pkinative-mcp

Overview Schema Source Related Servers Discussions Admin

Create OCSP request (RFC 6960 DER, SHA-1 or SHA-256 CertID, nonce)

create_ocsp_request

Builds a DER OCSP request to ask a responder for a certificate's revocation status, computing the CertID from the issuing CA and optionally adding a nonce.

Instructions

Build the DER OCSPRequest (RFC 6960 §4.1) asking a responder for the status of certificate, identified by the CertID computed from issuer (the CA that issued it — its name and key hashes) and the serial. hashAlgorithm 'SHA-1' (default, the engine default and what every responder answers) or 'SHA-256' (recommended where the responder supports it). nonce adds the RFC 8954 nonce extension: 'random' (16 bytes from node:crypto, summary.randomNonce:true) or your own hex (1–32 bytes); keep summary.nonceHex to demand it back with check_ocsp_status. certIdOnly:true returns the bare CertID (der / hex). This server never sends anything: POST the bytes yourself (Content-Type application/ocsp-request) to the URL in the certificate's authorityInfoAccess (inspect_certificate), then judge the answer with check_ocsp_status { response, certificate, issuer, nonce }. summary.certIdHex is the CertID to match in the response. Output DER (default, .orq), PEM or hex, inline or as a sandbox file (never overwritten).

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`label`	No	The PEM label for encoding:'pem' (default OCSP REQUEST; upper-case words and digits). A private-key label is refused.
`nonce`	No	The RFC 8954 nonce extension: 'random', or hex of 1–32 bytes. Omitted: no nonce. Keep summary.nonceHex to match the response (check_ocsp_status nonce).
`issuer`	Yes	The CA certificate that issued it (its name and key are hashed into the CertID): exactly one of pem / derBase64 / path.
`limits`	No	Raise pkinative's 22 named security bounds for this call (trusted input only; absent keys keep the engine defaults). A value above an operator ceiling (PKINATIVE_MCP_MAX_INPUT_BYTES, PKINATIVE_MCP_MAX_KDF_ITERATIONS, PKINATIVE_MCP_MAX_PATHS_EXPLORED) is LIMIT_CEILING_EXCEEDED; describe_engine lists the defaults and the ceilings.
`strict`	No	Escalate the first engine warning to a PKI_STRICT_DIAGNOSTIC error instead of listing it in diagnostics[].
`pemMode`	No	'strict' (RFC 7468 exactly, default) or 'lax' (tolerates whitespace, line length and RFC 1421 headers).	strict
`encoding`	No	Artefact encoding: 'pem' (RFC 7468 text), 'der' (raw bytes), 'hex' (lowercase hex in structuredContent, inline only, ≤ 64 KiB). Default 'der'.	der
`certIdOnly`	No	Return the bare DER CertID (RFC 6960 §4.1.1) instead of the request (der or hex only — a CertID has no PEM label).
`outputMode`	No	'base64' (default) returns the artefact inline as an embedded resource (≤ 50 MiB). 'file' writes it inside PKINATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR (never overwrites; ≤ 1 GiB) and returns a resource_link.	base64
`outputPath`	No	Relative path inside the sandbox (only when outputMode='file'); the extension must match the encoding (.orq .der .bin for der). Key-bearing extensions (.key .p8 .p12 .pfx) are refused: nothing here writes a private key.
`certificate`	Yes	The certificate whose status to ask for: exactly one of pem / derBase64 / path.
`encodingRules`	No	'der' (strict X.690 DER, default) or 'ber' (indefinite / non-minimal lengths and constructed strings, as legacy CMS producers write).	der
`hashAlgorithm`	No	The CertID hash. 'SHA-1' (default — the engine default and what every responder answers; RFC 6960 §4.3) or 'SHA-256' (recommended, RFC 6960 §4.3 / RFC 5019 note: some responders still answer SHA-1 only).	SHA-1

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`hex`	No	The artefact as lowercase hex (when encoding='hex').
`mode`	Yes
`sha256`	Yes	SHA-256 of the DER bytes (lowercase hex) — the reproducibility proof.
`summary`	Yes
`encoding`	Yes
`filePath`	No	Sandboxed absolute path (when outputMode='file').
`sizeBytes`	Yes	Size of the DER artefact.
`diagnostics`	Yes	Non-fatal concerns the engine raised (PKI_DIAG_*, de-duplicated, at most 200; explain_code explains one).
`diagnosticCounts`	Yes	Occurrences per diagnostic code.
`diagnosticsTruncated`	No	true when distinct diagnostics beyond the 200 listed were dropped.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv0.1.0Oct 27, 2026

TDQS

A4.4/5.0

Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare readOnlyHint=false with destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is already covered. The description adds real context beyond that: no network I/O, output files are never overwritten, nonce is 16 bytes from node:crypto, and sandbox extension restrictions. However it does not discuss error conditions (e.g. LIMIT_CEILING_EXCEEDED or strict-mode failures) that the 22 limit parameters imply. Solid additional context, but not exhaustive for the mutation surface.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded and there is no filler, but the single dense paragraph crams encoding, output mode, nonce, certIdOnly and the POST workflow into one block. Slight over-packing of backticked identifiers reduces scanability. No wasted sentences.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 13-parameter tool with nested objects, an output schema and 100% schema coverage, the description supplies the missing pieces an agent needs: the offline nature of the server, the external POST step, and the nonce/CertID matching protocol. Nothing essential to correct invocation is absent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description nonetheless adds value by explaining why SHA-1 is the default versus SHA-256, the nonce 1–32 byte constraint and its round-trip role via summary.nonceHex, and certIdOnly's bare-CertID output (der/hex only). It adds rationale and cross-tool linkage the schema cannot express. Small deduction for restating several schema-documented defaults verbatim.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

First sentence names a specific verb (build) and artefact (DER OCSPRequest, RFC 6960 §4.1) plus the two inputs that define the CertID, which is unambiguous and distinguishable from check_ocsp_status and inspect_ocsp_response. An agent can identify the tool without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states this server never sends anything, tells the agent to POST the bytes to the URL from authorityInfoAccess (obtained via inspect_certificate), then judge the answer with check_ocsp_status. It routes to both prerequisite and successor siblings with the exact parameters to carry forward.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.