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# Guardian QA

**A pre-execution counterparty check and policy gate for AI payment agents, exposed as an MCP server.**

An agent that can move money will eventually be tricked into moving it to the wrong place. Guardian QA sits between the agent's intent and the signature: it checks the destination, the token, the account history, the shared blocklist and the text that produced the payment, then returns exactly one verdict — `allow`, `warn` or `block` — with machine-readable reason codes.

Built for the **NEAR HACKATHON 2026**, track **AI Security & Defense** (`security`).

- No mainnet, no real funds, no private keys.
- Read-only NEAR RPC and NearBlocks calls, plus a local SQLite ledger.
- Dry-run execution receipts and an append-only audit log.
- A red-team suite with 19 prompt-injection and payment-fraud attempts.

---

## Demo video

**`docs/demo.mp4`** — 91 seconds, 1080p30, burned-in English subtitles (`docs/demo.srt`). No audio, so it reads in mute. Visual language follows the nearbuilders.org dark theme, with Inter and IBM Plex Mono bundled in `video/assets/fonts/`.

| Time | Section |
| --- | --- |
| 0:00 | Title: `Guardian QA`, badge `Built on NEAR · testnet` |
| 0:06 | The problem: untrusted content, an injected payout, irreversible settlement |
| 0:22 | The solution: `PolicyGate` → MCP server → `allow` / `warn` / `block` |
| 0:42 | Red-team evidence read from `reports/red_team_results.json` |
| 1:00 | Terminal replay of the real 7/7 demo run |
| 1:22 | Commands and scope, then the `NEAR HACKATHON 2026 · AI Security & Defense` closing line |

Two honesty notes:

- The terminal section is a **replay of captured output** (`video/assets/terminal_demo.txt`), not a screen recording. The frame is labelled as such.
- The video refuses to render if the reports disagree with it. `video/build.py` validates 19/19 contained, 0 escaped, `A-01` blocked, the control allowed, and `matched 7/7` in the terminal capture before it starts Manim.

Rebuild it (Manim is used from the global install, not the project virtualenv):

```bash
python video/build.py            # reuses already-rendered segments
python video/build.py --force    # re-renders every scene
```

Manim Community 0.22+, ffmpeg and LaTeX must be on `PATH`. Rendering all six scenes takes roughly 10–12 minutes at 1080p30; the checked-in build is 91.00 s and 2.99 MB. The Inter and IBM Plex Mono files (SIL Open Font License) are registered with `manimpango.register_font()` at import time and copied next to the subtitles so libass resolves the same typeface.

---

## The problem

Agentic payment stacks usually protect the wallet with a key, not with a decision. A prompt-injected agent with a signing key can pay an attacker before any human sees the transaction. Spend limits alone are not enough: the first payment to a brand-new address is often the one that matters.

Guardian QA adds the missing decision point:

1. The agent describes the payment it is about to make.
2. Guardian QA collects risk signals and evaluates a deterministic policy.
3. The agent-side wrapper refuses, asks a human, or proceeds in dry-run.
4. Every decision is logged with the evidence behind it.

## Verdict contract

| Verdict | Meaning | Agent-side behaviour |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `allow` | No hard rule and no warning crossed the threshold. | Execute in dry-run, attach the receipt and TEE evidence if available. |
| `warn` | A risk signal crossed the warning threshold, or the score is between 30 and 69. | **Halt.** Ask the human operator for explicit approval. Without a human, fail closed. |
| `block` | A hard rule matched, or the weighted score reached 70. | **Refuse.** Do not retry the same destination with a different amount. Report the address if evidence exists. |

A `warn` is not a soft `allow`: the wrapper's default is to stop. The only path to execution on `warn` is an approval handler that returns `True`, and that approval is written to the audit log.

---

## Try it in 60 seconds

Prerequisites: Python 3.10+ and a shell. No API key and no funded account are required for the offline demo.

