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delete_secret

DestructiveIdempotent

Permanently remove a secret value and its environment states from the keyring for a given scope. Use when retiring a credential or correcting an accidental creation.

Instructions

[secrets] Permanently remove a secret value (and all its env states) from the keyring for the given scope. Use when a credential is being retired or was created in error; prefer disentangle_secrets to break a sync link without erasing values, remove_hook to detach lifecycle callbacks, and tunnel_destroy for ephemeral tunnels. Destructive and not undoable from q-ring (no built-in trash). Writes a 'delete' event to the audit log and fires matching hooks. Returns 'Deleted "KEY"' on success or a not-found error if the key did not exist in the requested scope. Subject to tool policy.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
keyYesExact secret key name to delete. Example: 'OLD_API_KEY'.
orgIdNoOrganization identifier for org-scoped secrets. Required only when scope='org'. Example: 'acme-corp'.
scopeNoWhere the secret lives. 'global' = user keyring (default if omitted on reads), 'project' = scoped to projectPath, 'team' = team-shared (needs teamId), 'org' = org-shared (needs orgId).
teamIdNoTeam identifier for team-scoped secrets. Required only when scope='team'. Example: 'acme-platform'.
projectPathNoAbsolute path to the project root for project-scoped secrets and policy resolution. Defaults to the MCP server's current working directory when omitted.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed5 schema fields changedv0.11.7
    • changedInput schema / properties / key / description
      Previous value: -"The secret key name"New value: +"Exact secret key name to delete. Example: 'OLD_API_KEY'."
    • changedInput schema / properties / orgId / description
      Previous value: -"Org identifier for org-scoped secrets"New value: +"Organization identifier for org-scoped secrets. Required only when scope='org'. Example: 'acme-corp'."
    • changedInput schema / properties / projectPath / description
      Previous value: -"Project root path for project-scoped secrets"New value: +"Absolute path to the project root for project-scoped secrets and policy resolution. Defaults to the MCP server's current working directory when omitted."
    • changedInput schema / properties / scope / description
      Previous value: -"Scope: global, project, team, or org"New value: +"Where the secret lives. 'global' = user keyring (default if omitted on reads), 'project' = scoped to projectPath, 'team' = team-shared (needs teamId), 'org' = org-shared (needs orgId)."
    • changedInput schema / properties / teamId / description
      Previous value: -"Team identifier for team-scoped secrets"New value: +"Team identifier for team-scoped secrets. Required only when scope='team'. Example: 'acme-platform'."
  2. Changed4 schema fields changedv0.11.5
    • addedInput schema / properties / orgId
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Org identifier for org-scoped secrets",
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • changedInput schema / properties / scope / description
      Previous value: -"Scope: global or project"New value: +"Scope: global, project, team, or org"
    • changedInput schema / properties / scope / enum
      Previous value: -[
-  "global",
-  "project"
-]New value: +[
+  "global",
+  "project",
+  "team",
+  "org"
+]
    • addedInput schema / properties / teamId
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Team identifier for team-scoped secrets",
+  "type": "string"
+}
  3. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint/readOnlyHint/idempotent, but the description adds substantial value beyond them: no undo and no built-in trash, all env states removed, an audit-log 'delete' event is written, matching hooks fire, and it is subject to tool policy. This is exactly the behavioral context a mutation tool needs.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the destructive action and constraint, then routing, then side effects, then return values. Dense but every sentence earns its place; slightly long, keeping it just below a 5.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, yet the description supplies the return contract ('Deleted "KEY"' or a not-found error), the side effects (audit event, hooks), and the irreversibility caveat. Complete for a 5-parameter destructive tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so every parameter (key, scope, orgId, teamId, projectPath) is already documented in the schema. The description reinforces scope-based behavior ('for the given scope', not-found 'in the requested scope') but adds no syntax or format detail beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Permanently remove a secret value ... from the keyring for the given scope'), scopes it, and explicitly distinguishes itself from three siblings by naming conditions under which each alternative is preferred. An agent can select this over disentangle_secrets/remove_hook/tunnel_destroy without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives both when-to-use ('credential is being retired or was created in error') and when-not-to-use with named alternatives and their selecting conditions (disentangle_secrets for breaking sync links without erasing, remove_hook for callbacks, tunnel_destroy for ephemeral tunnels). Nothing is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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