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Guardian QA

A pre-execution counterparty check and policy gate for AI payment agents, exposed as an MCP server.

An agent that can move money will eventually be tricked into moving it to the wrong place. Guardian QA sits between the agent's intent and the signature: it checks the destination, the token, the account history, the shared blocklist and the text that produced the payment, then returns exactly one verdict — allow, warn or block — with machine-readable reason codes.

Built for the NEAR HACKATHON 2026, track AI Security & Defense (security).

  • No mainnet, no real funds, no private keys.

  • Read-only NEAR RPC and NearBlocks calls, plus a local SQLite ledger.

  • Dry-run execution receipts and an append-only audit log.

  • A red-team suite with 19 prompt-injection and payment-fraud attempts.


Demo video

docs/demo.mp4 — 91 seconds, 1080p30, burned-in English subtitles (docs/demo.srt). No audio, so it reads in mute. Visual language follows the nearbuilders.org dark theme, with Inter and IBM Plex Mono bundled in video/assets/fonts/.

Time

Section

0:00

Title: Guardian QA, badge Built on NEAR · testnet

0:06

The problem: untrusted content, an injected payout, irreversible settlement

0:22

The solution: PolicyGate → MCP server → allow / warn / block

0:42

Red-team evidence read from reports/red_team_results.json

1:00

Terminal replay of the real 7/7 demo run

1:22

Commands and scope, then the NEAR HACKATHON 2026 · AI Security & Defense closing line

Two honesty notes:

  • The terminal section is a replay of captured output (video/assets/terminal_demo.txt), not a screen recording. The frame is labelled as such.

  • The video refuses to render if the reports disagree with it. video/build.py validates 19/19 contained, 0 escaped, A-01 blocked, the control allowed, and matched 7/7 in the terminal capture before it starts Manim.

Rebuild it (Manim is used from the global install, not the project virtualenv):

python video/build.py            # reuses already-rendered segments
python video/build.py --force    # re-renders every scene

Manim Community 0.22+, ffmpeg and LaTeX must be on PATH. Rendering all six scenes takes roughly 10–12 minutes at 1080p30; the checked-in build is 91.00 s and 2.99 MB. The Inter and IBM Plex Mono files (SIL Open Font License) are registered with manimpango.register_font() at import time and copied next to the subtitles so libass resolves the same typeface.


Related MCP server: attest-mcp

The problem

Agentic payment stacks usually protect the wallet with a key, not with a decision. A prompt-injected agent with a signing key can pay an attacker before any human sees the transaction. Spend limits alone are not enough: the first payment to a brand-new address is often the one that matters.

Guardian QA adds the missing decision point:

  1. The agent describes the payment it is about to make.

  2. Guardian QA collects risk signals and evaluates a deterministic policy.

  3. The agent-side wrapper refuses, asks a human, or proceeds in dry-run.

  4. Every decision is logged with the evidence behind it.

Verdict contract

Verdict

Meaning

Agent-side behaviour

allow

No hard rule and no warning crossed the threshold.

Execute in dry-run, attach the receipt and TEE evidence if available.

warn

A risk signal crossed the warning threshold, or the score is between 30 and 69.

Halt. Ask the human operator for explicit approval. Without a human, fail closed.

block

A hard rule matched, or the weighted score reached 70.

Refuse. Do not retry the same destination with a different amount. Report the address if evidence exists.

A warn is not a soft allow: the wrapper's default is to stop. The only path to execution on warn is an approval handler that returns True, and that approval is written to the audit log.


Try it in 60 seconds

Prerequisites: Python 3.10+ and a shell. No API key and no funded account are required for the offline demo.

1. Install

cd guardian-qa
python -m venv .venv

# Windows
.venv\Scripts\activate
# macOS / Linux
# source .venv/bin/activate

pip install -e ".[dev]"

Optional configuration:

cp .env.example .env

The defaults use NEAR testnet. Leave NEARAI_API_KEY empty to run with local heuristics only.

