Blackveil DNS
Blackveil DNS is a read-only MCP server for DNS and email security scanning, auditing, benchmarking, remediation planning, and brand/recon intelligence.
Run full domain audits with scores, NIST-aligned grades, maturity stages, and prioritized findings; batch-scan up to 10 domains and compare domains or policy baselines.
Check email authentication controls: SPF, DMARC, DKIM, MX, MTA-STS, BIMI, TLS-RPT, subdomailing risk, MX reputation, spoofability, and SPF include chains.
Audit DNS and web infrastructure: DNSSEC and chain of trust, DNSKEY strength, SSL/TLS, NS, CAA, HTTP security headers, DANE/DANE-HTTPS, SVCB/HTTPS, PTR, SRV, TXT/zone hygiene, resolver consistency, NSEC walkability, authoritative DNS/root-server posture, subdomain takeover, fast flux, blocklists, ASN, and RDAP.
Discover and assess brand exposure: CT-based subdomain discovery, lookalikes, shadow domains, brand-domain discovery, brand audits with reports, recurring watches, webhooks, and portfolio lead prioritization.
Generate remediation artifacts such as SPF/DMARC/DKIM records, MTA-STS policies, fix plans, and DMARC rollout plans; validate applied fixes and map findings to compliance frameworks.
Perform intelligence workflows: supply-chain mapping, attack-path simulation, drift analysis, industry/provider benchmarks, domain ranking, and compliance mapping.
Use async job tools for batch scans, brand discovery/audits, bucket scans, and OSINT investigations with status/report polling; some recon/OSINT tools are operator-deploy only and may degrade when unprovisioned.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Blackveil DNS scan example.com"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
BLACKVEIL DNS
Know where you stand.
Source-available DNS & email security scanner for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, and MCP clients across Streamable HTTP, stdio, and legacy HTTP+SSE.
Try it in 30 seconds
Claude Desktop (one-click install):
Download the Blackveil DNS extension and open it — the current 82-tool surface is available instantly. Verify your download.
Claude Code (one command):
claude mcp add --transport http blackveil-dns https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcpThen ask: scan anthropic.com
Smithery (one command):
smithery mcp add MadaBurns/bv-mcpVerify the endpoint is live:
curl https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/healthNo install. No API key. One URL for hosted HTTP:
Endpoint https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcp
Transport Streamable HTTP · JSON-RPC 2.0
Auth None requiredTransport support:
Streamable HTTP:POST /mcp,GET /mcp,DELETE /mcpNative stdio:blackveil-dns-mcpCLI from theblackveil-dnsnpm packageLegacy HTTP+SSE:GET /mcp/ssebootstrap stream plusPOST /mcp/messages?sessionId=...
For Streamable HTTP, clients should retain the Mcp-Session-Id returned by initialize and send it on every subsequent request, including notifications. Send the negotiated version in MCP-Protocol-Version; unsupported values are rejected with HTTP 400, while expired or terminated sessions return 404 and require a fresh initialize.
Related MCP server: nslookup.io MCP Server
What you get
82 MCP tools with 19 scoring categories — SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DNSSEC, SSL/TLS, MTA-STS, NS, CAA, MX, BIMI, TLS-RPT, subdomain takeover, HTTP security headers, DANE, SVCB/HTTPS, DANE-HTTPS, subdomailing, reverse DNS (PTR/FCrDNS), and DNSKEY strength
Maturity staging — Stage 0-4 classification (Unprotected to Hardened) with score-based capping to prevent inflated labels
Trust surface analysis — detects shared SaaS senders in SPF, both cataloged platforms (Google, M365, SendGrid) and uncataloged hosts identifiable by their
spfdelegation label, then cross-references DMARC enforcement to determine real exposureGuided remediation —
generate(artifact=fix_plan) produces provider-aware prioritized actions; its record artifacts (spf_record,dmarc_record,dkim_config,mta_sts_policy,rollout_plan) output ready-to-publish records;validate_fixconfirms whether a fix was applied successfullySupply chain mapping —
map_supply_chaincorrelates DNS signals to build a full third-party dependency graph with trust levels and risk signalsAttack path simulation —
simulate_attack_pathsenumerates specific paths (spoofing, takeover, hijack) with severity, steps, and mitigationsCompliance mapping —
map_compliancemaps scan findings to NIST 800-177, PCI DSS 4.0, SOC 2, and CIS ControlsSelf-tuning scoring — adaptive weights adjust category importance based on patterns seen across scans via Durable Object telemetry
Per-tier analytics — usage tracking by auth tier with operator API for tier summaries, key-level usage, and daily digests
Read-only — checks never modify a target and need no authorization from it. Most are passive lookups over public Cloudflare DNS-over-HTTPS;
check_authoritative_dns_infraandcheck_root_server_setquery authoritative and root nameservers directly over TCP/53, and for authenticated callerscheck_authoritative_dns_infraalso tests whether a domain's nameservers refuse a zone transfer (no zone data is retrieved)
Tools
82 MCP tools · 7 prompts · 6 resources
Email Auth Infrastructure Brand & Threats Meta
───────────── ────────────── ─────────────── ───────────────
check_mx check_dnssec check_bimi scan_domain
check_spf check_ssl check_tlsrpt batch_scan
check_dmarc check_ns check_lookalikes compare_domains
check_dkim check_caa check_shadow_domains compare_baseline
check_mta_sts check_http_security explain_finding
check_subdomailing check_dane
check_mx_reputation check_dane_https DNS Hygiene Remediation
check_svcb_https ───────────── ───────────────
check_ptr check_txt_hygiene generate (one tool;
Intelligence check_srv artifact=fix_plan,
───────────── check_zone_hygiene spf_record,
get_benchmark check_resolver_ Discovery dmarc_record,
get_domain_rank consistency ───────────── dkim_config,
get_provider_ discover_brand_ mta_sts_policy,
insights check_dbl domains rollout_plan)
assess_spoofability check_rbl brand_audit_single validate_fix
map_supply_chain cymru_asn brand_audit_batch_
analyze_drift rdap_lookup start
resolve_spf_chain check_nsec_ brand_audit_status
discover_subdomains walkability brand_audit_get_
map_compliance check_dnssec_chain report
prioritize_portfolio_
leads
simulate_attack_paths check_fast_flux list_brand_audit_watches
check_agent_discovery check_dnskey_strength
check_llms_txt check_authoritative_dns_infra
check_root_server_set register_brand_audit_watch
delete_brand_audit_watch