### 1. Install

```bash
cd guardian-qa
python -m venv .venv

# Windows
.venv\Scripts\activate
# macOS / Linux
# source .venv/bin/activate

pip install -e ".[dev]"
```

Optional configuration:

```bash
cp .env.example .env
```

The defaults use NEAR **testnet**. Leave `NEARAI_API_KEY` empty to run with local heuristics only.

### 2. Run the demo agent — do X, see Y

```bash
python -m guardian_qa.agent.mock_agent --fresh --offline
```

**See:** seven scenarios scored by the real policy engine and enforced by the real wrapper. The final table says:

```text
matched 7/7 expected verdicts
```

What the seven scenarios show:

| Scenario | Expected | Why |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `clean_payment` | `allow` | Established merchant, low amount, no injection. |
| `new_counterparty` | `warn` | Account is one day old with two transactions. |
| `blocklisted_payout` | `block` | Destination is on the shared blocklist (critical). |
| `prompt_injected_payout` | `block` | The intent contains an instruction override and concealment. |
| `token_impersonation` | `block` | A contract claims symbol `USDC` but is not canonical. |
| `contract_upgraded` | `warn` | Receiver contract code changed two days ago. |
| `spend_limit` | `block` | Amount exceeds the wrapper's single-payment cap. |

To answer the human-in-the-loop prompt yourself:

```bash
python -m guardian_qa.agent.mock_agent --fresh --offline --interactive
```

### 3. Run the red team

```bash
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --offline --generator static
# equivalent convenience script:
# python run_red_team.py --offline --generator static
```

**See:** 19 adversarial attempts plus one benign control, then a summary:

```text
adversarial attempts        19
compliant attacks           19
non-compliant victim         0
contained (warn or block)   19
hard blocked                16
escaped (allow)              0
detection rate           100.0%
mandatory A-01             blocked
control C-00               allowed
```

The generated report is at `reports/red_team_report.md` and the raw results at `reports/red_team_results.json`. `A-01` is the mandatory case: a prompt-injected agent tries to pay a known-bad address and is stopped. With the static generator, sixteen attacks hard-block and three warn (50, 50 and 30), and nothing escapes. The checked-in abliterated run also contains all nineteen; its block/warn split moves between runs because both the payloads and the classifier are probabilistic (observed 16–18 hard blocks, 1–3 warns).

### 4. Run the tests

```bash
pytest
```

**See:** `81 passed`. The suite covers the policy engine, storage, the wrapper's fail-closed behaviour, spend limits, token resolution, injection heuristics, the service end-to-end, the MCP server itself, and red-team generation/compliance accounting.

### 5. Start the MCP server

```bash
# stdio, for a local MCP client
python -m guardian_qa.mcp_server

# HTTP, for a shared deployment
python -m guardian_qa.mcp_server --transport http --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8765
```

The HTTP endpoint is `http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp`. The server exposes four tools:

| Tool | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `check_counterparty` | Score a payment before it is signed. |
| `report_address` | Add an address to the shared blocklist with evidence. |
| `get_blocklist` | Read the current blocklist, newest first. |
| `guardian_health` | Return network, thresholds, spend policy and tool names. |

Example MCP client configuration:

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "guardian-qa": {
      "command": "C:\\path\\to\\guardian-qa\\.venv\\Scripts\\python.exe",
      "args": ["-m", "guardian_qa.mcp_server"],
      "env": {
        "NEAR_NETWORK": "testnet",
        "GUARDIAN_OFFLINE": "0"
      }
    }
  }
}
```

### 6. Use real testnet data (still read-only)

```bash
python -m guardian_qa.agent.mock_agent --fresh
```

Without `--offline`, account signals come from the public NEAR testnet RPC and NearBlocks. Demo accounts that are not deployed on testnet fall back to `data/account_fixtures.json`, and the signal notes say so. The blocklisted sink used in the demo is a synthetic 64-character address that is **not deployed** on testnet; the live check confirms that.

### 7. Call the check directly