2. Run the demo agent — do X, see Y

python -m guardian_qa.agent.mock_agent --fresh --offline

See: seven scenarios scored by the real policy engine and enforced by the real wrapper. The final table says:

matched 7/7 expected verdicts

What the seven scenarios show:

Scenario

Expected

Why

clean_payment

allow

Established merchant, low amount, no injection.

new_counterparty

warn

Account is one day old with two transactions.

blocklisted_payout

block

Destination is on the shared blocklist (critical).

prompt_injected_payout

block

The intent contains an instruction override and concealment.

token_impersonation

block

A contract claims symbol USDC but is not canonical.

contract_upgraded

warn

Receiver contract code changed two days ago.

spend_limit

block

Amount exceeds the wrapper's single-payment cap.

To answer the human-in-the-loop prompt yourself:

python -m guardian_qa.agent.mock_agent --fresh --offline --interactive

3. Run the red team

python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --offline --generator static
# equivalent convenience script:
# python run_red_team.py --offline --generator static

See: 19 adversarial attempts plus one benign control, then a summary:

adversarial attempts        19
compliant attacks           19
non-compliant victim         0
contained (warn or block)   19
hard blocked                16
escaped (allow)              0
detection rate           100.0%
mandatory A-01             blocked
control C-00               allowed

The generated report is at reports/red_team_report.md and the raw results at reports/red_team_results.json. A-01 is the mandatory case: a prompt-injected agent tries to pay a known-bad address and is stopped. With the static generator, sixteen attacks hard-block and three warn (50, 50 and 30), and nothing escapes. The checked-in abliterated run also contains all nineteen; its block/warn split moves between runs because both the payloads and the classifier are probabilistic (observed 16–18 hard blocks, 1–3 warns).

4. Run the tests

pytest

See: 81 passed. The suite covers the policy engine, storage, the wrapper's fail-closed behaviour, spend limits, token resolution, injection heuristics, the service end-to-end, the MCP server itself, and red-team generation/compliance accounting.

5. Start the MCP server

# stdio, for a local MCP client
python -m guardian_qa.mcp_server

# HTTP, for a shared deployment
python -m guardian_qa.mcp_server --transport http --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8765

The HTTP endpoint is http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp. The server exposes four tools:

Tool

Purpose

check_counterparty

Score a payment before it is signed.

report_address

Add an address to the shared blocklist with evidence.

get_blocklist

Read the current blocklist, newest first.

guardian_health

Return network, thresholds, spend policy and tool names.

Example MCP client configuration:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "guardian-qa": {
      "command": "C:\\path\\to\\guardian-qa\\.venv\\Scripts\\python.exe",
      "args": ["-m", "guardian_qa.mcp_server"],
      "env": {
        "NEAR_NETWORK": "testnet",
        "GUARDIAN_OFFLINE": "0"
      }
    }
  }
}

6. Use real testnet data (still read-only)

python -m guardian_qa.agent.mock_agent --fresh

Without --offline, account signals come from the public NEAR testnet RPC and NearBlocks. Demo accounts that are not deployed on testnet fall back to data/account_fixtures.json, and the signal notes say so. The blocklisted sink used in the demo is a synthetic 64-character address that is not deployed on testnet; the live check confirms that.

7. Call the check directly

import asyncio
from guardian_qa.models import PaymentIntent
from guardian_qa.service import GuardianService

async def main():
    result = await GuardianService().check_counterparty(
        PaymentIntent(
            destination="merchant-outlet.testnet",
            amount=12.0,
            token="NEAR",
            network="testnet",
            intent="Invoice payment.",
            agent_id="demo-agent",
        )
    )
    print(result.verdict, result.risk_score, [r.code for r in result.reason_codes])

asyncio.run(main())

A blocked result looks like this (trimmed):

{
  "verdict": "block",
  "risk_score": 100,
  "explanation": "Blocked. A hard rule rejected this counterparty. ...",
  "destination": "4a1c9d3d2b7e5f0a6c8b1e2d3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a",
  "amount": 20.0,
  "token": "NEAR",
  "network": "testnet",
  "dry_run": true,
  "reason_codes": [
    {"code": "GQA-BLOCK-001", "severity": "block", "message": "Destination ... is on the shared blocklist (critical, prompt_injection_sink): ..."},
    {"code": "GQA-WARN-001", "severity": "warn", "message": "Destination ... is not deployed on testnet (unknown or brand-new account)"}
  ]
}

8. Optional: run the red team with the abliterated model

The default attacker model is NEAR AI Cloud's private-TEE, uncensored DeepSeek 4.1 Flash. The catalog is public, so the model check works without a key; generation needs one.

