE_MCP_PASSWORD, and specifies the alternative open_pkcs12 for import. It also states when legacy errors occur, and the summary verbosity option, leaving little to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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