terminal-use-mcp
Allows AI agents to interact with htop for system monitoring and process management within terminal sessions.
Enables AI agents to interact with Python REPL for executing Python code interactively in a terminal.
Provides tmux-based terminal sessions with persistence, disconnect recovery, and multi-user attach capabilities.
Allows AI agents to interact with Vim editor for text editing tasks within terminal sessions.
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@terminal-use-mcpstart lazygit in my project directory"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
terminal-use-mcp
Local + remote terminal interaction control MCP Server. Lets AI agents control interactive TUI programs the way a human would.
This is not a shell runner. Use your bash tool for simple commands. This server handles TUI programs that require keyboard interaction: lazygit, vim, htop, Python REPL, debuggers, installers, external agent TUIs (Claude Code, Codex CLI, OpenCode).
Quick Start
Prerequisites
Dependency | Minimum | Purpose |
Node.js | 18+ | Run the MCP server |
npm | 8+ | Install dependencies |
node-gyp + C++ toolchain | -- | Compile node-pty native addon (optional; fallback to tmux if missing) |
tmux | 3.2+ | tmux provider (optional; only native-pty available if missing) |
Environment Variables
Variable | Required | Default | Description |
| Yes |
| Root directory for CWD validation |
| No | (empty) | Comma-separated additional allowed directories |
| No |
| Session auto-cleanup timeout (1 hour) |
MCP Client Configuration
Claude Code
Add to your project root .mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"terminal-use": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "terminal-use-mcp"],
"env": {
"TERMINAL_USE_WORKSPACE_ROOT": "<your-project-path>",
"TERMINAL_USE_ALLOWED_CWD": "<your-project-path>,/tmp"
}
}
}
}Claude Desktop
Edit ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):
{
"mcpServers": {
"terminal-use": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "terminal-use-mcp"],
"env": {
"TERMINAL_USE_WORKSPACE_ROOT": "<your-project-path>",
"TERMINAL_USE_ALLOWED_CWD": "<your-project-path>,/tmp"
}
}
}
}OpenCode
Add to .opencode/opencode.json in the mcp field:
{
"mcp": {
"terminal-use": {
"type": "local",
"command": ["npx", "-y", "terminal-use-mcp"],
"enabled": true,
"environment": {
"TERMINAL_USE_WORKSPACE_ROOT": "<your-project-path>",
"TERMINAL_USE_ALLOWED_CWD": "<your-project-path>,/tmp"
}
}
}
}stdio transport: stdout is reserved for MCP protocol. All logs go to stderr. Server cleans up all sessions on SIGINT/SIGTERM.
Copy-Paste Setup (for AI agent one-shot install)
Paste the appropriate prompt below into your AI agent. It will handle installation, configuration, and verification autonomously.
Claude Code
Set up terminal-use-mcp with these steps:
1. Prerequisites check:
- Confirm Node.js 18+ and npm 8+ are available (node -v / npm -v)
2. Configure MCP:
- Create or edit .mcp.json in the project root, adding:
{
"mcpServers": {
"terminal-use": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "terminal-use-mcp"],
"env": {
"TERMINAL_USE_WORKSPACE_ROOT": "<current-project-absolute-path>",
"TERMINAL_USE_ALLOWED_CWD": "<current-project-absolute-path>,/tmp"
}
}
}
}
- Replace <current-project-absolute-path> with the actual path
3. Restart Claude Code for the config to take effect
4. Verify:
- Confirm terminal.health, terminal.start etc. appear in the MCP tool list
- Call terminal.health to confirm server and provider status are OK
- If tools are not visible, check .mcp.json formatting and restart again
Constraints:
- Do not output any secrets
- Only notify me if node-pty compilation fails; handle other issues yourselfClaude Desktop
Set up terminal-use-mcp with these steps:
1. Prerequisites check:
- Confirm Node.js 18+ and npm 8+ are available (node -v / npm -v)
2. Configure MCP:
- Edit the Claude Desktop config file:
- macOS: ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json
- Windows: %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json
- Add to mcpServers:
"terminal-use": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "terminal-use-mcp"],
"env": {
"TERMINAL_USE_WORKSPACE_ROOT": "<current-project-absolute-path>",
"TERMINAL_USE_ALLOWED_CWD": "<current-project-absolute-path>,/tmp"
}
}
- Replace <current-project-absolute-path> with the actual path
3. Fully quit and restart Claude Desktop
4. Verify:
- Confirm terminal.health and similar tools appear in conversation
- Call terminal.health to confirm server status is OK
- If tools are not visible, check config file JSON format and path spelling
Constraints:
- Do not output any secrets
- Only notify me if node-pty compilation fails or config file cannot be foundOpenCode
Set up terminal-use-mcp with these steps:
1. Prerequisites check:
- Confirm Node.js 18+ and npm 8+ are available (node -v / npm -v)
2. Configure MCP:
- Add to .opencode/opencode.json in the mcp field:
{
"type": "local",
"command": ["npx", "-y", "terminal-use-mcp"],
"enabled": true,
"environment": {
"TERMINAL_USE_WORKSPACE_ROOT": "<current-project-absolute-path>",
"TERMINAL_USE_ALLOWED_CWD": "<current-project-absolute-path>,/tmp"
}
}
- Replace <current-project-absolute-path> with the actual path
3. Restart OpenCode for the config to take effect
4. Verify:
- Confirm terminal.health, terminal.start etc. appear in the MCP tool list
- Call terminal.health to confirm server and provider status are OK
- If tools are not visible, check .opencode/opencode.json formatting and restart again
Constraints:
- Do not output any secrets
- Only notify me if node-pty compilation fails; handle other issues yourselfRelated MCP server: interactive-process-mcp
Providers
Provider | Use Case | Key Advantage |
| Most interactive TUI programs (default) | Fast response, high-quality snapshots, highlight detection |
| Sessions needing persistence, disconnect recovery, multi-user attach | Attachable, sessions survive MCP restart |
| TUI programs on remote hosts | Reuses local xterm/snapshot/transcript stack over SSH |
| Persistent remote sessions, disconnect recovery, human-attachable | Full remote tmux lifecycle management |
Auto-selection rules:
Local: native-pty, falling back to tmux
Remote (V2): ssh-pty, falling back to ssh-tmux (fallback response tagged with
fallbackFrom)
MCP Tools
Session Lifecycle (7 tools)
Tool | Purpose | Key Parameters |
| Start a terminal session |
|
| Attach to an existing session (tmux) |
|
| List all active sessions | (none) |
| Query session details |
|
| Rename a session label |
|
| Terminate a session and its process |
|
| Clean up all expired sessions | (none) |
Observation (5 tools)
Tool | Purpose | Key Parameters |
| Capture current screen state |
|
| Wait for specific text to appear |
|
| Wait until output stops changing |
|
| Search for text in screen/scrollback |
|
| Scroll the terminal viewport |
|
Input (5 tools)
Tool | Purpose | Key Parameters |
| Type text into the terminal |
|
| Send a key press (supports arbitrary combos) |
|
| Paste large text (with safety checks) |
|
| Mouse click (SGR-1006) |
|
| Mouse wheel scroll (SGR-1006) |
|
Meta (7 tools)
Tool | Purpose | Key Parameters |
| Change terminal dimensions |
|
| Export session transcript |
|
| Check server and provider status | (none) |
| List available key expressions (by category) | (none) |
| Query provider capability matrix |
|
| Get session event history |
|
| Send signal (SIGINT/SIGTERM/SIGKILL) |
|
Remote Control (3 tools, V2 Design Phase)
Tool | Purpose | Key Parameters |
| List available targets (local + SSH) | (none) |
| Query target details (redacted) |
|
| Verify SSH target connectivity |
|
Scrollback Strategy
Terminals have two buffer modes that affect how scrollback works. Understanding this distinction is critical for effective terminal control.