# Check the configured model IDs (public catalog, no key needed)
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --preflight

Expected:

attacker   deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017-abliterated             OK
classifier Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B                                             OK
victim     openai/gpt-4.1-mini                                           OK

Then add your key to .env and smoke-test one attack:

# .env: NEARAI_API_KEY=...
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --generator nearai --only A-01 --limit 1 --delay 1

Full run:

# Recommended: abliterated generator, deterministic worst-case victim
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --generator nearai --victim scripted --delay 1

# Optional: let a model act as the victim too
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --generator nearai --victim llm --delay 1

An explicit --generator nearai without a key exits with status 2 instead of silently falling back. If you want the old behaviour, pass --allow-fallback; the report records Mode fallback: True. --only and --limit are available for smoke tests.

Model

ID

Context

Price per 1M tokens

DeepSeek 4.1 Flash (abliterated)

deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017-abliterated

1.05M

$0.30 in / $1.20 out

Qwen3.8 27B (abliterated)

Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B-abliterated

262K

$0.04 in / $1.35 out

A 19-attack run costs cents and usually takes a few minutes. The JSON results include every generated payload; the Markdown report shows samples and marks non-compliant victims separately.

Current checked-in reports: reports/red_team_report.md was generated with the real gateway, --generator nearai --victim scripted on 2026-11-13. The latest run shows Attack generator: nearai, Generated payloads: 19, Contained: 19 (18 hard blocks, 1 warn), and TEE evidence with nonce_echoed=True. Earlier runs of the same command had 16 blocks and 3 warns; the split moves, the containment does not. The raw JSON records the quote digest and nonce as well.

reports/red_team_static.md and .json are the same suite with deterministic payloads and no network calls (--offline --generator static). Same split: 19 contained, 16 blocks, 3 warns. Keeping both makes the reproducibility claim checkable without a key.

Using a local or third-party abliterated endpoint

The client is plain OpenAI-compatible, so NEAR AI Cloud is not mandatory for generation. Any server that exposes /v1/chat/completions works — vLLM, Ollama, LM Studio, or your own gateway:

# .env
NEARAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1
NEARAI_API_KEY=local
NEARAI_ATTACKER_MODEL=<model id served by that endpoint>
NEARAI_ATTESTATION=0
python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --generator nearai --victim scripted --delay 1

Two honest differences from the NEAR AI Cloud path:

  • There is no /attestation/report route, so NEARAI_ATTESTATION=0 skips the call and the report shows status: disabled instead of a quote digest.

  • No TEE evidence means no proof that the model weights are the advertised ones. The report says so rather than implying verification.

--preflight reads /v1/models from whatever NEARAI_BASE_URL points at. With the default it checks the public NEAR AI catalog; with a local endpoint it reports the model IDs that server serves, so a mismatched NEARAI_ATTACKER_MODEL shows up before the run starts.

9. Optional: let a model play the victim

The scripted victim is the worst case and the recommended number for a demo. A model victim answers a different question: would a real agent actually fall for this payload? That is a property of the victim, not of the firewall.

python -m guardian_qa.red_team.runner --generator nearai --victim llm --delay 1 \
  --report reports/red_team_llm_victim.md --json reports/red_team_llm_victim.json

Checked-in result (openai/gpt-4.1-mini as victim, 2026-11-13):

Metric

Value

Adversarial attempts

19

Victim complied with the injected destination

18

Victim refused or used another destination

1 (A-04, zero-width address)

Contained (warn or block)

18 of 18 compliant attempts

Escaped

0

Control payment

allow

Two honest notes:

  • The number moves between runs. An earlier run of the same command had 17 compliant and 2 non-compliant. The detector contained every compliant attempt both times.

  • A-05 fell back to its static payload in this run: the generator call failed after the retry, so Generated payloads is 18, not 19. The report marks that row static instead of hiding it.