+ check_subdomain_takeover (standalone tool + internal — runs inside scan_domain)
+ check_authoritative_dns_infra and check_root_server_set (authoritative DNS infrastructure profile)
+ batch_scan_start / batch_scan_status / batch_scan_findings
(async start → poll → fetch sibling of batch_scan)
+ sge_quickscan (NZ Secure Government Email readiness for one domain)
+ discover_brand_domains_start / discover_brand_domains_status / discover_brand_domains_findings
(async start → poll → fetch sibling of discover_brand_domains, for clients that time out on the ~24s sync call)
Operator-deploy only (BV_RECON binding; degrade to unprovisioned on self-hosted BUSL deployments):
+ check_realtime_threat_feed — curated intel-gateway threat feed lookup
+ scan_buckets_start — async cloud-bucket discovery scan (start → poll → findings)
+ scan_buckets_status — poll status of a running bucket scan
+ scan_buckets_findings — retrieve findings for a completed bucket scan
+ osint_investigate_domain_start — async domain OSINT investigation (start → poll → report)
+ osint_investigate_infrastructure_start — async deep-infrastructure OSINT (domain, IP, or org)
+ osint_investigate_supply_chain_start — async supply-chain OSINT investigation
+ osint_investigate_username_start — async username OSINT (owner/enterprise tier only)
+ osint_investigate_email_start — async email OSINT (owner/enterprise tier only)
+ osint_investigation_status — poll status of any running OSINT investigation
+ osint_investigation_report — retrieve report for a completed OSINT investigation
Internal-only compatibility surface (withdrawn from public `tools/list`; the three active Microsoft 365 / Entra tools proxy through `BV_WEB` and degrade to unprovisioned without it):
+ query_signins — query Microsoft Entra sign-in logs for a tenant
+ query_ual — DEPRECATED tombstone; valid, authorized calls return query_ual_deprecated with no tenant-data access
+ get_ca_policies — retrieve Conditional Access policies for an Entra tenant
+ assess_coverage — assess Conditional Access coverage gaps for an Entra tenant
+ map_registrar_products — map a domain's gaps to registrar brand-protection productsTool discovery metadata (_meta)
tools/list returns every tool with server-specific discovery metadata under each tool's _meta (the MCP-sanctioned extension point), so a client can group or filter the surface without hard-coding tool names:
group— functional group (email_auth,infrastructure,brand_threats,dns_hygiene,intelligence,remediation,discovery,identity_secops,meta).tier— scoring tier (core/protective/hardening); absent for non-scoring tools.scanIncluded—truewhen the tool runs insidescan_domain's parallel audit.recommended— present (true) only on the curated starter set (scan_domain,explain_finding,compare_baseline); omitted otherwise. A client facing the full surface can lead withtools.filter(t => t._meta.recommended)to avoid overwhelming an LLM with all tools flat. Every tool is still listed — this is an additive signal, not a filter.
Authoritative DNS infrastructure
check_authoritative_dns_infra measures authoritative DNS infrastructure posture for a hostname over direct DNS-over-TCP/53 from a single vantage, via the BV_INFRA_PROBE service binding: TCP/53 reachability, the authoritative AA flag, recursion exposure, SOA serial consistency across nameservers, DNSKEY/RRSIG presence (not validation), IPv4/IPv6 answer parity, and unsupported-query handling. For authenticated callers only, it also runs a zone-transfer refusal test (first response only — no zone data is ever retrieved) and CHAOS version.bind/id.server disclosure. It does not measure, and reports as inconclusive: UDP/53 reachability, amplification, EDNS large-response/truncation, DNS cookies/RRL, BGP origin, RPKI, route-leak signals, anycast diversity, vantage latency, and RIR/RDAP.
check_root_server_set queries a rotating sample of 3 root servers per call and compares the priming NS set, glue, SOA serials, and cross-root consistency with the embedded official root hints, via BV_INFRA_PROBE.
Self-hosted or local deployments without BV_INFRA_PROBE still return structured partial results. The worker-only mode records the embedded root hints and marks every live-probe capability inconclusive rather than pretending it ran; both tools then withhold their verdict (checkStatus: 'error', excluded from scoring) instead of grading reference data.
Quality & Reliability
The server classifies detected MCP clients by their default response format:
Interactive clients:
claude_mobile,claude_code,cursor,vscode,claude_desktop,claude_connector,windsurf(auto-format:compact)Non-interactive clients:
mcp_remote,blackveil_dns_action,bv_claude_dns_proxy,unknown(auto-format:full)
The bv_load_test class identifies internal load/chaos/tranco-scan traffic so it stays out of real-client analytics segments.
The comprehensive chaos suite validates session stability, authentication precedence, format negotiation, and transport-specific edge cases across Streamable HTTP and Legacy SSE for its supported client fixtures. Without an API key it exercises the public/free-tier path; with a valid key exported as BV_API_KEY, it covers Bearer authentication, legacy self-host ?api_key= compatibility, authenticated SSE bootstrap, and authenticated batch behavior.
Run the client/session chaos suite locally: python3 scripts/chaos/chaos-test-clients.py.
Run repeat force-refresh scans to detect production scoring drift:
BV_API_KEY=... python3 scripts/chaos/score-stability-test.py --count 20 --rounds 3 --concurrency 5The stability harness negotiates MCP protocol 2025-06-18, accepts JSON and Streamable HTTP SSE responses, and exits non-zero on any transport/tool error or score/category drift. Use --from <json-file> with a JSON array of domains for a targeted provider-diversity sweep.
SSOT guardrails are enforced by focused audit tests:
Tool counts and public resource copy are generated from the
TOOLSregistry, not hand-written —npm run generate:tool-surfacerewrites every advertised count, andnpm run check:tool-surfacefails CI if any drifts. Counts advertised to clients use the public surface (TOOLSminus internal-only tools), so the number in the docs, the badge, the VS Code listing and theresources/readcopy is the numbertools/listactually returns.Domain-required validation is derived from each tool input schema.
Scan timeout budgets are resolved from shared runtime config.
WASM tool permissions are generated from MCP tool annotations.
Public quota copy is checked against runtime quota config.