Two Buffer Modes
Mode | Programs | tmux |
|
Normal buffer | bash, python REPL, shell commands | > 0 |
|
Alternate buffer | vim, htop, less, opencode, claude code, lazygit | = 0 |
|
Alternate buffer (fullscreen TUI) programs have zero tmux scrollback. They take over the entire screen and manage their own internal scrolling. terminal.scroll() and snapshot(mode="full") provide no additional content for these programs.
Snapshot Mode Recommendations
Scenario | Recommended | Why |
Normal shell, need recent output |
| Default, compact |
Normal shell, need scrolled-off output |
| Incremental, avoids context duplication |
Normal shell, need ALL output at once |
| One-shot complete capture; use sparingly |
TUI program (opencode/vim/htop) |
|
|
Browsing History in TUI Programs
terminal.scroll() enters tmux copy-mode, which does NOT work for TUI programs. Use the program's own navigation instead:
Program | How to scroll/browse history |
opencode |
|
claude code |
|
codex cli |
|
vim |
|
htop | Arrow keys to scroll process list; F5/F6 for tree/sort |
lazygit |
|
less | Built-in scroll keys ( |
Security
terminal-use-mcp is not a sandbox. Security policies restrict the entry point, not the TUI program's internal behavior.
Command Safety
Startup command deny list:
sudo, su, ssh, scp, sftp, rm, dd, mkfs,
shutdown, reboot, chmod, chown, curl, wget,
nc, ncat, telnet// Environment variable overrides
TERMINAL_USE_ALLOW_COMMANDS=git,make // additional allow
TERMINAL_USE_DENY_COMMANDS=node,python3 // additional deny
TERMINAL_USE_RISKY_COMMAND_MODE=deny // deny | ask | allowUnder ask mode, dangerous commands return CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED. The agent should stop and ask the user.
Boundary: command policy only restricts the startup command passed to terminal.start. TUI subprocesses, REPL eval()/exec(), and shell chains within the TUI are not restricted. The deny list is not a complete sandbox.
CWD Policy
Local CWD validation:
// Allowed by default
const allowedCwdRoots = [
process.cwd(),
process.env.TERMINAL_USE_WORKSPACE_ROOT,
...splitCsv(process.env.TERMINAL_USE_ALLOWED_CWD),
]
// Denied by default (unless under an allowedCwdRoots subtree)
const deniedCwdRoots = ["/", "/root", "/home", "/etc", "/usr", "/var", "/sys", "/proc", "/boot"]When workspace root is $HOME/dev/homelab, $HOME/dev/homelab/** is allowed, but the entire $HOME is not.
Remote CWD (V2) uses independent validation with remoteAllowedCwd / remoteDeniedCwd from the profile, not local rules.
Secret Redaction
The following patterns are automatically replaced with <REDACTED_*> in snapshots and transcripts:
const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
/ghp_[0-9a-zA-Z]{36}/g, // GitHub PAT
/sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20}T3BlbkFJ.+/g, // OpenAI key
/sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9-]+/g, // Anthropic key
/(?:AKIA|ABIA|ACCA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}/g, // AWS key
/Bearer\s+[a-zA-Z0-9\-._~+/]+=*/g, // Bearer token
/-----BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY----[\s\S]*?-----END .* PRIVATE KEY-----/g, // Private key block
/(?<=^|\n)\s*(password|secret|token|api_key)\s*=\s*.+/gi, // .env style
]Confirmation Detection
Snapshots automatically detect dangerous prompts on screen:
const CONFIRMATION_PATTERNS = [
/\bapprov[ei]\b/i, /\ballow\b/i, /\bconfirm\b/i,
/\boverwrite\b/i, /\bdelete\b/i, /\bpassword\b/i,
/\[y\/n\]/i, /\[Y\/n\]/i,
/\bAllow command\??/i, /\bRun command\??/i,
]Severity levels: high (credential/destructive prompt, agent must stop and ask user), medium (confirmation prompt, proceed with caution), low (generic approval, normal judgment applies).
observationTrust
All snapshots return:
{ observationTrust: "untrusted" }Terminal output is untrusted observation, not instruction.