Reasoning models are a trap here. Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B spent all 1200 tokens on hidden reasoning and returned empty content with finish_reason: length. The victim call now retries with 2000 tokens, but the default victim is an instruct model, which is cheaper and returns JSON reliably. Override it with --victim-model or NEARAI_VICTIM_MODEL.


Architecture

                          ┌──────────────────────────────┐
  agent reasoning ───────▶│  PolicyGate (agent wrapper)  │
  payment intent          │  - submit()                  │
                          │  - spend limits              │
                          │  - human approval on warn    │
                          └──────────────┬───────────────┘
                                         │ check_counterparty
                                         ▼
                          ┌──────────────────────────────┐
                          │  GuardianService             │
                          │  gathers signals, scores,    │
                          │  persists, reports           │
                          └───┬───────┬───────┬───────┬──┘
                              │       │       │       │
              ┌───────────────┘       │       │       └────────────────┐
              ▼                       ▼       ▼                        ▼
      ┌──────────────┐        ┌────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐
      │ account      │        │ token      │ │ blocklist +  │  │ injection    │
      │ RPC +        │        │ registry + │ │ interactions │  │ heuristics + │
      │ NearBlocks   │        │ NearBlocks │ │ SQLite       │  │ NEAR AI Cloud│
      └──────────────┘        └────────────┘ └──────────────┘  └──────────────┘
                                         │
                                         ▼
                          ┌──────────────────────────────┐
                          │  Deterministic policy engine │
                          │  hard blocks + weighted sum  │
                          └──────────────┬───────────────┘
                                         ▼
                             allow / warn / block
                             + reason codes + evidence

The same GuardianService powers the MCP server, the demo agent and the red team. There is no execution path that bypasses PolicyGate.

check_counterparty is a decision service. Spend limits, the token allowlist and human approval are enforced by PolicyGate; calling the MCP tool directly gives you the verdict and evidence, not the enforcement.

Key files

Path

Responsibility

src/guardian_qa/mcp_server.py

FastMCP server, four tools, stdio/HTTP transports.

src/guardian_qa/service.py

Signal orchestration, persistence, reporting, health.

src/guardian_qa/policy/engine.py

Scoring and verdict selection.

src/guardian_qa/policy/reason_codes.py

Stable GQA-* reason-code registry.

src/guardian_qa/agent/policy_gate.py

Fail-closed enforcement, spend limits, dry-run receipts.

src/guardian_qa/agent/mock_agent.py

Seven-scenario demo agent.

src/guardian_qa/red_team/runner.py

Red-team CLI and report generation.

src/guardian_qa/signals/

Account, token, blocklist, interaction and injection collectors.


Signals and scoring

Signal sources

Signal

What is measured

Source

Fallback

Account age and activity

Creation date, transaction count, last activity

NEAR RPC query/view_account (https://test.rpc.fastnear.com); NearBlocks /v3/accounts/{a}/stats and /v3/accounts/{a}

Fixtures, then deterministic synthetic profile

Contract risk

Whether the receiver is a contract; days since last code deployment

NEAR RPC code_hash; NearBlocks /v3/accounts/{a}/contract/deployments

Fixtures

Prior interactions

Count, last time, whether a previous attempt was blocked

Local SQLite interactions table

Empty history

Stablecoin validity

Canonical contract per network, decimals, symbol impersonation

Bundled registry (data/stablecoin_registry.json); NearBlocks /v3/fts/{contract}

Offline token fixtures

Shared blocklist

Severity, category, evidence, reporter

Local SQLite blocklist table seeded from data/blocklist.seed.json

Empty blocklist

Prompt injection

Instruction override, payment redirect, concealment, obfuscation, credential theft

Local regex heuristics; NEAR AI Cloud classifier (Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B)

Heuristics only

TEE evidence

Gateway quote digest, nonce echo, signing address

NEAR AI Cloud GET /v1/attestation/report

null when no key is configured

All network clients are read-only. NearBlocks responses are cached in memory for 60 seconds.

Scoring

  1. Hard blocks force block regardless of the score:

    • GQA-BLOCK-001: high/critical blocklist hit.