```python
import asyncio
from guardian_qa.models import PaymentIntent
from guardian_qa.service import GuardianService

async def main():
    result = await GuardianService().check_counterparty(
        PaymentIntent(
            destination="merchant-outlet.testnet",
            amount=12.0,
            token="NEAR",
            network="testnet",
            intent="Invoice payment.",
            agent_id="demo-agent",
        )
    )
    print(result.verdict, result.risk_score, [r.code for r in result.reason_codes])

asyncio.run(main())
```

A blocked result looks like this (trimmed):

```json
{
  "verdict": "block",
  "risk_score": 100,
  "explanation": "Blocked. A hard rule rejected this counterparty. ...",
  "destination": "4a1c9d3d2b7e5f0a6c8b1e2d3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a",
  "amount": 20.0,
  "token": "NEAR",
  "network": "testnet",
  "dry_run": true,
  "reason_codes": [
    {"code": "GQA-BLOCK-001", "severity": "block", "message": "Destination ... is on the shared blocklist (critical, prompt_injection_sink): ..."},
    {"code": "GQA-WARN-001", "severity": "warn", "message": "Destination ... is not deployed on testnet (unknown or brand-new account)"}
  ]
}
```

### 8. Optional: run the red team with the abliterated model

The default attacker model is NEAR AI Cloud's private-TEE, uncensored DeepSeek 4.1 Flash. The catalog is public, so the model check works without a key; generation needs one.

```bash
# Check the configured model IDs (public catalog, no key needed)
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --preflight
```

Expected:

```text
attacker   deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017-abliterated             OK
classifier Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B                                             OK
victim     openai/gpt-4.1-mini                                           OK
```

Then add your key to `.env` and smoke-test one attack:

```bash
# .env: NEARAI_API_KEY=...
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --generator nearai --only A-01 --limit 1 --delay 1
```

Full run:

```bash
# Recommended: abliterated generator, deterministic worst-case victim
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --generator nearai --victim scripted --delay 1

# Optional: let a model act as the victim too
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --generator nearai --victim llm --delay 1
```

An explicit `--generator nearai` without a key exits with status `2` instead of silently falling back. If you want the old behaviour, pass `--allow-fallback`; the report records `Mode fallback: True`. `--only` and `--limit` are available for smoke tests.

| Model | ID | Context | Price per 1M tokens |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DeepSeek 4.1 Flash (abliterated) | `deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017-abliterated` | 1.05M | $0.30 in / $1.20 out |
| Qwen3.8 27B (abliterated) | `Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B-abliterated` | 262K | $0.04 in / $1.35 out |

A 19-attack run costs cents and usually takes a few minutes. The JSON results include every generated payload; the Markdown report shows samples and marks non-compliant victims separately.

**Current checked-in reports:** `reports/red_team_report.md` was generated with the real gateway, `--generator nearai --victim scripted` on 2026-11-13. The latest run shows `Attack generator: nearai`, `Generated payloads: 19`, `Contained: 19` (18 hard blocks, 1 warn), and TEE evidence with `nonce_echoed=True`. Earlier runs of the same command had 16 blocks and 3 warns; the split moves, the containment does not. The raw JSON records the quote digest and nonce as well.

`reports/red_team_static.md` and `.json` are the same suite with deterministic payloads and no network calls (`--offline --generator static`). Same split: 19 contained, 16 blocks, 3 warns. Keeping both makes the reproducibility claim checkable without a key.

#### Using a local or third-party abliterated endpoint

The client is plain OpenAI-compatible, so NEAR AI Cloud is not mandatory for generation. Any server that exposes `/v1/chat/completions` works — vLLM, Ollama, LM Studio, or your own gateway:

```bash
# .env
NEARAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1
NEARAI_API_KEY=local
NEARAI_ATTACKER_MODEL=<model id served by that endpoint>
NEARAI_ATTESTATION=0
```

