Tunnel Manager
Tunnel Manager
CLI または API | MCP | エージェント
バージョン: 3.1.0
ドキュメント — API、CLI、MCP、そしてエージェントインターフェースにわたるインストール、デプロイ、使用法は、 公式ドキュメント に管理されています。
Related MCP server: mcp-ssh
概要
Tunnel Manager は、リモートホストへのSSHトンネルを作成し、Agentic AI向けのMCPサーバーとしてホストするために直接インターフェースする、本番グレードのエージェントおよび Model Context Protocol (MCP) サーバーです。
主要な機能
統合されたアクションルーティングMCPツール: メソッドを最適化されたトグル可能なツールモジュールにグループ化することで、LLMコンテキストにおけるトークンオーバーヘッドを最小化し、ツールの肥大化を排除します。
エンタープライズグレードのセキュリティ: Eunomiaポリシー、OIDCトークン委任、および詳細な実行コンテキスト追跡を包括的にサポートします。
統合グラフエージェント: Agent Control Protocol (ACP) と標準Webインターフェース (AG-UI) をサポートする組み込みのPydantic AIエージェント。
ネイティブテレメトリとトレーシング: すぐに使えるOpenTelemetryエクスポートとネイティブのLangfuseトレーシング。
CLI または API
このエージェントは、リモートホストへのSSHトンネルを作成し、Agentic AI向けのMCPサーバーとしてホストするAPIをラップしています。プログラム的にも、統合された実行エントリポイントを介しても操作できます。
基盤となるAPIラッパー、拡張スキーマバインディング、開発者SDKリファレンスの使用方法の詳細な手順は、docs/index.md に管理されています。
MCP
このサーバーは、動的なアクションルーティングツールを利用して、トークンオーバーヘッドを最適化し、IDE互換性を最大化します。
利用可能なMCPツール
ライブMCPサーバーから自動生成 — 手動で編集しないでください。
凝縮されたアクションルーティングツール (MCP_TOOL_MODE=condensed)
MCPツール | トグル環境変数 | 説明 |
|
| リモートホストでの高度なファイル操作。 |
|
| ローカルホストエイリアスインベントリを管理します。 |
|
| YAMLホストグループに対する一括インベントリ操作。 |
|
| 操作ライフサイクルとセッション管理。 |
|
| 共有接続パラメータを使用したシングルホストSSH操作。 |
|
| セキュリティスキャンとコンプライアンス。 |
|
| SSHによるリモートシステムインテリジェンス。 |
|
| 管理対象のSSHインベントリをリスト表示し、epistemic-graph KGにプッシュします。 |
冗長な1:1 APIマッピングツール (MCP_TOOL_MODE=verbose または both)
MCPツール | トグル環境変数 | 説明 |
|
| add_host 操作を呼び出します。 |
|
| エイリアスでホスト設定を取得し、呼び出し元が権限を持たないエイリアスを拒否します。 |
|
| 呼び出し元が権限を持つホストエイリアスをリスト表示し、シークレットは編集されます。 |
|
| load_inventory 操作を呼び出します。 |
|
| remove_host 操作を呼び出します。 |
|
| save_inventory 操作を呼び出します。 |
8つのアクションルーティングツール · 6つの冗長な1:1ツール。各ツールは、その <DOMAIN>TOOL トグルが false に設定されていない限り有効です。MCP_TOOL_MODE はサーフェスを選択します (**intent デフォルト* — 6つの動詞ツール、必要に応じてロードされる詳細セット · condensed アクションルーティング · verbose 1:1 · both)。自動生成 — 手動で編集しないでください。*
詳細なツールスキーマ、パラメータ形状、検証制約は、docs/usage.md に保存されています。
動的ツール選択と可視性
このMCPサーバーは、実行時の動的なツールセット選択と可視性フィルタリングをサポートしています。これにより、LLMのコンテキストウィンドウを肥大化させないために、公開するツールのセットを制限できます。
ツールフィルタリングは、複数の入力チャネルを介して設定できます:
CLI引数: 起動時に
--toolsまたは--toolsets(または無効化対応の--disabled-toolsと--disabled-toolsets) を渡します。環境変数: 標準の環境変数を定義します:
MCP_ENABLED_TOOLS/MCP_DISABLED_TOOLSMCP_ENABLED_TAGS/MCP_DISABLED_TAGS
HTTP SSEリクエストヘッダー: トランスポート初期化中にカスタムヘッダーを渡します:
x-mcp-enabled-tools/x-mcp-disabled-toolsx-mcp-enabled-tags/x-mcp-disabled-tags
HTTP SSEリクエストクエリパラメータ: トランスポート接続URLに直接クエリパラメータを追加します:
?tools=tool1,tool2?tags=tag1
クエリ文字列またはパラメータが指定されると、LLMフリーの ナレッジグラフ解決レイヤー (DynamicToolOrchestrator を使用) が、クエリの意図を既知のツールタグ、名前、または説明と照合し、安全なフォールバックと自動化された24時間バックグラウンドキャッシュ更新を行います。
MCP設定例
コネクタ焦点の
[mcp]エクストラをインストールします。 例ではtunnel-manager[mcp]を使用して、agent-utilities[mcp]を介して FastMCP / FastAPI を追加します。必要な Agent Utilities コア は引き続きepistemic-graph[full]を保持します。[agent-runtime]エクストラはさらに モデルオーケストレーションを有効にします。
stdio トランスポート (ローカルIDE — Cursor、Claude Desktop、VS Code)
{
"mcpServers": {
"tunnel-manager-mcp": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"--from",
"tunnel-manager[mcp]",
"tunnel-manager-mcp"
],
"env": {
"MCP_TOOL_MODE": "intent",
"FILETOOL": "True",
"HOSTTOOL": "True",
"INGESTTOOL": "True",
"INVENTORYTOOL": "True",
"OPERATIONSTOOL": "True",
"REMOTETOOL": "True",
"SECURITYTOOL": "True",
"SYSTEMTOOL": "True",
"TUNNEL_IDENTITY_FILE": "~/.ssh/id_ed25519",
"TUNNEL_INVENTORY_GROUP": "all",
"TUNNEL_KG_INGEST": "true",
"TUNNEL_KNOWN_HOSTS": "~/.ssh/known_hosts",
"TUNNEL_MANAGER_HEALTH_AGGREGATE_S": "3600",
"TUNNEL_MANAGER_HEALTH_INGEST": "true",
"TUNNEL_MANAGER_HOSTS": "r510,r710,r820,rw710",
"TUNNEL_MAX_THREADS": "6",
"TUNNEL_PARALLEL": "False",
"TUNNEL_REMOTE_PORT": "22"
}
}
}
}ランタイム参照には、GraphOS などのエイリアス対応ランチャーが必要です。他の ランチャーは、それらのエントリを省略し、解決された値を独自の ランタイムシークレット境界を介して注入する必要があります。
Streamable-HTTP トランスポート (ネットワーク / 本番)
{
"mcpServers": {
"tunnel-manager-mcp": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"--from",
"tunnel-manager[mcp]",
"tunnel-manager-mcp",
"--transport",
"streamable-http",
"--port",
"8000"
],
"env": {
"TRANSPORT": "streamable-http",
"HOST": "127.0.0.1",
"PORT": "8000",
"MCP_TOOL_MODE": "intent",
"FILETOOL": "True",
"HOSTTOOL": "True",
"INGESTTOOL": "True",
"INVENTORYTOOL": "True",
"OPERATIONSTOOL": "True",
"REMOTETOOL": "True",
"SECURITYTOOL": "True",
"SYSTEMTOOL": "True",
"TUNNEL_IDENTITY_FILE": "~/.ssh/id_ed25519",
"TUNNEL_INVENTORY_GROUP": "all",
"TUNNEL_KG_INGEST": "true",
"TUNNEL_KNOWN_HOSTS": "~/.ssh/known_hosts",
"TUNNEL_MANAGER_HEALTH_AGGREGATE_S": "3600",
"TUNNEL_MANAGER_HEALTH_INGEST": "true",
"TUNNEL_MANAGER_HOSTS": "r510,r710,r820,rw710",
"TUNNEL_MAX_THREADS": "6",
"TUNNEL_PARALLEL": "False",
"TUNNEL_REMOTE_PORT": "22"
}
}
}
}または、url で事前デプロイされた Streamable-HTTP インスタンスに接続します:
{
"mcpServers": {