Version stamps in scan output
Every scan_domain / batch_scan result carries three reproducibility stamps. They are three different namespaces — do not compare them to each other, and do not read any of them as the npm package version unless it says so:
Field | What it tracks | How often it moves |
| The scoring policy: category weights, profile weights, grade thresholds, severity penalties, the | Only when a change alters scores or grades. Slowly — most releases do not touch it. |
| The | Every package release — code, new detections, bug fixes. |
| Fingerprint of the effective scoring configuration that produced this result, including any | Whenever the effective config differs. |
scoringModelVersion is independent of dnsChecksPackageVersion and is normally lower — for example model 1.10.0 alongside package 1.18.0. That is not a version gap, and it does not mean a consumer's vendored copy scores differently from the hosted service: the package advanced eight minors without changing scoring policy. Reading the model version as the package version has twice triggered a false "engine version gap" investigation, which is why both are now emitted side by side.
When you publish or cite a score, record scoringConfigHash — not either version number. It is the value that identifies the exact scoring configuration behind a result, so two scans carrying the same hash were graded under the same rules.
Status badge
GET /badge/<domain> returns an embeddable SVG — the badge at the top of this README is a live scan of our own domain. It needs no authentication and is subject to the same anonymous rate limits and daily caps as a public scan.
The badge shows the same customer-facing letter scan_domain reports — the NIST-aligned 6-band grade (A+ ≥95, A ≥90, B ≥80, C ≥70, D ≥60, F <60) — so a domain cannot show one grade on its badge and a different one in its report. Two further states are stated rather than papered over:
<grade> partial— the scan was graded, but did not complete every check (a WAF challenge, a timeout, an unreachable host). The hover/aria title gives the exact coverage, e.g.17 of 19 checks measured. The grade and its colour are unchanged: coverage and posture are different axes.unknown— the domain could not be measured at all. The badge says so instead of substituting a letter, which would publish a failing grade nobody measured.
See docs/scoring.md for the grade scales and the evidence rules behind them.
Architecture
MCP Client
│
│ POST /mcp (JSON-RPC 2.0)
│
┌───▼──────────────────────┐
│ Cloudflare Worker │
│ │
│ Hono ─► Origin check │
│ ─► Auth │
│ ─► Rate limiting │
│ ─► Session mgmt │
└───┬──────────────────────┘
│
┌───▼──────────────────────┐
│ Tool Handlers │
│ 19 scoring categories │
└───┬──────────────────────┘
│
┌───▼──────────────────────┐
│ Generic Scoring Engine │
│ Three-tier model │
└───┬──────────────────────┘
│
┌───▼──────────────────────┐
│ Cloudflare DoH │
│ DNS-over-HTTPS │
└──────────────────────────┘Generic Scoring Engine: Runtime-agnostic, string-keyed three-tier scoring with configurable weights
Infra Probe Binding: Optional
BV_INFRA_PROBEservice binding supplies live DNS-over-TCP/53 authoritative DNS and root-server evidence for the authoritative DNS infrastructure profileCT Index Binding: Optional
BV_CERTSTREAMservice binding supplies Certificate Transparency names fordiscover_subdomainsand SAN correlation. Operator deployments point it at the ownedbv-ct-indexsidecar (packages/bv-ct-index), a forward-only names index built from the public CT logs; source order stays binding, then crt.sh, then CertSpotter, then the last-known-good cache, so the direct sources remain the fallback. Seedocs/bv-ct-index-runbook.mdWASM Policy Engine: High-performance permission and token checks via
bv-wasm-coreReliable Sessions: Hardened tombstone logic prevents race-condition revival of terminated sessions
Protocol Enforcement: Unsupported MCP versions fail closed; notifications and SSE connections use the same session-validity rules as other post-initialize requests
Bounded Egress: Public CT and target-HTML responses are streamed under byte ceilings before parsing or fingerprinting
Cryptographic Identifiers: Session and brand-report identifiers use Web Crypto randomness
Adaptive Scoring: Durable Object telemetry adjusts weights based on real-world distributions
Client Awareness: Automatic response formatting (
compactvsfull) based on clientUser-Agent
Brand-discovery modes (discover_brand_domains / brand_audit_*)
The discovery_mode argument accepts two values:
classic(the default everywhere this repo runs out-of-the-box) — the public, BUSL-licensed signal-sweep pipeline. Uses only public-internet data sources (DNS, RDAP, CT logs, MX/TXT inspection). This is the only mode supported for self-hosted deployments and the only mode the open test suite covers end-to-end.tiered— layers a portfolio-aware Tier 0 / infrastructure-graph Tier 1 / declared-evidence Tier 2 pipeline in front of the classic sweep. Tiered mode requires private BlackVeil-internal cross-Worker bindings (BV_INFRA_GRAPH,BV_INTEL_GATEWAY,BV_ENTERPRISE) that are not packaged with the open distribution — they live in BlackVeil's production deploy overlay (.dev/wrangler.deploy.jsonc) and call into proprietary Workers. Self-hosters cannot enable tiered mode without those bindings.
BlackVeil's hosted production at dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com flips its runtime default to tiered via the env var BRAND_AUDIT_DISCOVERY_MODE_DEFAULT="tiered" in the private overlay; the public schema default in src/schemas/tool-args.ts stays 'classic' permanently so anyone building from main gets the BUSL-licensed behaviour unchanged. An explicit caller-supplied discovery_mode always wins over the env default.
Client setup
The free tier requires no authentication. Authenticated requests bypass per-IP rate limits and follow your tier's daily quota. Hosted production supports:
Header:
Authorization: Bearer <KEY>Header (alternative):
X-API-Key: <KEY>— for clients that cannot setAuthorization. If both are sent,Authorization: Bearerwins.OAuth 2.1: optional authorization-code flow with PKCE, enabled only when operators set
ENABLE_OAUTH=true; owner-key consent is separately gated byENABLE_OWNER_OAUTH=true.Enterprise Managed Auth: when OAuth is enabled, Claude Team and Enterprise organizations can connect through their identity provider with no per-user sign-in, using the RFC 7523
jwt-bearergrant (an ID-JAG assertion) and Claude's client-ID-metadata-document (CIMD) identity. Each customer issuer is an explicit allowlisted tenant; tokens never carry theownertier. Admin setup: docs/enterprise-managed-auth.md. The silent exchange starts from the HTTP 401 challenge described under paid-only tools below.
The ?api_key=<KEY> fallback is legacy/self-host compatibility only. BlackVeil hosted production sets REJECT_QUERY_API_KEY=true; clients that cannot send headers should use OAuth or an mcp-remote header bridge.
For full hosted setup examples, stdio usage, OAuth setup, and legacy fallback endpoints, see docs/client-setup.md.
To build the service into a product or a scheduled pipeline (storing scores, partial scans, batch jobs, retries, authority to scan), see the integrator guide.