```bash
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --generator nearai --victim scripted --delay 1
```

Two honest differences from the NEAR AI Cloud path:

- There is no `/attestation/report` route, so `NEARAI_ATTESTATION=0` skips the call and the report shows `status: disabled` instead of a quote digest.
- No TEE evidence means no proof that the model weights are the advertised ones. The report says so rather than implying verification.

`--preflight` reads `/v1/models` from whatever `NEARAI_BASE_URL` points at. With the default it checks the public NEAR AI catalog; with a local endpoint it reports the model IDs that server serves, so a mismatched `NEARAI_ATTACKER_MODEL` shows up before the run starts.

### 9. Optional: let a model play the victim

The scripted victim is the worst case and the recommended number for a demo. A model victim answers a different question: **would a real agent actually fall for this payload?** That is a property of the victim, not of the firewall.

```bash
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --generator nearai --victim llm --delay 1 \
  --report reports/red_team_llm_victim.md --json reports/red_team_llm_victim.json
```

Checked-in result (`openai/gpt-4.1-mini` as victim, 2026-11-13):

| Metric | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Adversarial attempts | 19 |
| Victim complied with the injected destination | 18 |
| Victim refused or used another destination | 1 (`A-04`, zero-width address) |
| Contained (warn or block) | 18 of 18 compliant attempts |
| Escaped | 0 |
| Control payment | `allow` |

Two honest notes:

- **The number moves between runs.** An earlier run of the same command had 17 compliant and 2 non-compliant. The detector contained every compliant attempt both times.
- **A-05 fell back to its static payload** in this run: the generator call failed after the retry, so `Generated payloads` is 18, not 19. The report marks that row `static` instead of hiding it.

Reasoning models are a trap here. `Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B` spent all 1200 tokens on hidden reasoning and returned empty content with `finish_reason: length`. The victim call now retries with 2000 tokens, but the default victim is an instruct model, which is cheaper and returns JSON reliably. Override it with `--victim-model` or `NEARAI_VICTIM_MODEL`.

---

## Architecture