"tunnel-manager-mcp": {
"url": "http://localhost:8000/tunnel-manager-mcp/mcp"
}
}
}レビュー済みコンテナイメージを最小権限のstdio子プロセスとして実行します (リスナーや 公開ポートなし):
docker run -i --rm \
--read-only \
--cap-drop=ALL \
--security-opt=no-new-privileges \
--pids-limit=256 \
--tmpfs /tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=64m \
-e TRANSPORT=stdio \
-e MCP_TOOL_MODE=intent \
-e FILETOOL=True \
-e HOSTTOOL=True \
-e INGESTTOOL=True \
-e INVENTORYTOOL=True \
-e OPERATIONSTOOL=True \
-e REMOTETOOL=True \
-e SECURITYTOOL=True \
-e SYSTEMTOOL=True \
-e TUNNEL_IDENTITY_FILE=~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \
-e TUNNEL_INVENTORY_GROUP=all \
-e TUNNEL_KG_INGEST=true \
-e TUNNEL_KNOWN_HOSTS=~/.ssh/known_hosts \
-e TUNNEL_MANAGER_HEALTH_AGGREGATE_S=3600 \
-e TUNNEL_MANAGER_HEALTH_INGEST=true \
-e TUNNEL_MANAGER_HOSTS=r510,r710,r820,rw710 \
-e TUNNEL_MAX_THREADS=6 \
-e TUNNEL_PARALLEL=False \
-e TUNNEL_REMOTE_PORT=22 \
registry.example.invalid/tunnel-manager@sha256:<digest> tunnel-manager-mcpコンテナ化されたネットワークHTTPの場合、認証されたTLSイングレス (または
直接サーバーTLS)、正確な MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS、そしてオペレーター所有のデプロイプロファイルを通じた
正確な信頼プロキシCIDRポリシーを提供します。ジェネレーターは、
認証されていない非ループバックリスナーを生成しません。
コード読み取り環境サーフェス (MCP_TOOL_MODE + パッケージ変数) から自動生成 — 手動で編集しないでください。
追加のデプロイオプション
tunnel-manager は、ローカルのstdioプロセスまたはコンテナとして、またはリモートの
ネットワーク境界の背後で実行できます。
デプロイガイド に
詳細なトランスポート契約が記載されています。
ローカルコンテナ — レビュー済みの不変イメージを、リスナーや公開ポートのない 最小権限のstdio子プロセスとして起動します。
リモートURL — オペレーター提供の認証済みHTTPSイングレスを介して接続します。 そのURL、送信ID参照、信頼プロファイル、正確な
MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTSをAgentConfigに保持します。
インベントリ
tunnel-manager は、短いホストエイリアス (例: edge-node) をSSH接続詳細にマッピングする
単一の共有YAML インベントリ から動作します。すべてのエコシステムサーフェスは
同じファイル を読み取ります — HostManager API、tunnel-manager CLI、MCPサーバー、
container-manager-mcp (その cm_* ホストエイリアス)、そして ssh-bootstrap スキル — そのため、
フリートを一度定義するだけです。
場所 —
~/.config/agent-utilities/inventory.yml(.yml推奨)。同じパスにある従来のinventory.yamlは、.ymlが存在しない場合にも引き続き読み取られるため、既存の インストールは動作し続けます。TUNNEL_INVENTORYで上書きします。管理 は
inventoryサブコマンドで行います:tunnel-manager inventory init # write a commented inventory.yml template (--force to overwrite) tunnel-manager inventory doctor # validate hosts/groups; --fix migrates legacy .yaml -> .yml tunnel-manager inventory show # print the resolved path + host/group summary
完全なスキーマ、すべてのホストフィールド、コピーペーストテンプレート、上書きオプションは、 インベントリガイド にあります。
環境変数
パッケージ環境変数
変数 | 例 | 説明 |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| オプション: stdio、streamable-http、sse |
|
| |
|
| |
| secret-injected | |
| secret-injected | |
|
| |
|
| オプション: none、embedded、remote |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
| — | デフォルトのリモートホスト(例: 198.51.100.10) |
|
| デフォルトのSSHポート |
| — | デフォルトのSSHユーザー名 |
| — |
|
|
| 独立して検証されたサーバーホストキー |
| — | SSH証明書ファイルへのパス |
| — | ジャンプホスト/踏み台接続用のSSH ProxyCommand |
| — | インベントリファイルへのパス(デフォルトはXDG設定パス) |
|
| 対象とするインベントリホストグループ |
|
| ホスト操作を並列実行する |
|
|
|
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
| — | インベントリ解決用のベース設定ディレクトリ(デフォルトは ~/.config) |
|
| グループ化された condensed サーフェスのトグル。 |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| KG取り込みツール(SSHインベントリを epistemic-graph に一覧表示) |
|
|
|
|
| デフォルト有効なベストエフォートのネットワークシグナル傾向の取り込み |
|
| サンプルが1つの :HealthTrend ノード/ホスト/シグナルに集約されるウィンドウ(秒) |
|
| プローブ/導出するカンマ区切りのインベントリエイリアス(デフォルト: 全インベントリ) |
| — | ネットワーク異常通知用のベストエフォートWebhook |
継承されたエージェントユーティリティ変数(すべてのコネクタに適用)
変数 | 例 | 説明 |
|
| ツールサーフェス: |
| — | カンマ区切りのツール許可リスト |
| — | カンマ区切りのツール拒否リスト |
| — | カンマ区切りのタグ許可リスト |
| — | カンマ区切りのタグ拒否リスト |
| — | 送信MCP子認証: |
| — | OIDCクライアントID(サービスアカウント認証) |
|
| OIDCサービスアカウントのランタイムシークレット参照 |
| — | HTTP Basic ユーザー名( |
|
| HTTP Basic 認証のランタイムシークレット参照( |
|
| エージェントが接続するMCPサーバーのURL |
|
| エージェントのLLMプロバイダー |
|
| エージェントのモデルID |
|
| AG-UI Webインターフェースを提供する |
パッケージ44個 + 継承変数14個。.env.example + 共有エージェントユーティリティセットから自動生成 — 編集しないでください。
サーバーが読み取るすべての変数を目的別にグループ化しています。コピー&ペースト用の出発点として .env.example を参照してください。
SSH接続と認証情報
変数 | 説明 | デフォルト |
| SSH秘密鍵へのパス |
|
| SSHユーザー名 | — |
|
| — |
| 独立して検証されたSSHサーバーキーのトラストストア |
|
| SSH証明書へのパス | — |
| デフォルトのリモートホスト | — |
| デフォルトのリモートSSHポート |
|
| ジャンプホスト用のSSH | — |
インベントリと並列性
変数 | 説明 | デフォルト |
| 共有インベントリへのパス( |
|
| デフォルトのインベントリホストグループ | — |
| 一括操作を並列実行 | — |
| SSHワーカースレッドの最大同時実行数 | — |
| インベントリの解決に使用するベース設定ディレクトリ |
|
MCPサーバー / トランスポート
変数 | 説明 | デフォルト |
|
|
|
| バインドホスト(HTTPトランスポート) |
|
| バインドポート(HTTPトランスポート) |
|
| ツールサーフェス: |
|
| カンマ区切りのツール許可/拒否リスト | — |
| カンマ区切りのタグ許可/拒否リスト | — |
| 詳細ログ出力 |
|
| バッファリングなしの標準出力(コンテナ内で推奨) |
|
ツールトグル
各アクションルーティングツールは、トグル環境変数(falseに設定)で個別に無効化できます。
完全なリストは上記の利用可能なMCPツールテーブルにあります
(HOSTTOOL、REMOTETOOL、INVENTORYTOOL、OPERATIONSTOOL、
SYSTEMTOOL、FILETOOL、SECURITYTOOL)。
テレメトリとガバナンス
変数 | 説明 | デフォルト |
| OpenTelemetryエクスポートを有効化 |
|