CLI
This repository's root package ships a blackveil bin (src/cli.ts, built to dist/cli.js): a client for the hosted endpoint, not a local scanner. It calls https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcp and works without a key; set BLACKVEIL_API_KEY to use a keyed tier's quota (keys are never accepted on the command line). BLACKVEIL_MCP_URL overrides the endpoint (HTTPS required except loopback).
blackveil scan example.com --format json
blackveil check spf example.com
blackveil batch --file domains.txt --fail-below 70
blackveil policy example.com --policy policy.json
blackveil drift save example.com --out baseline.json
blackveil drift compare example.com --baseline baseline.json
blackveil evidence verify baseline.jsonCommands: scan, check, batch, policy, drift save|compare, evidence verify. Output formats (--format): human (default), json, ndjson, evidence; --out <file> writes to a file, --fail-below <0-100> or --policy <file> turns a scan into a pass/fail gate. Exit codes: 0 pass, 1 verified policy or integrity failure, 2 usage/input, 3 auth/quota/transport/tool error, 4 ungraded/inconclusive. blackveil --help prints the full usage (source of truth: src/cli/command.ts).
The npm package blackveil-dns is published from release tags by a manually dispatched workflow, and not every release is published, so npm can be behind this repository: npm view blackveil-dns version shows what is there. Versions from 3.100.1 carry both the blackveil CLI and the blackveil-dns-mcp stdio bin; 2.13.0 carries only blackveil-dns-mcp. Build from source (npm ci && npm run build) for the CLI at the current commit, or use blackveil-dns-action in CI; it calls the hosted endpoint and needs no npm package.
REST / HTTP
The hosted engine is also reachable without MCP framing through BlackVeil's public API (pointer only; the API's own docs are authoritative):
Keyless single checks:
POST https://www.blackveilsecurity.com/api/v1/tools/lookup— OpenAPI spec athttps://www.blackveilsecurity.com/openapi.json.Keyed, metered full scan:
POST https://www.blackveilsecurity.com/api/scan/v1/scanwith a tenant API key, on plans that include API access (see Pricing).
Operator configuration
These settings apply to operators running their own deployment. They are optional — self-hosted (BUSL) deployments fall back to privacy-preserving defaults when they are unset.
Detailed analytics capture
The public /mcp path writes a per-event access log enriched with geolocation and network identity. The write path, PII depth, and retention are operator-controlled:
Binding / var | Type | Purpose |
| Queue | Operator-deploy only. Batches access-log writes off the request path. Absent on self-hosts → inline-insert fallback (no reverse-DNS lookup). |
| var |
|
| var | Access-log retention window in days (default |
PTR third-party disclosure | — | At |
Internal analytics endpoints
These live under the internal auth gate (/internal/*) and are called by bv-web, not the public surface:
Endpoint | Source | Notes |
| D1 | Precise per-customer usage report. |
| Analytics Engine | Geographic rollup (country/region/city/ASN) for dashboards. |
| D1 | STRICT-gated, operator-only. Returns decrypted client IP + PTR for abuse investigation; every call writes a self-audit row. |
Pricing
Free | Developer | Enterprise | |
Price | $0 | $39/mo (provisioned by BlackVeil, not self-serve checkout) | |
Scans/day | 25 (anonymous, per IP); 50 with a free key | 500 per tool, 5,000 across all tools | 10,000+ per tool, 50,000 across all tools |
Checks/day | Tool-specific limits | Tool-specific limits | Tool-specific limits |
Rate limit | 50 req/min | None | None |
API access | No | Yes | Yes |
MCP access | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Free-tier daily limits depend on whether you send a key. Anonymous (no key): 25 scan_domain scans/day per IP, across at most 12 distinct domains/day. Free key: 50/day per tool. Agent, developer and enterprise keys also have a daily total across all tools combined (2,000, 5,000 and 50,000 calls respectively), on top of their per-tool limits; the first call past the total gets HTTP 429. Free keys do not carry the REST scan API (see REST / HTTP); "API access" above means that keyed API. Limits are read from TIER_DAILY_LIMITS, TIER_AGGREGATE_DAILY_LIMITS, FREE_TOOL_DAILY_LIMITS and FREE_DISTINCT_DOMAIN_DAILY_LIMIT in src/lib/config.ts.
Offensive/recon and multi-domain tools (subdomain discovery, attack-path simulation, lookalike/shadow-domain detection, fast-flux detection, supply-chain mapping, real-time threat feed, bucket/OSINT investigations, batch_scan, compare_domains, brand audits) require a paid plan (Developer tier or higher). An unauthenticated call gets HTTP 401 with a WWW-Authenticate challenge pointing at the OAuth protected-resource metadata (Claude shows its Connect card); a signed-in free or agent-tier caller gets an HTTP 403 upgrade-required response (-32003). Self-hosts without OAuth enabled keep the 403 for unauthenticated callers. Unauthenticated callers are additionally capped at 12 distinct domains per day (best-effort, fail-open). The OSINT/bucket status and report pollers stay free; the brand-audit and brand-discovery pollers (brand_audit_status, brand_audit_get_report, discover_brand_domains_status, discover_brand_domains_findings) have no unauthenticated allowance and return HTTP 429 without a key.
Example prompts
These demonstrate core functionality — paste any of them into Claude with the Blackveil DNS connector enabled:
Prompt | What it does |
| Full security audit — score, grade, prioritized findings |
| Side-by-side comparison of two domains' postures |
| Produces a ready-to-publish DNS record |
| Enumerates spoofing, takeover, and hijack vectors |
| Maps findings to compliance framework controls |
Support
Bug reports & feature requests: GitHub Issues
Security vulnerabilities: security@blackveilsecurity.com (see SECURITY.md)
General questions: GitHub Discussions
Support the project: Ko-fi — the hosted scanner is free to use; tips help keep it that way
Responsible use
This tool is intended for authorized security assessments of domains you own or have explicit permission to test. Do not use it for unauthorized reconnaissance, harassment, or any activity that violates applicable laws. Findings from attack simulation, spoofability, and subdomain discovery tools should be used to improve your own security posture, not to exploit others.
If you discover a vulnerability in a third-party domain, please follow coordinated disclosure practices.