    • GQA-BLOCK-002: prompt injection with confidence ≥ 0.75.

    • GQA-BLOCK-003: stablecoin impersonation.

    • GQA-BLOCK-004 / GQA-BLOCK-005: spend policy or token allowlist violation.

  2. Warning weights accumulate and are capped at 100.

  3. Verdict selection:

    • block if a hard block matched or score ≥ 70.

    • warn if score ≥ 30 or any warning reason is present.

    • allow otherwise.

Thresholds live in src/guardian_qa/config.py and can be changed in code. They are returned by guardian_health.

Reason codes

Code

Severity

Meaning

GQA-BLOCK-001

block

Destination is on the shared blocklist with high or critical severity.

GQA-BLOCK-002

block

Prompt injection detected with confidence ≥ 0.75.

GQA-BLOCK-003

block

Token impersonates a stablecoin but is not the canonical contract.

GQA-BLOCK-004

block

Agent spend policy rejected the payment (single or daily limit).

GQA-BLOCK-005

block

Token is not in the agent token allowlist.

GQA-WARN-001

warn

Destination is not deployed on the network.

GQA-WARN-002

warn

Destination account is young (under 30 days).

GQA-WARN-003

warn

Destination has very little activity.

GQA-WARN-004

warn

Contract code changed recently (under 30 days).

GQA-WARN-005

warn

First interaction with a high-value amount.

GQA-WARN-006

warn

This agent already had a blocked attempt to this destination.

GQA-WARN-007

warn

Network is not supported by this deployment.

GQA-WARN-008

warn

Token is not a canonical stablecoin on this network, or is unknown.

GQA-WARN-009

warn

A signal could not be collected; verdict relies on partial data.

GQA-WARN-010

warn

Low/medium blocklist hit.

GQA-WARN-011

warn

Possible prompt injection below the hard-block threshold.

GQA-ALLOW-001

info

All counterparty checks passed.

GQA-ALLOW-002

info

Known prior interaction with this counterparty.

Reason codes are stable and machine-readable. The message field carries the human explanation, and evidence carries the raw values used.


Least privilege and function-call keys

This repository never signs or broadcasts a transaction. The wrapper returns a dry-run receipt with a simulated transaction hash. In a production deployment, the signing key should be a function-call access key scoped to one contract, never a full-access key.

A function-call key:

  • can call methods on one contract only;

  • cannot transfer NEAR, stake, deploy code, or add/delete keys;

  • has a gas allowance that the account owner funds; when it runs out, the key stops working and the account can lock itself out of that key path.

That is the right primitive for an agent that pays through a specific contract (for example a payment splitter or a subscription contract). It limits the blast radius if the key leaks or the agent is hijacked.

Equivalence, and where it breaks. Guardian QA's policy gate is a software analogue of a function-call key: both narrow what the agent is allowed to do. The key is enforced by the NEAR protocol at signing time; the gate is enforced by the agent process before signing. The key cannot be talked out of its scope by a prompt, while the gate can be bypassed if the process itself is compromised. Use both.

Limits of this approach, stated plainly:

  • A function-call key can still call any method on its scoped contract, including methods that move value held by that contract. Scope is not intent.

  • An upgradeable contract can change behaviour after the key is issued. Guardian QA's contract-change signal is a warning, not a guarantee.

  • A stolen function-call key can be used by anyone until the allowance is exhausted or the key is deleted.

  • Guardian QA is a software policy layer. It must run in a trusted process; an attacker who controls the agent process can skip it. Defence in depth means combining the policy gate, a scoped key, spend limits and human approval.

  • The wrapper's spend limits are local configuration, not on-chain enforcement.

See the NEAR access-key documentation: https://docs.near.org/protocol/accounts-contracts/access-keys.


Real vs simulated

This project is honest about what is live and what is not:

Area

Status

NEAR network

Testnet only. No mainnet calls are made by default.

Funds and keys

None. The repo contains no private keys and never signs a transaction. Execution is a dry-run receipt.

Account data

Live for accounts that exist on testnet. Demo accounts that are not deployed use data/account_fixtures.json; the signal notes say fixture and explain why.