| OTLPコレクターエンドポイント | — |
| OTLP認証キー | — |
| OTLPプロトコル(例: | — |
| 認可モード: |
|
| 組み込みポリシーファイル |
|
| リモートEunomiaサーバーURL | — |
エージェントランタイム(フル[agent]ランタイムのみ)
変数 | 説明 | デフォルト |
| エージェントが接続するMCPサーバーのURL |
|
| LLMプロバイダー(例: |
|
| モデルID(例: |
|
| AG-UI Webインターフェースを提供 |
|
エージェント
このリポジトリには、完全統合されたPydantic AI Graph Agentが含まれています。Agent Control Protocol (ACP) を介して通信し、Agent Web UI (AG-UI) およびターミナルインターフェースとシームレスに連携します。
Agent CLIの実行
対話型コマンドラインエージェントを起動するには:
# Set credentials
export TUNNEL_IDENTITY_FILE="your_value"
export DEBUG="your_value"
export PYTHONUNBUFFERED="your_value"
# Run the agent server
tunnel-manager-agent --provider openai --model-id gpt-4oDocker Composeオーケストレーション
以下のdocker/agent.compose.ymlは、Agent、Web UI、ターミナルインターフェースをまとめて設定します:
version: '3.8'
services:
tunnel-manager-mcp:
image: example/tunnel-manager:mcp
container_name: tunnel-manager-mcp
hostname: tunnel-manager-mcp
restart: always
env_file:
- ../.env
environment:
- PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
- HOST=0.0.0.0
- PORT=8000
- TRANSPORT=streamable-http
ports:
- "8000:8000"
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "python3", "-c", "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:8000/health')"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 10s
retries: 3
start_period: 10s
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
tunnel-manager-agent:
image: example/tunnel-manager@sha256:<digest>
container_name: tunnel-manager-agent
hostname: tunnel-manager-agent
restart: always
depends_on:
- tunnel-manager-mcp
env_file:
- ../.env
command: [ "tunnel-manager-agent" ]
environment:
- PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
- HOST=0.0.0.0
- PORT=9002
- MCP_URL=http://tunnel-manager-mcp:8000/mcp
- PROVIDER=${PROVIDER:-openai}
- MODEL_ID=${MODEL_ID:-gpt-4o}
- ENABLE_WEB_UI=True
- ENABLE_OTEL=True
ports:
- "9002:9002"
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "python3", "-c", "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:9002/health')"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 10s
retries: 3
start_period: 10s
logging:
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
詳細なグラフノードアーキテクチャの説明、カスタムスキル設定、エージェントトレースガイドはdocs/deployment.mdで参照できます。
セキュリティとガバナンス
エンタープライズ対応のagent-utilitiesコア上に直接構築されており、標準のセキュリティパラメータを完全にサポートしています:
アクセス制御とポリシー適用
Eunomiaポリシー: きめ細かいポリシー駆動のツール認可。
none、ローカルembedded(mcp_policies.json)、または集中型remoteモードをサポート。OIDCトークンデリゲーション: Web UI / ACP → Agent → MCP の認証ユーザー資格情報のフローに対応したRFC 8693トークン交換に準拠。
スコープ付き資格情報: 実行コンテキストは特定の呼び出し元IDに制限されます。
ランタイムセキュリティグリッド
機能 | 機能性 | 有効化 |
ツールガード | ヒューマンインザループ検証による機密性検査 | デフォルトで有効 |
プロンプトインジェクション防御 | 入力スキャン、繰り返し監視、再帰ループブロック | デフォルトで有効 |
コンテキスト安全ガード | スタックループ検出とコンテキストオーバーフロー事前警告 | デフォルトで有効 |
インストール
実行したい内容に合ったエクストラを選択してください:
エクストラ | インストール内容 | 使用する場合 |
| コネクタ特化型MCPサーバー( | MCPサーバーのみを実行する場合(最小インストール/イメージ) |
| エージェントランタイム( | 統合エージェントを実行する場合 |
| すべて( | 開発 / 両方のサーフェス |
# Connector-focused MCP server (includes the shared graph engine)
uv pip install "tunnel-manager[mcp]"
# Agent runtime (adds model orchestration to the shared graph engine)
uv pip install "tunnel-manager[agent]"
# Everything (development)
uv pip install "tunnel-manager[all]" # or: python -m pip install "tunnel-manager[all]"コンテナイメージ(:mcp vs :agent)
1つのマルチステージdocker/Dockerfileが、--targetで選択される2つの適切なサイズのイメージをビルドします:
イメージタグ | ビルドターゲット | 内容 | エントリポイント |
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docker build --target mcp -t example/tunnel-manager:mcp docker/ # connector-focused MCP server
docker build --target agent -t example/tunnel-manager:agent-local docker/ # agent runtimedocker/mcp.compose.ymlはコネクタ特化型の:mcpサーバーを実行し、docker/agent.compose.ymlは同一配置の:mcpサイドカーとともにエージェント(immutable agent digest)を実行します。
ナレッジグラフデータベース(epistemic-graph)
[mcp]と[agent]の両方が、必須のAgent Utilitiesコア依存関係(epistemic-graph[full])を通じてepistemic-graphエンジンを搭載しています。[mcp]エクストラはサーバーをコネクタ特化型に保ち、[agent]はさらにモデルオーケストレーションを有効にします。ローカルデプロイではバンドルされたエンジンを使用できます。本番環境や共有状態の場合は、epistemic-graphを専用データベースサービスとして実行し、ランタイムがそれを使用するように設定してください。デプロイレシピ(シングルノード + Raft HA)、接続設定、アーキテクチャ図はepistemic-graphデプロイメントガイドに文書化されています。
ドキュメント
完全なドキュメントは公式ドキュメントサイトとして公開されており、インストール、デプロイ、日常運用の推奨リファレンスです。
ページ | 内容 |
pip、ソース、エクストラ、ビルド済みDockerイメージ | |
共有 | |
MCPおよびエージェントサーバーの実行、Compose、Caddy + Technitium、環境設定 | |
MCPツール、 | |
エコシステムの役割、分散SSHスウォームスケーリング、MCP設定 | |
証明書、プロキシ、クロスOS接続モデル | |
コンセプトレジストリ( |
AGENTS.mdは正規のコントリビューター/エージェントガイダンスです。
メンテナー
プロジェクトのコントリビューターチームによって保守されています。パッケージメタデータは、個人のIDではなく意図的にロールアドレスを使用しています。
コントリビュート
コントリビューションを歓迎します!プルリクエストを送信する前に、ローカルチェックを実行してコード品質を確保してください:
ruff format .でコードをフォーマットruff check .でコードをリントmypy .で型安全性を検証pytestでテストスイートを実行
agent-utilities-deploymentでデプロイ