Self-hosting and license
The supported self-host path is the stdio bin (blackveil-dns-mcp) for non-commercial use. The Cloudflare Worker configuration in this repository references BlackVeil-private bindings and is not a third-party deploy target. Under the LICENSE Additional Use Grant, providing the Licensed Work as a hosted service to third parties for a fee, or embedding it in a commercial product, is commercial use and needs a separate licence from BLACKVEIL. Commercial licences are available on request via https://blackveilsecurity.com/contact.
Built and maintained by BLACKVEIL — NZ-owned cybersecurity consultancy.
Privacy Policy · Terms of Service · License (BUSL-1.1 → MIT on 2030-03-17)
Available Tools
82 toolsanalyze_driftARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Measure whether a domain's DNS security posture improved or regressed versus a prior scan snapshot; returns a drift classification (improving/stable/regressing/mixed), score delta, and lists of improvements and regressions. Use for "did our score improve or regress since last time?"; not compare_baseline, which checks compliance with a fixed policy.
Inputs: domain (required), baseline (required), format, force_refresh.
assess_spoofabilityARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Compute a composite email spoofability risk score (0-100, higher = more spoofable) from SPF trust surface, DMARC enforcement and DKIM coverage. Returns a risk level (minimal to critical), per-control sub-scores and a plain-language summary. Use when asked how easy it is to spoof email from a domain, or for a composite spoofing risk score.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh.
batch_scanARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Bulk-scan up to 10 domains in parallel with a full security audit each; returns score, NIST-aligned letter grade (A+ to F) and finding counts per domain. Use to audit several domains at once; use compare_domains for a side-by-side comparison of 2-5 domains. scoringModelVersion (policy) is independent of dnsChecksPackageVersion (engine); cite scoringConfigHash with scores.
Inputs: domains (required), format, force_refresh.
batch_scan_findingsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Fetch owner-scoped findings for a completed asynchronous batch scan.
Inputs: job_id (required), format.
batch_scan_startAIdempotentInspect
Start a durable asynchronous scan of 1–10 domains. Returns a stable job ID; replaying the same idempotency key with the same principal, normalized inputs, and scoring versions returns the same job.
Inputs: domains (required), idempotency_key (required), format, force_refresh.
batch_scan_statusBRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Read the owner-scoped status of an asynchronous batch scan.
Inputs: job_id (required), format.
brand_audit_batch_startAInspect
Enqueue an async brand audit across up to 50 target domains with optional standard/deep discovery depth, brand aliases, and caller-supplied candidate domains. Returns { auditId, queuedAt, targetCount, etaSeconds } immediately; poll with brand_audit_status and fetch results with brand_audit_get_report once complete. Each target consumes 1 unit of the monthly BRAND_AUDIT_QUOTAS budget.
Inputs: domains (required), view, depth, format, +6 more.
brand_audit_get_reportARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Fetch the result JSON of a completed brand audit: the per-target CheckResult when target is set, else the audit-level aggregate; returns notReady while in flight. When a PDF sidecar exists, metadata includes pdfUrl, an authenticated /reports/ download link (same bearer credential). Targets whose PDF is still rendering include pdfPending, so poll again.
Inputs: auditId (required), format, target.
brand_audit_singleAInspect
Run a full brand audit on one target (optional standard/deep depth, brand aliases, candidate domains). Discovers brand-related domains, looks up registrar and registrant, and classifies each as consolidated, shadowIt, authorized vendor, indeterminate or impersonation. Gated by monthly BRAND_AUDIT_QUOTAS (free/agent=0, developer=50, partner=200, enterprise=500, owner=unlimited).
Inputs: domain (required), view, depth, format, +7 more.
brand_audit_statusARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Poll the status of an enqueued brand audit. Returns audit-level status (queued | running | completed | failed), progress 'N/M', and per-target statuses. Owner-scoped — auditIds owned by other principals surface as notFound.
Inputs: auditId (required), format.
check_agent_discoveryARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Assess IETF BANDAID agent-discovery DNS records: finds SVCB agent records under _agents, reports whether the discovery zone is DNSSEC-anchored (unsigned means spoofable endpoints), evaluates DANE/TLSA binding trust and checks capability-document integrity (cap / cap-sha256). Read-only; uses Private-Use SVCB param code points pending IANA assignment.
Inputs: domain (required), name, format, protocol, +2 more. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_authoritative_dns_infraARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Measure a hostname's authoritative DNS posture by querying its nameservers directly over TCP/53 from one vantage: reachability, AA flag, recursion exposure, SOA serial consistency, DNSKEY/RRSIG presence (not validation), IPv4/IPv6 parity. Authenticated callers also get a zone-transfer refusal test (no zone data retrieved) and CHAOS disclosure. UDP, BGP, RPKI, anycast not measured.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_bimiARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check the BIMI record at default._bimi.: validates the logo URL (l=), the presence of mark-certificate authority evidence (a=; a bare URL, so VMC vs CMC is not determined), and the DMARC enforcement prerequisite (p=quarantine/reject) mail clients require. Use to assess brand-logo readiness in inboxes. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_caaARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Look up CAA records for a domain. Shows which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_daneARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check DANE/TLSA pinning for SMTP: looks up TLSA records at _25._tcp. for each MX and validates their fields and DNSSEC backing. Records are reported present but UNVERIFIED: there is no port-25 certificate probe, so a pin is never compared to the certificate actually served. Use for SMTP DANE; use check_dane_https for port 443. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_dane_httpsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Verify DANE/TLSA pinning for HTTPS (port 443): looks up TLSA records at _443._tcp. and validates fields and DNSSEC backing. Reported present but UNVERIFIED in every deployment: comparison with the served certificate is withdrawn (the probe cannot observe the origin certificate), so a stale pin is NOT detected. Use check_dane for SMTP. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_dblBRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check domain reputation against DNS-based Domain Block Lists (Spamhaus DBL, URIBL, SURBL). Returns listing status with decoded return codes.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_dkimARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Look up DKIM records for a domain. Probes common selectors, validates the signing algorithm used for outgoing email (RSA-1024/2048, Ed25519), and reports key strength. Use to verify that outbound email signatures are cryptographically sound. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, selector, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_dmarcARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Look up and validate a domain's DMARC record: enforcement level (none/quarantine/reject), alignment mode, and aggregate/forensic reporting destinations. Use to find a domain's DMARC enforcement, whether it sends aggregate reports, or whether it is protected against email impersonation; not check_shadow_domains (TLD variants) or assess_spoofability (composite score). Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_dnskey_strengthARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Audit DNSKEY signing algorithms used for DNSSEC: reports the algorithm in use (RSA/SHA-1, RSA/SHA-256, ECDSA P-256, Ed25519, etc.) and flags deprecated ones (RSA/SHA-1, DSA), independent of whether the chain validates. Use when asked which algorithm signs DNSSEC keys or if deprecated DNSKEY algorithms are in use. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_dnssecARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check DNSSEC status for a domain. Verifies whether DNS is tamper-proof and protected against cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks by validating DNSKEY and DS records. Reports whether DNSSEC is enabled and validating. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_dnssec_chainARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Walk the full DNSSEC chain of trust from the DNS root down to the target domain, tracing DS/DNSKEY records and algorithm usage at each zone level. Use when asked to trace the chain of trust from the DNS root, or to see the full DNSSEC delegation path step by step.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_fast_fluxARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Detect fast-flux DNS behavior: performs multiple rounds of A/AAAA queries and checks whether IP addresses are rotating rapidly on each DNS query (a sign of botnet or malicious infrastructure). Compares IP answer sets and TTLs across rounds to identify rapidly rotating infrastructure used to hide malicious activity.
