privatevault-gate
Related Servers
Alternatives to privatevault-gate
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to call backend tools under per-agent policy, deciding which tools each agent can see, what arguments it may pass, how often it may call, and which writes wait for human approval. It also redacts secrets and PII from tool results, fences untrusted output against injection, and records every call in a hash-chained audit log.25 npmMIT
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceProvides a secure MCP boundary for AI agents, intercepting and validating tool calls, redacting secrets, and requiring human approval for sensitive actions with a tamper-evident audit trail.-
- AlicenseAqualityAmaintenanceGates every AI agent tool call against your policy before it runs, then writes a hash-chained, tamper-evident record of what was decided and what happened. Anyone can verify that record offline, without your software, your systems or any key you hold.4529 PyPI15AGPL 3.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityAmaintenancePolicy gateway for AI agent tool calls: checks every MCP, shell and file call against one provio.yaml (allow / deny / ask / redact) before it runs, pins MCP tool definitions against rug pulls, and records each decision in a tamper-evident, signed ledger.2Apache 2.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to call tools through a security gateway that intercepts requests, enforces deterministic policy and risk checks, blocks or escalates high-risk actions for human approval, and keeps tool credentials and audit logs protected.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables any MCP-compatible agent to route its outbound tool calls and inbound tool responses through a boundary-enforced consent firewall that detects and minimizes sensitive fields per recipient, purpose and data type, pauses for user approval, quarantines prompt injections, and writes a tamper-evident privacy receipt for every decision. Sensitive values stay as vault tokens so the model provider never receives them unless policy explicitly allows it.1 npm1MIT
TDQS
Scored across 5 tools
Each pv_* tool has a distinct purpose (exec, write, HTTP, decide, list blocked). Minimal ambiguity between pv_decide (advisory) and the gated tools is mitigated by clear descriptions of enforcement.
All tools use a consistent pv_ prefix with snake_case verbs. Minor deviation: 'decide' is an action but 'blocked' is a list operation, but the pattern is still predictable.
Five tools perfectly suit a security-gating server: core gated operations plus an advisory decision and a history check. No bloat or gap in scope.
The server covers the essential lifecycle of gating actions and checking decisions. Missing features like allowing/denying decisions or a detailed audit log, but these are secondary for advisory/lists.