このパッケージを統合された agent-utilities-deployment ワークフローでプロビジョニングしてください。インストール済みパッケージ、編集可能ソース、またはイミュータブルコンテナのパスを選択し、AgentConfig にはランタイムのシークレットと TLS プロファイルの参照のみを記録し、doctor、登録、ポリシー、可観測性、ロールバックのゲートを実行します。エージェントに 「tunnel-manager を agent-utilities-deployment でデプロイ」 と依頼してください。
インストールモード | コマンド |
インストール済みパッケージ |
|
編集可能ソース |
|
イミュータブルコンテナ | オペレーターが選択したオーケストレーターを通じて |
リポジトリには、デプロイプロファイル、認証情報の値、証明書パス、環境固有のエンドポイントは埋め込まれていません。これらは実行時に AgentConfig と設定済みのシークレットプロバイダーを通じて提供してください。
管理対象ケイパビリティ契約
このパッケージは、専門手順を参照ワークフローとして保持した、コンパクトな標準スキルサーフェスを提供します。現在の MCP ツール、スキルメタデータ、connector_manifest.yml、オントロジー、マッピング、シェイプ、フィクスチャ、マイグレーション、ツールスキーマのフィンガープリント、および認証メタデータは、1 つのバージョン管理されたケイパビリティ契約を構成します。これらをまとめて検証してください。古いツール名や過去のタスク別スキルラッパーに依存しないでください。
ランタイムのエンドポイント、認証情報、証明書の信頼、テナント ID、保持、および可観測性ポリシーはデプロイ時の入力であり、パッケージ化された値になることはありません。ネットワークトランスポート、コネクタの取り込み、GraphOS 委任、またはトレースエクスポートを有効にする前に、構成、信頼、およびプライバシー を参照してください。
Available Tools
8 toolstm_filesAdvanced File OperationsCDestructive
Advanced file operations on remote hosts.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| mode | No | Permission mode (recursive_ops/chmod). | 755 |
| group | No | Group (recursive_ops/chown). | |
| host1 | No | First host (diff_compare). | |
| host2 | No | Second host (diff_compare). | |
| owner | No | Owner (recursive_ops/chown). | |
| action | Yes | Action: 'recursive_ops', 'content_search', 'watch', 'diff_compare', 'backup' | |
| source | No | Source path (recursive_ops). | |
| pattern | No | Search pattern (content_search). | |
| duration | No | Monitor duration secs (watch). | |
| password | No | SSH password. | |
| username | No | SSH username. | |
| file_path | No | File path to compare (diff_compare). | |
| operation | No | Operation type: copy, move, delete, list, chmod, chown (recursive_ops). | |
| recursive | No | Recursive search (content_search). | |
| backup_dest | No | Backup destination (backup). | |
| compression | No | Enable compression (backup). | |
| destination | No | Destination path (recursive_ops/copy/move). | |
| incremental | No | Incremental backup (backup). | |
| max_results | No | Max results (content_search). | |
| remote_host | No | Remote host. | |
| watch_paths | No | Paths to monitor (watch). | |
| backup_paths | No | Paths to backup (backup). | |
| search_paths | No | Directories to search (content_search). | |
| identity_file | No | SSH identity file path. | |
| case_sensitive | No | Case-sensitive (content_search). |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description does not add behavioral context beyond the annotations. Annotations already indicate destructiveHint=true, but the description fails to mention that operations may modify or delete files, require SSH credentials, or have side effects. With annotations present, the description should still provide safety or prerequisite details.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely short (one sentence), but it fails to convey essential information. Conciseness should not come at the cost of usefulness. Every sentence should add value; this sentence is generic and does not help the agent select or invoke the tool effectively.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (25 parameters, 5 actions, output schema exists), the description is severely incomplete. It does not mention the supported actions, prerequisites (SSH credentials), or how to combine parameters. An output schema exists but is not referenced. The description leaves the agent with no guidance on how to operate the tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Although schema coverage is 100% with parameter descriptions, the tool's description does not summarize which parameters correspond to which action. With 25 parameters and multiple actions, the description should group parameters or list actions, but it just repeats the title. Baseline for high coverage is 3, but the lack of structural guidance reduces clarity.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states 'Advanced file operations on remote hosts', which indicates the tool's domain (files on remote hosts) and implies operations, but lacks a specific verb-resource pair. It distinguishes from sibling tools like tm_hosts or tm_inventory, so a clear domain is established.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives. The description does not specify contexts like 'for file management, use this; for host management, use tm_hosts'. An agent must infer from the name and schema alone, which is insufficient.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
tm_hostsHost ManagementCDestructive
Manage the local host alias inventory.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| port | No | SSH port. | |