Inputs: domain (required), format, rounds, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_http_securityARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Audit browser-facing HTTP security headers over HTTPS: Content-Security-Policy (unsafe-inline/unsafe-eval/wildcards), X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy and COOP/COEP/CORP; also detects CDN/WAF interception. Returns per-header findings for missing or weak protection against XSS, clickjacking and cross-origin attacks. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_llms_txtARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Inspect a domain's /llms.txt and /llms-full.txt for links and install commands an AI agent could inherit. Sweeps external link hosts for dangling CNAMEs and deprovisioned-service fingerprints (evidence, not proof it is claimable) and checks npm/PyPI install package names for unregistered names and OSV malicious-package advisories. Detection only, not scored; notAssessed lists unmeasured items.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_lookalikesARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Detect active typosquat and lookalike/homoglyph domains that impersonate your brand and could be used in phishing. Identifies character-substitution and visual-confusion domains registered by attackers. Distinct from check_shadow_domains (TLD variants with auth gaps) and discover_brand_domains (legitimate brand portfolio).
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_mta_stsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check whether a domain enforces SMTP TLS for inbound mail via MTA-STS, protecting against downgrade attacks. Queries _mta-sts. and fetches the policy file, reports mode (enforce/testing/none) and MX coverage. Use to verify whether inbound SMTP is protected against TLS downgrade or MITM — distinct from check_dane which uses TLSA pinning. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_mxARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Look up MX records for a domain. Identifies which mail servers receive inbound email for the domain and which email hosting provider is used (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Proofpoint, etc.). Use when asked which email provider hosts inbound mail for a domain, or to see MX record configuration. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_mx_reputationARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check whether the mail server (MX) IP addresses are listed on spam blocklists (Spamhaus, Barracuda, SORBS, and other RBLs). Also verifies reverse DNS for MX hosts. Use when you want to know if your mail server IP is blacklisted, or if your MX is on any blocklist — distinct from check_rbl which checks a specific IP directly.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_nsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Audit a domain’s nameserver delegation and redundancy. Identifies the DNS hosting provider and, when the infrastructure probe is available, directly compares parent and child NS sets, verifies authoritative AA responses, and checks required glue addresses. Use to detect stale registrar delegations, lame nameservers, and intermittent resolution risk. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_nsec_walkabilityARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Assess zone walkability risk by analyzing NSEC3PARAM configuration. Detects plain NSEC zones, weak NSEC3 parameters, and opt-out flags.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_ptrARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Verify forward-confirmed reverse DNS (PTR/FCrDNS) for mail servers. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_rblBRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check MX server IP reputation against 6 DNS-based Real-time Blocklists (SpamCop, UCEProtect, Mailspike, Barracuda, PSBL). Resolves MX hosts to IPs first.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_realtime_threat_feedARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check a domain against BlackVeil real-time threat intelligence (curated intel-gateway feed). Distinct from DNSBL checks. Operator-deploy only; degrades to info when unprovisioned.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_resolver_consistencyBRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check DNS consistency across 4 public resolvers.
Inputs: domain (required), format, record_type.
check_root_server_setARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Query a rotating sample of 3 root servers per call and compare the priming NS set, glue, SOA serials, and cross-root consistency against the embedded official root hints. Uses BV_INFRA_PROBE when available; without it, returns the embedded hints as reference data only.
Inputs: format. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_shadow_domainsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Find alternate TLD variants of a domain (e.g. example.net, example.co) that have weak or missing email authentication and could be used to spoof email. Use when asked about TLD variants with email auth gaps — distinct from check_lookalikes which detects typosquat/homoglyph impersonation domains.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_spfARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Look up and validate the SPF record for a domain. Lists all IP addresses and third-party senders authorised to send email on behalf of the domain, flags syntax errors, and shows the trust surface (which mail servers are whitelisted). Use when you need to know who is permitted to send email as a domain. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_srvARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Map a domain's DNS-visible service footprint by probing 19 common SRV prefixes (email, calendar, messaging, directory, web) in parallel; returns discovered services and flags insecure advertisements such as plaintext IMAP/POP3/LDAP with no encrypted variant. No match among probed prefixes is not proof the domain has no services. Use to map DNS-visible services.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_sslARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check HTTPS/TLS posture: reachability, HSTS, HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect, and certificate issuer, expiry and SAN count from CT logs (the latest LOGGED certificate, which may differ from the one served). servedCertificate gives the issuer and expiry of the one actually SERVED on port 443, or not_assessed with a reason. TLS versions and cipher suites are not assessed. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_subdomailingARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Detect SubdoMailing risk: analyzes the SPF include chain for dangling or hijackable subdomains that could let an attacker send email as the domain. Use when you want to know if an SPF include chain can be hijacked through a dangling domain, or to detect subdomain mailing risk hidden in SPF includes. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_subdomain_takeoverARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Sweep subdomains for dangling CNAMEs pointing at deprovisioned cloud services an attacker could claim (subdomain takeover); detects 16 provider families such as AWS S3/CloudFront, Azure, GCP Storage, Heroku, GitHub Pages, Vercel and Firebase. Use when asked if subdomains point to deprovisioned services. Pair with discover_subdomains to widen candidates (it returns a CT sample).