Blocklist entries

Synthetic. They are demo data, not accusations against real accounts. The main sink is a 64-character address that is not deployed on testnet.

Prompt-injection classifier

Local heuristics always run. The NEAR AI Cloud classifier runs when NEARAI_API_KEY is set; the checked-in report used it, so every attempt has both the heuristic and the model score.

Abliterated attacker model

Exercised. The checked-in report was generated by deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017-abliterated through NEAR AI Cloud; all 19 payloads carry generated: true.

LLM victim

Exercised with openai/gpt-4.1-mini: 18 of 19 complied with the injected destination, 0 escaped, 1 non-compliant. Non-compliant victims are reported separately and excluded from the detection rate.

TEE attestation

Guardian QA records the gateway evidence digest and checks the nonce echo. The report is fetched once per run and cached for 300 seconds. It does not perform full Intel DCAP or NVIDIA NRAS verification; use nearai-cloud-verifier for that.

Detection quality

Probabilistic. The red-team result is evidence for this test set, not a proof of safety.

If you configure NEARAI_API_KEY, the classifier, the abliterated generator, the LLM victim and the attestation report path become available. Without it, everything still runs offline and deterministically.

Calibration note (live run, 2026-11-13): the first real run with the classifier over-flagged ordinary business text. A plain "our vendor changed payout account" invoice scored 0.85 payment_redirect, which turned an expected warn into a block in two demo scenarios. The classifier prompt now requires control-oriented language (override, impersonation, concealment, credential theft, obfuscation) and includes two benign and two malicious examples. After that change: demo 7/7 expected verdicts, red team 19/19 contained (16 blocks, 3 warns), control allowed. The false positive only appeared against the real model, not in the offline tests.


Configuration

Copy .env.example to .env. Never commit .env.

Variable

Default

Purpose

NEAR_NETWORK

testnet

testnet or mainnet. Keep testnet for the demo.

NEAR_RPC_URL

https://test.rpc.fastnear.com

Read-only RPC endpoint.

NEARBLOCKS_API_URL

https://api-testnet.nearblocks.io

NearBlocks v3 base URL.

NEARAI_API_KEY

empty

Enables the NEAR AI Cloud classifier, attacker model and attestation.

NEARAI_BASE_URL

https://cloud-api.near.ai/v1

OpenAI-compatible gateway.

NEARAI_CLASSIFIER_MODEL

Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B

Injection classifier.

NEARAI_ATTACKER_MODEL

deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017-abliterated

Red-team payload generator.

NEARAI_VICTIM_MODEL

openai/gpt-4.1-mini

LLM victim for the red team. Reasoning models such as Qwen3.8 spend the budget on hidden tokens and return empty content; the victim call retries with a larger budget, but an instruct model is cheaper and more reliable here.

NEARAI_TIMEOUT

60

Timeout in seconds for LLM and attestation calls.

NEARAI_ATTESTATION_CACHE_SECONDS

300

How long one gateway attestation is reused per process.

NEARAI_ATTESTATION

1

0 skips the gateway attestation call, for endpoints without /attestation/report.

GUARDIAN_OFFLINE

0

1 skips NEAR RPC/NearBlocks calls and uses fixtures. Explicit NEAR AI calls still run when a key is set.

GUARDIAN_MAX_SINGLE_PAYMENT

50

Wrapper single-payment limit, in token units.

GUARDIAN_DAILY_LIMIT

200

Wrapper daily limit, in token units.