| user | No | Username. | |
| alias | No | Host alias. | |
| action | Yes | Action: 'list', 'add', 'remove' | |
| hostname | No | Real hostname or IP. | |
| password | No | Password (if no key). | |
| identity_file | No | Path to private key. | |
| proxy_command | No | Proxy command. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The annotations already indicate destructiveHint=true, but the description does not elaborate on the destructive nature (e.g., removing hosts permanently) or other behavioral traits like authentication requirements or system changes. It adds no value beyond the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single short sentence, which is concise but under-specified. It lacks critical information such as the available actions or the fact that it modifies local configuration. It is appropriately sized for a simple tool but incomplete for the complexity of 8 parameters.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool has 8 parameters, a required 'action' parameter, and a destructive annotation, the description is too minimal. It does not mention the three actions (list, add, remove) or the potential impacts. Even with an output schema, the description fails to provide essential operational context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has 100% description coverage, so each parameter is already documented. The description ('Manage...') does not add any additional meaning or context about how parameters relate. The baseline is 3 since the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states 'Manage the local host alias inventory,' which identifies the resource but uses the vague verb 'manage.' It does not specify the actions (list, add, remove) or how the tool operates. The title 'Host Management' provides context, but the description alone is insufficient to clearly distinguish the tool's specific function from siblings like tm_inventory.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives such as tm_remote or tunnel_ingest_hosts. There are no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use conditions, leaving the agent to infer usage from the action parameter and sibling names.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
tm_inventoryInventory OperationsCDestructive
Bulk inventory operations against YAML host groups.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cfg | No | Local SSH config path (copy_ssh_config). | |
| cmd | No | Shell command (run_command). | |
| key | No | Shared key path (configure_key_auth). | /app/.ssh/id_ed25519 |
| group | No | Target group. | all |
| lpath | No | Local file path (send_file). | |
| rpath | No | Remote file path (send_file/receive_file). | |
| action | Yes | Action: 'configure_key_auth', 'mesh_bootstrap', 'run_command', 'copy_ssh_config', 'rotate_key', 'send_file', 'receive_file' | |
| key_pfx | No | Prefix for new keys (rotate_key). | /root/.ssh/id_ |
| rmt_cfg | No | Remote config path (copy_ssh_config). | /root/.ssh/config |
| timeout | No | Command timeout in seconds. | |
| key_type | No | Key type: rsa or ed25519. | ed25519 |
| parallel | No | Run parallel. | |
| inventory | No | YAML inventory path (default: $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/agent-utilities/inventory.yaml). | /root/.config/agent-utilities/inventory.yml |
| max_threads | No | Max threads. | |
| lpath_prefix | No | Local dir prefix (receive_file). |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations provide destructiveHint=true, but the description adds no behavioral context beyond that. It does not disclose what is destroyed, safety precautions, or any side effects. The description relies solely on the annotations for transparency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is terse (one sentence) and front-loaded with key terms. However, given the tool's complexity (15 parameters, multiple actions), it is too brief and could benefit from a structured overview.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite having an output schema and 15 parameters, the description fails to provide a high-level explanation of the tool's actions or typical use cases. It is insufficient for an agent to fully understand the tool's capabilities without inspecting the schema extensively.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so each parameter has a description. The tool-level description adds no additional meaning beyond the schema. It is adequate but not enhanced.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description 'Bulk inventory operations against YAML host groups' is somewhat vague, using the generic term 'operations' without specifying the types of actions. The title 'Inventory Operations' also lacks specificity. It indicates the resource (YAML host groups) and bulk nature, but does not clearly define the tool's purpose relative to siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives like tm_hosts or tm_operations. The description does not mention context, prerequisites, or exclusions, leaving the agent to infer usage from the action parameter alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