Inputs: domain (required), format, subdomains, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_svcb_httpsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Validate HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) for modern transport capability advertisement. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_tlsrptARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check whether a domain has SMTP TLS Reporting (TLS-RPT) configured. Queries _smtp._tls. for the v=TLSRPTv1 record and validates its reporting destination (rua= mailto:/https:), flagging a missing record, duplicate records, or an invalid/absent reporting URI. Complements MTA-STS by giving visibility into TLS delivery failures. Part of the scan_domain audit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_txt_hygieneBRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Audit TXT records for stale entries and SaaS exposure.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
check_zone_hygieneBRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Audit DNS zone hygiene: identifies sensitive or forgotten subdomains exposed in DNS, stale SOA records, and zone propagation issues. Use to find any sensitive subdomains that should not be publicly visible, or to audit overall DNS zone cleanliness.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
compare_baselineARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Compare a domain's current security configuration against a fixed policy baseline to determine compliance. Use to check whether a domain meets a policy requirement — not for tracking improvement/regression over time (use analyze_drift) and not for comparing multiple domains (use compare_domains).
Inputs: domain (required), baseline (required), format, force_refresh.
compare_domainsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Side-by-side security comparison of 2–5 domains. Shows relative scores, category gaps, and unique weaknesses for each domain. Use when comparing your security posture against a competitor, or doing a head-to-head comparison between multiple domains.
Inputs: domains (required), format, force_refresh.
cymru_asnARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Map domain IPs to Autonomous System Numbers via Team Cymru DNS. Returns ASN, prefix, country, registry, and organization for each IP. Flags high-risk hosting ASNs.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
delete_brand_audit_watchADestructiveIdempotentInspect
Permanently removes a recurring brand-audit watch by watchId. Owner-scoped — a watchId owned by another principal surfaces as notFound. Returns confirmation of deletion.
Inputs: watchId (required), format.
discover_brand_domainsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Discover all domains that belong to a brand's portfolio by aggregating certificate, DNS, redirect, and mail-policy signals. Use when asked what domains are part of a brand portfolio, or to find all domains related to a brand. Pass the EXACT seed domain verbatim — do NOT normalize or substitute a canonical domain.
Inputs: domain (required), discovery_mode (required), depth, format, +8 more. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
discover_brand_domains_findingsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Fetch the ranked candidate domains (the discovery CheckResult) for an async run started with discover_brand_domains_start. Returns notReady while the discovery is still in-flight; the discovery result once complete. Owner-scoped.
Inputs: operationId (required), format.
discover_brand_domains_startAInspect
Start an async brand-domain discovery for the EXACT seed domain provided (the async sibling of discover_brand_domains, which can run ~24s and time out interactive clients). Same args as discover_brand_domains. Returns { auditId, queuedAt, etaSeconds } immediately; poll with discover_brand_domains_status and fetch ranked candidates with discover_brand_domains_findings once complete.
Inputs: domain (required), discovery_mode (required), depth, format, +8 more.
discover_brand_domains_statusARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Poll the status of an async brand-domain discovery started with discover_brand_domains_start. Returns status (queued | running | completed | failed) and progress. Owner-scoped — operationIds owned by other principals surface as notFound.
Inputs: operationId (required), format.
discover_subdomainsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Find subdomains via Certificate Transparency logs to reveal shadow IT and forgotten services. Returns a CT SAMPLE, not an asset inventory: counts are a lower bound, hosts without a logged certificate never appear, and a per-source coverage record states what was consulted. countBasis marks totalSubdomains as sample or a cut-recall floor; concreteSubdomains excludes wildcards.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh.
explain_findingBRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Explain a finding with impact and remediation.
Inputs: status (required), checkType (required), format, details.
generateARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Generate a DNS/email security remediation artifact. Artifact types: spf_record (build a new SPF record), dmarc_record (create a DMARC policy), dkim_config (DKIM key setup), mta_sts_policy (generate an MTA-STS policy file), fix_plan (prioritized remediation plan for all findings), or rollout_plan (phased DMARC enforcement timeline). Use when asked to generate or create a record or policy.
Inputs: domain (required), artifact (required), format, policy, +7 more.
get_access_contextARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Read the effective authentication context for this request: tier, owner-IP-gate disposition, a keyed pseudonymous principal reference, server version and observation time. Performs no target checks or quota/session/cache/job writes. An unavailable result is not anonymous/free fallback.
Inputs: no named parameters.
get_benchmarkARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Get industry benchmark data: shows what percentile a domain's security score ranks at within its sector or country cohort, the mean score, and the most common DNS security failures across the industry. Use when asked how a score compares to the industry average, what percentile a score is in, or what the most common security failures are in an industry or sector.
Inputs: format, profile.
get_domain_rankARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Rank a domain against its country or global cohort using the GSI benchmark corpus. Accepts a domain score (from scan_domain) and optional country/sector; returns a percentile: "scores better than X% of peers". Owner-gate exempt — public cohort data only.
Inputs: score (required), domain (required), format, sector, +1 more.
get_provider_insightsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Get security benchmarks and common configuration issues for a specific email or DNS service-provider cohort (e.g. Google Workspace customers, Microsoft 365 customers). Use when asked how an email service provider compares to competitors on security posture, or to see typical misconfigurations for a named vendor's customers.
Inputs: provider (required), format, profile.
list_brand_audit_watchesARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Returns the caller's recurring brand-audit watches: watchId, domain, interval, webhook presence, last-run time, and active state. Owner-scoped. Read-only.
Inputs: format. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
map_complianceBRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Map scan findings to compliance frameworks: NIST 800-177, PCI DSS 4.0, SOC 2, CIS Controls. Shows pass/fail/partial status per control.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh.
map_supply_chainARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Map DNS-visible third-party service dependencies for a domain. Correlates SPF, NS, TXT verifications, SRV services, and CAA records to reveal which third-party vendors can send email as the domain, control DNS, or access integrated services. Use when asked to map third-party or supply-chain dependencies — not for listing who can send email (use check_spf for that).
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh.
osint_investigate_domain_startAInspect
Start an async OSINT investigation for a domain. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status and retrieve results with osint_investigation_report.
Inputs: query (required).
osint_investigate_email_startAInspect
Start an async OSINT investigation for an email address (breach exposure, account correlation). Owner/enterprise tier only — people-centric OSINT is restricted to prevent misuse. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status and retrieve results with osint_investigation_report.
Inputs: query (required).
osint_investigate_infrastructure_startAInspect
Start an async deep-infrastructure OSINT investigation for a query (domain, IP, or org). Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status.
Inputs: query (required).
osint_investigate_supply_chain_startAInspect
Start an async supply-chain OSINT investigation for a query. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status.