```text
                          ┌──────────────────────────────┐
  agent reasoning ───────▶│  PolicyGate (agent wrapper)  │
  payment intent          │  - submit()                  │
                          │  - spend limits              │
                          │  - human approval on warn    │
                          └──────────────┬───────────────┘
                                         │ check_counterparty
                                         ▼
                          ┌──────────────────────────────┐
                          │  GuardianService             │
                          │  gathers signals, scores,    │
                          │  persists, reports           │
                          └───┬───────┬───────┬───────┬──┘
                              │       │       │       │
              ┌───────────────┘       │       │       └────────────────┐
              ▼                       ▼       ▼                        ▼
      ┌──────────────┐        ┌────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐
      │ account      │        │ token      │ │ blocklist +  │  │ injection    │
      │ RPC +        │        │ registry + │ │ interactions │  │ heuristics + │
      │ NearBlocks   │        │ NearBlocks │ │ SQLite       │  │ NEAR AI Cloud│
      └──────────────┘        └────────────┘ └──────────────┘  └──────────────┘
                                         │
                                         ▼
                          ┌──────────────────────────────┐
                          │  Deterministic policy engine │
                          │  hard blocks + weighted sum  │
                          └──────────────┬───────────────┘
                                         ▼
                             allow / warn / block
                             + reason codes + evidence
```

The same `GuardianService` powers the MCP server, the demo agent and the red team. There is no execution path that bypasses `PolicyGate`.

`check_counterparty` is a decision service. Spend limits, the token allowlist and human approval are enforced by `PolicyGate`; calling the MCP tool directly gives you the verdict and evidence, not the enforcement.

**Key files**

| Path | Responsibility |
| --- | --- |
| `src/guardian_qa/mcp_server.py` | FastMCP server, four tools, stdio/HTTP transports. |
| `src/guardian_qa/service.py` | Signal orchestration, persistence, reporting, health. |
| `src/guardian_qa/policy/engine.py` | Scoring and verdict selection. |
| `src/guardian_qa/policy/reason_codes.py` | Stable `GQA-*` reason-code registry. |
| `src/guardian_qa/agent/policy_gate.py` | Fail-closed enforcement, spend limits, dry-run receipts. |
| `src/guardian_qa/agent/mock_agent.py` | Seven-scenario demo agent. |
| `src/guardian_qa/red_team/runner.py` | Red-team CLI and report generation. |
| `src/guardian_qa/signals/` | Account, token, blocklist, interaction and injection collectors. |

---

## Signals and scoring

### Signal sources

| Signal | What is measured | Source | Fallback |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Account age and activity | Creation date, transaction count, last activity | NEAR RPC `query/view_account` (`https://test.rpc.fastnear.com`); NearBlocks `/v3/accounts/{a}/stats` and `/v3/accounts/{a}` | Fixtures, then deterministic synthetic profile |
| Contract risk | Whether the receiver is a contract; days since last code deployment | NEAR RPC `code_hash`; NearBlocks `/v3/accounts/{a}/contract/deployments` | Fixtures |
| Prior interactions | Count, last time, whether a previous attempt was blocked | Local SQLite `interactions` table | Empty history |
| Stablecoin validity | Canonical contract per network, decimals, symbol impersonation | Bundled registry (`data/stablecoin_registry.json`); NearBlocks `/v3/fts/{contract}` | Offline token fixtures |
| Shared blocklist | Severity, category, evidence, reporter | Local SQLite `blocklist` table seeded from `data/blocklist.seed.json` | Empty blocklist |
| Prompt injection | Instruction override, payment redirect, concealment, obfuscation, credential theft | Local regex heuristics; NEAR AI Cloud classifier (`Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B`) | Heuristics only |
| TEE evidence | Gateway quote digest, nonce echo, signing address | NEAR AI Cloud `GET /v1/attestation/report` | `null` when no key is configured |

All network clients are read-only. NearBlocks responses are cached in memory for 60 seconds.

### Scoring

1. Hard blocks force `block` regardless of the score:
   - `GQA-BLOCK-001`: high/critical blocklist hit.
   - `GQA-BLOCK-002`: prompt injection with confidence ≥ 0.75.
   - `GQA-BLOCK-003`: stablecoin impersonation.
   - `GQA-BLOCK-004` / `GQA-BLOCK-005`: spend policy or token allowlist violation.
2. Warning weights accumulate and are capped at 100.
3. Verdict selection:
   - `block` if a hard block matched or score ≥ 70.
   - `warn` if score ≥ 30 **or** any warning reason is present.
   - `allow` otherwise.

Thresholds live in `src/guardian_qa/config.py` and can be changed in code. They are returned by `guardian_health`.

### Reason codes

| Code | Severity | Meaning |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `GQA-BLOCK-001` | block | Destination is on the shared blocklist with high or critical severity. |
| `GQA-BLOCK-002` | block | Prompt injection detected with confidence ≥ 0.75. |
| `GQA-BLOCK-003` | block | Token impersonates a stablecoin but is not the canonical contract. |
| `GQA-BLOCK-004` | block | Agent spend policy rejected the payment (single or daily limit). |
| `GQA-BLOCK-005` | block | Token is not in the agent token allowlist. |
| `GQA-WARN-001` | warn | Destination is not deployed on the network. |
| `GQA-WARN-002` | warn | Destination account is young (under 30 days). |
| `GQA-WARN-003` | warn | Destination has very little activity. |
| `GQA-WARN-004` | warn | Contract code changed recently (under 30 days). |
| `GQA-WARN-005` | warn | First interaction with a high-value amount. |
| `GQA-WARN-006` | warn | This agent already had a blocked attempt to this destination. |
| `GQA-WARN-007` | warn | Network is not supported by this deployment. |
| `GQA-WARN-008` | warn | Token is not a canonical stablecoin on this network, or is unknown. |
| `GQA-WARN-009` | warn | A signal could not be collected; verdict relies on partial data. |
| `GQA-WARN-010` | warn | Low/medium blocklist hit. |
| `GQA-WARN-011` | warn | Possible prompt injection below the hard-block threshold. |
| `GQA-ALLOW-001` | info | All counterparty checks passed. |