tm_operationsOperation ManagementCDestructive
Operation lifecycle and session management.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | Action: 'start', 'get_progress', 'cancel', 'get_metrics', 'list_sessions' | |
| details | No | Additional details (start). | |
| total_steps | No | Total steps (start). | |
| operation_id | No | Operation ID (get_progress/cancel/get_metrics). | |
| operation_type | No | Type of operation (start). |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, so the description does not need to repeat that. However, it adds no further behavioral context beyond 'lifecycle and session management,' which is adequately covered by the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is only 5 words, which is too terse. While concise, it sacrifices informativeness and does not earn its place given the tool's complexity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite having an output schema and annotations, the description is too brief to cover the tool's multiple actions and use cases. It fails to explain how to use the action parameter or what each action entails.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so all parameters are documented in the schema. The description adds no additional parameter information, so it meets the baseline without adding value.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states the tool manages operation lifecycle and sessions, which is a general purpose. It distinguishes from siblings like tm_files or tm_hosts, but lacks specificity about the exact actions (start, cancel, etc.) that are available.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives. The description does not mention prerequisites, context for each action, or when to prefer sibling tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
tm_remoteRemote SSH OperationsCDestructive
Single-host SSH operations with shared connection params.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cfg | No | SSH config path. | /root/.ssh/config |
| cmd | No | Shell command (run_command). | |
| key | No | Key path (test_key_auth/setup_passwordless). | |
| host | No | Remote host. | |
| lcfg | No | Local SSH config (copy_ssh_config). | |
| port | No | Port. | |
| rcfg | No | Remote SSH config (copy_ssh_config). | /root/.ssh/config |
| user | No | Username. | |
| lpath | No | Local file path (send_file/receive_file). | |
| proxy | No | Teleport proxy. | |
| rpath | No | Remote file path (send_file/receive_file). | |
| action | Yes | Action: 'run_command', 'send_file', 'receive_file', 'check_ssh', 'test_key_auth', 'setup_passwordless', 'copy_ssh_config', 'rotate_key', 'remove_host_key' | |
| id_file | No | Private key path. | /app/.ssh/id_ed25519 |
| new_key | No | New private key path (rotate_key). | |
| timeout | No | Command timeout in seconds. | |
| key_type | No | Key type: rsa or ed25519 (setup_passwordless/rotate_key). | ed25519 |
| password | No | Password. | |
| certificate | No | Teleport certificate. | |
| known_hosts | No | Known hosts path (remove_host_key). | /root/.ssh/known_hosts |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, so the agent knows operations may be destructive. The description adds no further behavioral context (e.g., that actions like remove_host_key modify remote host keys, or that some operations require authentication). Minimal value beyond annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Single sentence is concise but overly minimal. It lacks front-loading of key information (e.g., list of actions or critical parameters). Every word earns its place, but additional context would improve usability without adding bloat.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With 19 parameters and multiple actions, the description is too sparse. It does not explain the variety of actions, how to use shared parameters, or typical usage patterns. Even with an output schema, the description fails to provide sufficient context for effective tool selection and invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% (all 19 parameters have brief descriptions). The tool description adds no extra meaning; it only says 'shared connection params.' Baseline is 3 as schema does the heavy lifting, but description does not enhance understanding of parameters.