Inputs: query (required).
osint_investigate_username_startAInspect
Start an async OSINT investigation for a username (cross-platform presence, breach correlation). Owner/enterprise tier only — people-centric OSINT is restricted to prevent misuse. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status and retrieve results with osint_investigation_report.
Inputs: query (required).
osint_investigation_reportARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Retrieve the final report of a completed OSINT investigation by investigationId. For a deep_infrastructure investigation the report also composes discover_subdomains for the target (a cached CT sample under ctDiscovery, never an inventory). Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned or not yet complete.
Inputs: investigationId (required).
osint_investigation_statusARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Poll the status of an OSINT investigation by investigationId. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns current status (running | completed | failed) and progress metadata.
Inputs: investigationId (required).
prioritize_portfolio_leadsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Rank a brand’s portfolio (or an explicit domain set) into prioritized registrar-partner sales leads by product-gap value × severity. Multi-domain, paid. Reuses map_registrar_products per domain, then ranks. Distinct from map_registrar_products (per-domain product mapping) and batch_scan (raw scores).
Inputs: brand, format, domains, force_refresh.
rdap_lookupARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Fetch domain registration data via RDAP (modern WHOIS replacement). Returns the domain registrar (the company the domain was registered with), registrant contact, creation/expiration dates, EPP status codes, and domain age. Use when asked who registered the domain, who the registrar is, or when the registration expires — distinct from check_ns which identifies the DNS nameserver provider.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh. Returns: score, passed, partial, category, +3 more
register_brand_audit_watchAInspect
Creates a recurring brand-audit watch for a domain on a daily/weekly/monthly cadence. Each run enqueues a fresh brand_audit_batch_start and (when a webhook is configured) POSTs a diff webhook on classification drift. Returns the new watchId. Owner-scoped; per-principal cap of 20 active watches.
Inputs: domain (required), interval (required), format, webhook_url.
resolve_spf_chainARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Trace the full SPF include chain for a domain. Recursively resolves all includes, shows lookup count, tree depth, and flags circular includes or exceeding the 10-lookup limit.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh.
scan_buckets_findingsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Retrieve findings from a completed cloud-bucket discovery scan by scanId. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. The scanId is required so reads can be owner-scoped; target and provider filters are optional.
Inputs: scanId (required), target, providers.
scan_buckets_startAInspect
Start an async cloud-bucket discovery scan for a target domain. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns a scanId immediately — poll progress with scan_buckets_status and retrieve results with scan_buckets_findings.
Inputs: target (required), providers.
scan_buckets_statusARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Poll the status of a cloud-bucket discovery scan by scanId. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns scan status (running | completed | failed) and progress metadata.
Inputs: scanId (required).
scan_domainARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Run a full DNS and email security audit for one domain across every scan-included check (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, DNSSEC and more); returns an overall score, NIST-aligned letter grade (A+ to F), maturity stage and prioritized findings. Use for a comprehensive audit, overall grade or email security maturity level. Cite scoringConfigHash with a score; model and engine versions are not comparable.
Inputs: domain (required), format, profile, force_refresh.
sge_quickscanARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Check whether ONE domain meets the New Zealand Secure Government Email (SGE) requirements due October 2026. Reports seven controls (DMARC p=reject, SPF -all, DKIM, SMTP transport TLS, MTA-STS enforce, TLS-RPT, sub-domain coverage) as satisfied, not satisfied or NOT MEASURED, with evidence. A DNS-only result tops out at INDETERMINATE, which is not a pass. Not map_compliance (NIST/PCI/SOC 2/CIS).
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh.
simulate_attack_pathsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Analyze current DNS posture and enumerate specific attack paths an adversary could exploit, with severity, feasibility, steps, and mitigations.
Inputs: domain (required), format, force_refresh.
validate_fixARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Re-check a specific security control after applying a fix, to confirm the finding is now resolved. Use only when a fix has already been applied and you want to verify or confirm the remediation was successful — not for initial inspection of a record.
Inputs: check (required), domain (required), format, expected.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
TDQS
Scored across 82 tools
Many tools are individually distinct and often explicitly cross-reference related tools, but the 82-tool set contains several clusters with similar names and adjacent purposes (DNSSEC checks, MX/reputation/PTR checks, SPF-chain checks, brand discovery vs. brand audit, sync vs. async variants). An agent can usually choose correctly by reading descriptions, but the volume and overlap make misselection plausible.
Most tools use readable snake_case with verb-first naming such as check_*, get_*, scan_*, compare_*, and register_*. There are a few outliers (cymru_asn, rdap_lookup, sge_quickscan, brand_audit_single) but the overall convention is predictable.
At 82 tools the surface is far beyond the typical well-scoped range of 3-15 tools. Even for a broad DNS/email security platform, the many niche checks, async job variants, and OSINT/brand/cloud tools create excessive discovery and selection overhead.
The set covers a wide audit lifecycle: scanning, async jobs, findings, explanations, remediation generation, validation, drift/baseline comparison, compliance mapping, benchmarks, brand audits, OSINT, and cloud-bucket checks. Minor gaps exist, such as the referenced but absent map_registrar_products tool and no explicit cancel/list-history operations for async jobs.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Assess any domain's email security across SPF, DMARC, DKIM, MTA-STS, DNSSEC, DANE, and TLS-RPT.
Remote MCP server: 19 domain-hygiene and email-auth tools (DNS, SPF, DMARC, DKIM, TLS).
DNS resolution, HTTP security headers, and SPF/DMARC email hygiene audits.
DNS and email security: check SPF, DKIM, DMARC, DNSSEC, DANE and build the records. 45 tools.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceEnables DNS and email security analysis through passive and active scanning capabilities. Provides comprehensive domain security checks including SPF, DMARC, DNSSEC validation, MX record analysis, and SMTP connectivity testing.MIT
- AlicenseAqualityCmaintenanceProvides comprehensive tools for real-time DNS queries across 53 record types, global propagation checks, and SSL certificate analysis. It also enables domain security scans for SPF/DKIM/DMARC configurations and HTTP uptime monitoring.891 npm23Apache 2.0
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceAn MCP server that checks SPF, DKIM, DMARC, and MX records for a domain, returning a health verdict and specific DNS fixes to improve email deliverability.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceEnables assessing and comparing domains for email spoofing risk by evaluating SPF, DMARC, MX, and DKIM records from public DNS, providing A-F grades and concrete remediation steps.MIT