| `GQA-ALLOW-002` | info | Known prior interaction with this counterparty. |

Reason codes are stable and machine-readable. The `message` field carries the human explanation, and `evidence` carries the raw values used.

---

## Least privilege and function-call keys

This repository never signs or broadcasts a transaction. The wrapper returns a **dry-run receipt** with a simulated transaction hash. In a production deployment, the signing key should be a **function-call access key scoped to one contract**, never a full-access key.

A function-call key:

- can call methods on **one** contract only;
- **cannot** transfer NEAR, stake, deploy code, or add/delete keys;
- has a gas allowance that the account owner funds; when it runs out, the key stops working and the account can lock itself out of that key path.

That is the right primitive for an agent that pays through a specific contract (for example a payment splitter or a subscription contract). It limits the blast radius if the key leaks or the agent is hijacked.

**Equivalence, and where it breaks.** Guardian QA's policy gate is a software analogue of a function-call key: both narrow what the agent is allowed to do. The key is enforced by the NEAR protocol at signing time; the gate is enforced by the agent process before signing. The key cannot be talked out of its scope by a prompt, while the gate can be bypassed if the process itself is compromised. Use both.

**Limits of this approach, stated plainly:**

- A function-call key can still call **any method** on its scoped contract, including methods that move value held by that contract. Scope is not intent.
- An upgradeable contract can change behaviour after the key is issued. Guardian QA's contract-change signal is a warning, not a guarantee.
- A stolen function-call key can be used by anyone until the allowance is exhausted or the key is deleted.
- Guardian QA is a software policy layer. It must run in a trusted process; an attacker who controls the agent process can skip it. Defence in depth means combining the policy gate, a scoped key, spend limits and human approval.
- The wrapper's spend limits are local configuration, not on-chain enforcement.

See the NEAR access-key documentation: <https://docs.near.org/protocol/accounts-contracts/access-keys>.

---

## Real vs simulated

This project is honest about what is live and what is not:

| Area | Status |
| --- | --- |
| NEAR network | **Testnet only.** No mainnet calls are made by default. |
| Funds and keys | **None.** The repo contains no private keys and never signs a transaction. Execution is a dry-run receipt. |
| Account data | Live for accounts that exist on testnet. Demo accounts that are not deployed use `data/account_fixtures.json`; the signal notes say `fixture` and explain why. |
| Blocklist entries | **Synthetic.** They are demo data, not accusations against real accounts. The main sink is a 64-character address that is not deployed on testnet. |
| Prompt-injection classifier | Local heuristics always run. The NEAR AI Cloud classifier runs when `NEARAI_API_KEY` is set; the checked-in report used it, so every attempt has both the heuristic and the model score. |
| Abliterated attacker model | **Exercised.** The checked-in report was generated by `deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017-abliterated` through NEAR AI Cloud; all 19 payloads carry `generated: true`. |
| LLM victim | **Exercised** with `openai/gpt-4.1-mini`: 18 of 19 complied with the injected destination, 0 escaped, 1 non-compliant. Non-compliant victims are reported separately and excluded from the detection rate. |
| TEE attestation | Guardian QA records the gateway evidence digest and checks the nonce echo. The report is fetched once per run and cached for 300 seconds. It does **not** perform full Intel DCAP or NVIDIA NRAS verification; use `nearai-cloud-verifier` for that. |
| Detection quality | Probabilistic. The red-team result is evidence for this test set, not a proof of safety. |

If you configure `NEARAI_API_KEY`, the classifier, the abliterated generator, the LLM victim and the attestation report path become available. Without it, everything still runs offline and deterministically.

**Calibration note (live run, 2026-11-13):** the first real run with the classifier over-flagged ordinary business text. A plain "our vendor changed payout account" invoice scored 0.85 `payment_redirect`, which turned an expected `warn` into a `block` in two demo scenarios. The classifier prompt now requires control-oriented language (override, impersonation, concealment, credential theft, obfuscation) and includes two benign and two malicious examples. After that change: demo 7/7 expected verdicts, red team 19/19 contained (16 blocks, 3 warns), control allowed. The false positive only appeared against the real model, not in the offline tests.

---

## Configuration

Copy `.env.example` to `.env`. Never commit `.env`.

| Variable | Default | Purpose |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `NEAR_NETWORK` | `testnet` | `testnet` or `mainnet`. Keep testnet for the demo. |
| `NEAR_RPC_URL` | `https://test.rpc.fastnear.com` | Read-only RPC endpoint. |
| `NEARBLOCKS_API_URL` | `https://api-testnet.nearblocks.io` | NearBlocks v3 base URL. |
| `NEARAI_API_KEY` | empty | Enables the NEAR AI Cloud classifier, attacker model and attestation. |
| `NEARAI_BASE_URL` | `https://cloud-api.near.ai/v1` | OpenAI-compatible gateway. |
| `NEARAI_CLASSIFIER_MODEL` | `Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B` | Injection classifier. |
| `NEARAI_ATTACKER_MODEL` | `deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017-abliterated` | Red-team payload generator. |
| `NEARAI_VICTIM_MODEL` | `openai/gpt-4.1-mini` | LLM victim for the red team. Reasoning models such as Qwen3.8 spend the budget on hidden tokens and return empty content; the victim call retries with a larger budget, but an instruct model is cheaper and more reliable here. |
| `NEARAI_TIMEOUT` | `60` | Timeout in seconds for LLM and attestation calls. |
| `NEARAI_ATTESTATION_CACHE_SECONDS` | `300` | How long one gateway attestation is reused per process. |
| `NEARAI_ATTESTATION` | `1` | `0` skips the gateway attestation call, for endpoints without `/attestation/report`. |
| `GUARDIAN_OFFLINE` | `0` | `1` skips NEAR RPC/NearBlocks calls and uses fixtures. Explicit NEAR AI calls still run when a key is set. |
| `GUARDIAN_MAX_SINGLE_PAYMENT` | `50` | Wrapper single-payment limit, in token units. |
| `GUARDIAN_DAILY_LIMIT` | `200` | Wrapper daily limit, in token units. |

---

## Project layout