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Description states 'Single-host SSH operations with shared connection params,' which clearly indicates the tool is for SSH actions on one remote host. It distinguishes from siblings like tm_files (local files) or tm_hosts (host management) by specifying SSH and single-host focus. However, it could list the specific actions (e.g., run_command, file transfer) for greater clarity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It only implies usage for SSH-related tasks on a single host. No exclusion criteria, prerequisites, or comparisons with sibling tools are provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
tm_securitySecurity AuditingCRead-onlyIdempotent
Security scanning and compliance.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| scope | No | Security areas to audit (security_audit). | |
| action | Yes | Action: 'security_audit', 'compliance_check', 'vulnerability_scan', 'access_control_audit' | |
| password | No | SSH password. | |
| standard | No | Compliance standard: cis_benchmark, pci_dss, hipaa (compliance_check). | cis_benchmark |
| username | No | SSH username. | |
| scan_type | No | Scan type: basic, package, config (vulnerability_scan). | basic |
| remote_host | Yes | Remote host to audit. | |
| identity_file | No | SSH identity file path. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and destructiveHint=false, so the description adds no behavioral context beyond confirming a read-only, idempotent operation. It fails to disclose that the tool requires SSH access (evident from schema but unmentioned) or to elaborate on side effects of scanning. The description does not add value beyond the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely short (5 words), which is concise but risks under-specification. It front-loads no critical details like supported actions or security implications. While brevity is valued, the lack of structure (no bullet points, no separation of concerns) reduces clarity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite having an output schema (not shown) and 8 parameters, the description covers almost nothing. It omits the tool's return values, SSH authentication requirements, and the specific actions it can perform. A complete description should at least hint at the action types (e.g., 'supports security_audit, compliance_check, etc.') to unify with the schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the structured data already documents each parameter's meaning. The description 'Security scanning and compliance' adds no additional semantics for parameters. Baseline 3 applies since the description does not compensate or elaborate beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description 'Security scanning and compliance' broadly matches the tool name and title, but it lacks a specific verb+resource combination. It vaguely groups scanning and compliance without defining distinct outcomes. Sibling tools (e.g., tm_files, tm_remote) imply a security focus, but the description does not differentiate this tool from potential security-related siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives. The description does not mention when not to use it, prerequisites, or preferred contexts. For a tool requiring SSH credentials and offering multiple action types, this omission hampers correct selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
tm_systemSystem IntelligenceARead-onlyIdempotent
Remote system intelligence via SSH.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | Action: 'get_info', 'discover_services', 'analyze_logs', 'network_topology' | |
| password | No | SSH password. | |
| patterns | No | Search patterns (analyze_logs). | |
| username | No | SSH username. | |
| log_paths | No | Log file paths (analyze_logs). | |
| remote_host | Yes | Remote host. | |
