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TypeScript
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rotate_secret

Destructive

Request a fresh credential from the upstream provider and store it in the keyring, replacing an expiring or leaked secret.

Instructions

[validation] Ask the upstream provider to issue a fresh credential for this secret and store the new value back into the keyring. Use when a secret is expiring, leaked, or part of a scheduled rotation; prefer generate_secret for self-managed values you fully control, and agent_scan --autoRotate for sweep-style rotation across multiple expired keys. Mutates the keyring with the newly-issued value if rotation succeeds (one 'write' audit event), and makes outbound network requests against the provider's rotation API. Returns JSON { rotated, newValue?, message?, ... }. If rotated is false, the existing value is left untouched.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
keyYesExact key to rotate. Must already exist in the keyring.
orgIdNoOrganization identifier for org-scoped secrets. Required only when scope='org'. Example: 'acme-corp'.
scopeNoWhere the secret lives. 'global' = user keyring (default if omitted on reads), 'project' = scoped to projectPath, 'team' = team-shared (needs teamId), 'org' = org-shared (needs orgId).
teamIdNoTeam identifier for team-scoped secrets. Required only when scope='team'. Example: 'acme-platform'.
providerNoForce a specific provider id (see `list_providers`). Omit to auto-detect from the current value or the secret's stored provider hint.
projectPathNoAbsolute path to the project root for project-scoped secrets and policy resolution. Defaults to the MCP server's current working directory when omitted.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed6 schema fields changedv0.11.7
    • changedInput schema / properties / key / description
      Previous value: -"The secret key to rotate"New value: +"Exact key to rotate. Must already exist in the keyring."
    • changedInput schema / properties / orgId / description
      Previous value: -"Org identifier for org-scoped secrets"New value: +"Organization identifier for org-scoped secrets. Required only when scope='org'. Example: 'acme-corp'."
    • changedInput schema / properties / projectPath / description
      Previous value: -"Project root path for project-scoped secrets"New value: +"Absolute path to the project root for project-scoped secrets and policy resolution. Defaults to the MCP server's current working directory when omitted."
    • changedInput schema / properties / provider / description
      Previous value: -"Force a specific provider"New value: +"Force a specific provider id (see `list_providers`). Omit to auto-detect from the current value or the secret's stored provider hint."
    • changedInput schema / properties / scope / description
      Previous value: -"Scope: global, project, team, or org"New value: +"Where the secret lives. 'global' = user keyring (default if omitted on reads), 'project' = scoped to projectPath, 'team' = team-shared (needs teamId), 'org' = org-shared (needs orgId)."
    • changedInput schema / properties / teamId / description
      Previous value: -"Team identifier for team-scoped secrets"New value: +"Team identifier for team-scoped secrets. Required only when scope='team'. Example: 'acme-platform'."
  2. Addedv0.11.5

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations: discloses the 'write' audit event, outbound provider network calls, the return shape `{ rotated, newValue?, message?, ... }`, and the failure semantics (rotated=false leaves existing value untouched). The annotations cover the safety profile, and the description layers concrete operational detail on top.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the action, then when-to-use, then behavioral side effects and return contract in tightly packed sentences. Every clause carries distinct information; nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Although there is no output schema, the description documents the return fields and the failure state, and it covers mutation effects and network behavior for a destructive operation. An agent has everything needed to call this correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all six parameters (key, orgId, scope, teamId, provider, projectPath) are already documented with examples and scope conditions. The description adds no syntax or format detail beyond the schema, so baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource: 'Ask the upstream provider to issue a fresh credential for this secret and store the new value back into the keyring.' It distinguishes itself from `generate_secret` (self-managed values) and `agent_scan --autoRotate` (sweep rotation), so an agent can route correctly without opening schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit trigger conditions ('expiring, leaked, or part of a scheduled rotation') plus two named alternatives with the conditions that select them. Nothing is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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