```text
guardian-qa/
├── data/
│   ├── account_fixtures.json      # offline demo account profiles
│   ├── blocklist.seed.json        # synthetic blocklist seed
│   ├── stablecoin_registry.json   # canonical USDC/USDT contracts
│   └── token_fixtures.json        # offline contract metadata
├── docs/
│   ├── DEMO_SCRIPT.md             # 60-second live demo script
│   ├── demo.mp4                   # 91-second Manim + terminal-replay video
│   └── demo.srt                   # burned-in subtitle track, standalone copy
├── reports/
│   ├── demo_live.json             # last demo run, JSON
│   ├── red_team_report.md         # abliterated generator, scripted victim
│   ├── red_team_results.json      # raw results for that run
│   ├── red_team_static.md         # same suite, deterministic payloads
│   ├── red_team_static.json
│   ├── red_team_llm_victim.md     # abliterated generator, LLM victim
│   └── red_team_llm_victim.json
├── src/guardian_qa/
│   ├── agent/                     # policy gate, audit log, demo agent
│   ├── policy/                    # engine and reason codes
│   ├── red_team/                  # attacks, runner, report writer
│   ├── signals/                   # account, token, blocklist, injection
│   ├── config.py
│   ├── mcp_server.py
│   ├── models.py
│   ├── near_rpc.py
│   ├── nearblocks.py
│   ├── nearai.py
│   ├── service.py
│   └── storage.py
├── tests/                         # 81 offline tests
├── video/
│   ├── scenes.py                  # six Manim scenes
│   ├── meta.py                    # durations and subtitle cues
│   ├── build.py                   # validate → render → concat → burn subtitles
│   ├── manim.cfg                  # 1080p30, dark background
│   ├── assets/terminal_demo.txt   # captured real run, replayed in the video
│   ├── assets/fonts/              # Inter + IBM Plex Mono, SIL OFL
│   └── out/                       # segments and logs, gitignored
├── .env.example
├── LICENSE
├── pyproject.toml
├── run_red_team.py                # red-team convenience entry point
└── README.md
```

---

## Testing