| identity_file | No | SSH identity file path. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already indicate readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false. The description adds that it uses SSH for intelligence, which aligns but doesn't elaborate on behaviors like connection handling or authentication requirements. It doesn't contradict annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence that front-loads the core purpose. It is concise and avoids fluff, though slightly more context could improve it without harming conciseness.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the presence of an output schema, annotations covering safety, and full schema coverage, the description is adequate but lacks details on SSH prerequisites, security considerations, or limitations. It could be more complete without being verbose.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with all 7 parameters described. The description itself adds no additional parameter-level meaning beyond what's already in the schema. Baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description 'Remote system intelligence via SSH' clearly states the tool's purpose: to gather intelligence from remote systems over SSH. This verb+resource pattern effectively distinguishes it from sibling tools like tm_files (file operations) or tm_hosts (host management).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides minimal guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It does not specify prerequisites, exclusions, or context. The name and description imply it's for system intelligence, but explicit usage guidance is lacking.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
tunnel_ingest_hostsIngest Hosts to Knowledge GraphCRead-onlyIdempotent
List the managed SSH inventory and push it into the epistemic-graph KG.
Maps each alias → a typed :Host node (+ :HostGroup / :SshKey and
their :inGroup / :usesKey links). Best-effort: no-ops cleanly when no
KG engine is reachable.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| group | No | HostGroup name to attach the ingested hosts to. | all |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description's claim to 'push it into the epistemic-graph KG' suggests a write operation, contradicting the annotation readOnlyHint=true. Annotations indicate no modifications, while the description implies data ingestion. This is a clear annotation contradiction, lowering the score to 1.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences long, with the first sentence stating the core purpose and the second providing behavioral detail. Every word is necessary, and critical information is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the output schema exists and schema coverage is high, the description covers the main action and best-effort behavior. However, it fails to explain the group parameter's role and does not differentiate from sibling tools, leaving gaps for an agent choosing among related tools.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% for the single parameter, so baseline is 3. The description does not add any meaning beyond the schema's description of the 'group' parameter; it omits explaining its role in attaching hosts to a host group.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action: 'List the managed SSH inventory and push it into the epistemic-graph KG.' This clearly identifies the verb and resource. However, it does not explicitly differentiate itself from sibling tools like tm_inventory or tm_hosts, which may have overlapping functionality.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description mentions 'Best-effort: no-ops cleanly when no KG engine is reachable,' which implies safe usage but does not specify when to use this tool versus alternatives like tm_inventory for direct inventory listing or tm_hosts for host management. No explicit when-not or alternative guidance is given.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
8 tool updates
v2.0.1- First observed
tm_files - First observed
tm_hosts - First observed
tm_inventory - First observed
tm_operations - First observed
tm_remote - First observed
tm_security - First observed
tm_system - First observed
tunnel_ingest_hosts
TDQS
Scored across 8 tools
Most tools have distinct purposes (e.g., files, security, system intelligence), but tm_hosts and tm_inventory overlap in managing host inventory, and tm_remote may conflict with tm_files and tm_system. The outlier tunnel_ingest_hosts is distinct but not clearly related.
Seven tools use the 'tm_' prefix, but one uses 'tunnel_', breaking consistency. The naming pattern is noun-based without clear verb-noun structure, which is acceptable but not ideal.
Eight tools is a well-scoped set for remote host management, covering operations, inventory, security, and system intelligence without being overwhelming.
Covers file operations, SSH sessions, inventory, security, and system intelligence. Minor gaps like individual host CRUD (e.g., create/delete alias) might exist, but bulk operations and KG ingestion fill some needs.
Maintenance
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