Project layout

guardian-qa/
├── data/
│   ├── account_fixtures.json      # offline demo account profiles
│   ├── blocklist.seed.json        # synthetic blocklist seed
│   ├── stablecoin_registry.json   # canonical USDC/USDT contracts
│   └── token_fixtures.json        # offline contract metadata
├── docs/
│   ├── DEMO_SCRIPT.md             # 60-second live demo script
│   ├── demo.mp4                   # 91-second Manim + terminal-replay video
│   └── demo.srt                   # burned-in subtitle track, standalone copy
├── reports/
│   ├── demo_live.json             # last demo run, JSON
│   ├── red_team_report.md         # abliterated generator, scripted victim
│   ├── red_team_results.json      # raw results for that run
│   ├── red_team_static.md         # same suite, deterministic payloads
│   ├── red_team_static.json
│   ├── red_team_llm_victim.md     # abliterated generator, LLM victim
│   └── red_team_llm_victim.json
├── src/guardian_qa/
│   ├── agent/                     # policy gate, audit log, demo agent
│   ├── policy/                    # engine and reason codes
│   ├── red_team/                  # attacks, runner, report writer
│   ├── signals/                   # account, token, blocklist, injection
│   ├── config.py
│   ├── mcp_server.py
│   ├── models.py
│   ├── near_rpc.py
│   ├── nearblocks.py
│   ├── nearai.py
│   ├── service.py
│   └── storage.py
├── tests/                         # 81 offline tests
├── video/
│   ├── scenes.py                  # six Manim scenes
│   ├── meta.py                    # durations and subtitle cues
│   ├── build.py                   # validate → render → concat → burn subtitles
│   ├── manim.cfg                  # 1080p30, dark background
│   ├── assets/terminal_demo.txt   # captured real run, replayed in the video
│   ├── assets/fonts/              # Inter + IBM Plex Mono, SIL OFL
│   └── out/                       # segments and logs, gitignored
├── .env.example
├── LICENSE
├── pyproject.toml
├── run_red_team.py                # red-team convenience entry point
└── README.md

Testing

pytest

The suite is fully offline and covers:

  • policy verdicts, hard blocks, warning accumulation and evidence;

  • blocklist seeding, network scoping, deduplication and spend accounting;

  • the wrapper's fail-closed behaviour, human approval, single/daily limits and token allowlist;

  • token resolution, stablecoin mismatch and unknown contracts;

  • injection heuristics, multilingual patterns and JSON extraction;

  • classifier category gating: a bare payment_redirect signal is capped below the block threshold unless a control-oriented category or a local heuristic matches;

  • the service end-to-end (block, allow, report-then-block);

  • the MCP server through the in-process FastMCP client (tools listed and called);

  • red-team mode resolution, generated-payload validation, victim compliance and non-compliant accounting;

  • gateway attestation parsing for both string and list event_log shapes.

Result on 2026-11-13: 81 passed.


Hackathon disclosures

  • Track: AI Security & Defense (security). The project also fits agents; one submission can list both track ids.

  • New repository (Q-003 / Q-004): all project code was written during the hackathon window. There is no pre-hackathon product baseline.

  • Libraries and templates (Q-005): FastMCP, httpx, the OpenAI Python SDK (used against the NEAR AI Cloud gateway), Pydantic, python-dotenv, Rich and pytest. NearBlocks and NEAR AI Cloud are external services, not bundled code. No pre-existing proprietary library is included.

  • NEAR AI Cloud: optional inference for the prompt-injection classifier, the abliterated red-team generator, the optional LLM victim, and gateway attestation evidence. No NEAR AI code is bundled; the API is OpenAI-compatible.

  • NEAR Intents (Q-007): not used. This project does not need a 1Click JWT or an Intents mainnet account.

  • Testnet only (Q-010): the demo and the checked-in reports use testnet only. The code accepts a mainnet setting, but this submission does not use it and no mainnet call is made by default.

  • License (Q-014): MIT. See LICENSE.

  • Secrets: no API key, seed phrase or private key is committed. .env is ignored by git.

  • Demo accounts: synthetic. The blocklist does not accuse real accounts.


Limitations and next steps

  • Prompt-injection detection is probabilistic and the checked-in heuristics are intentionally small. The NEAR AI Cloud classifier is the scalable path.

  • The blocklist is local SQLite. A production deployment would need signed reports, moderation, and an appeal path.

  • Account history comes from a public indexer. A production deployment should pin or verify its data source.

  • Full TEE quote verification is out of scope here; the attestation digest is recorded so an external verifier can consume it.

  • Spend limits are tracked in token units and do not convert between tokens. A production deployment should use a common unit or a per-token ledger.

  • The demo uses dry-run receipts. Wiring a real function-call key and a payment contract is the next integration step, and it must stay on testnet for this submission.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

Tool Schema Changelog

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