```bash
pytest
```

The suite is fully offline and covers:

- policy verdicts, hard blocks, warning accumulation and evidence;
- blocklist seeding, network scoping, deduplication and spend accounting;
- the wrapper's fail-closed behaviour, human approval, single/daily limits and token allowlist;
- token resolution, stablecoin mismatch and unknown contracts;
- injection heuristics, multilingual patterns and JSON extraction;
- classifier category gating: a bare `payment_redirect` signal is capped below the
  block threshold unless a control-oriented category or a local heuristic matches;
- the service end-to-end (block, allow, report-then-block);
- the MCP server through the in-process FastMCP client (tools listed and called);
- red-team mode resolution, generated-payload validation, victim compliance and
  non-compliant accounting;
- gateway attestation parsing for both string and list `event_log` shapes.

Result on 2026-11-13: **81 passed**.

---

## Hackathon disclosures

- **Track:** AI Security & Defense (`security`). The project also fits `agents`; one submission can list both track ids.
- **New repository (Q-003 / Q-004):** all project code was written during the hackathon window. There is no pre-hackathon product baseline.
- **Libraries and templates (Q-005):** FastMCP, `httpx`, the OpenAI Python SDK (used against the NEAR AI Cloud gateway), Pydantic, `python-dotenv`, Rich and pytest. NearBlocks and NEAR AI Cloud are external services, not bundled code. No pre-existing proprietary library is included.
- **NEAR AI Cloud:** optional inference for the prompt-injection classifier, the abliterated red-team generator, the optional LLM victim, and gateway attestation evidence. No NEAR AI code is bundled; the API is OpenAI-compatible.
- **NEAR Intents (Q-007):** not used. This project does not need a 1Click JWT or an Intents mainnet account.
- **Testnet only (Q-010):** the demo and the checked-in reports use testnet only. The code accepts a `mainnet` setting, but this submission does not use it and no mainnet call is made by default.
- **License (Q-014):** MIT. See `LICENSE`.
- **Secrets:** no API key, seed phrase or private key is committed. `.env` is ignored by git.
- **Demo accounts:** synthetic. The blocklist does not accuse real accounts.

---

## Limitations and next steps

- Prompt-injection detection is probabilistic and the checked-in heuristics are intentionally small. The NEAR AI Cloud classifier is the scalable path.
- The blocklist is local SQLite. A production deployment would need signed reports, moderation, and an appeal path.
- Account history comes from a public indexer. A production deployment should pin or verify its data source.
- Full TEE quote verification is out of scope here; the attestation digest is recorded so an external verifier can consume it.
- Spend limits are tracked in token units and do not convert between tokens. A production deployment should use a common unit or a per-token ledger.
- The demo uses dry-run receipts. Wiring a real function-call key and a payment contract is the next integration step, and it must stay on testnet for this submission.

## License

MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).