Remote SSH (V2, Design Phase)
V2 remote features are in the design phase and not yet implemented. See docs/V2_REMOTE_TERMINAL_GUIDE.md for the full design.
ssh-pty vs ssh-tmux
Aspect | ssh-pty | ssh-tmux |
Purpose | Remote PTY channel, direct TUI control | Remote tmux session, persistent + disconnect recovery |
Use case | Ephemeral remote interaction (REPL, installers) | Long-running remote tasks, human-attachable |
Attach | No | Yes |
Disconnect recovery | No | Yes |
Highlights | Yes (reuses local xterm) | No |
Implementation | ssh2 Client + shell/exec + pty | System ssh + remote tmux commands |
SSH Configuration
Config file location: ~/.config/terminal-use-mcp/hosts.json (or override via TERMINAL_USE_HOSTS_CONFIG).
{
"hosts": {
"devbox": {
"host": "192.168.1.20",
"port": 22,
"username": "hlh",
"auth": {
"type": "agent"
},
"knownHosts": "~/.ssh/known_hosts",
"defaultCwd": "/home/hlh/dev",
"remoteAllowedCwd": [
"/home/hlh/dev",
"/srv/lab"
],
"remoteDeniedCwd": [
"/",
"/root",
"/etc",
"/boot",
"/proc",
"/sys"
],
"allowTmux": true,
"connectTimeoutMs": 10000,
"keepaliveIntervalMs": 15000
}
}
}The config file must NOT contain: password, private key content, token, passphrase in plaintext, .env content. Key-file auth only stores the file path. Passphrases are referenced by env var name via passphraseEnv, never by value.
ssh-agent Setup
Recommended authentication method:
# Start ssh-agent
eval "$(ssh-agent -s)"
# Add key
ssh-add ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
# Confirm loaded
ssh-add -lSshAuthRef type:
type SshAuthRef =
| { type: "agent"; socket?: string }
| { type: "key-file"; path: string; passphraseEnv?: string }{ type: "password" } is prohibited. V2 does not support password login.
known_hosts / Pinned Fingerprint
Two host key verification methods:
known_hosts: Points to
~/.ssh/known_hosts, reuses the system's existing trust chainPinned fingerprint: Specify
pinnedHostFingerprint: "SHA256:..."in the profile for exact binding
When host key verification fails, the connection is refused. StrictHostKeyChecking=no is prohibited.
Remote Security Restrictions
Rule | Description |
Strict host key verification | Must pass via known_hosts or pinned fingerprint; unverified connections are refused |
No password login |
|
Inline SSH denied by default | Direct host/port in tool call is refused unless |
No auto-approve of agent permission prompts | "Allow command?" / "Apply changes?" in remote TUI, agent must stop and ask user |
Remote terminal output is untrusted |
|
Remote Session Lifecycle
// V2: Start remote TUI
terminal.start({
provider: "ssh-pty",
target: { kind: "ssh", profile: "devbox" },
command: "lazygit",
cwd: "/home/hlh/dev/project"
})
// V2: Verify target before starting
terminal.verify_target({ profile: "devbox" })
// → { ok: true, hostFingerprint: "SHA256:...", remote: { tmuxAvailable: true, ... } }
// V2: List available targets
terminal.targets({})
// → { targets: [{ kind: "local", name: "local" }, { kind: "ssh", profile: "devbox", ... }] }Remote session metadata is recorded in session.json, including SSH connection info, auth type, and host fingerprint. Artifacts must NOT contain: private key content, password, token, passphrase, or raw env sensitive values.
Security Restrictions Summary
Restriction | Local (V1) | Remote (V2) |
Command deny list | Yes | Yes |
CWD allowlist | Yes | Yes (independent policy) |
Secret redaction | Yes | Yes (additionally redacts hostname/username/home path) |
Confirmation detection | Yes | Yes (extended: remote_privilege_prompt / remote_host_key_prompt) |
observationTrust |
|
|
Host key verification | N/A | Strict (known_hosts or pinned fingerprint) |
Password login | N/A | Prohibited |
Inline SSH target | N/A | Denied by default, must explicitly enable |
Paste limits | >2000 chars requires confirmation, >10000 hard limit; secrets rejected | Same as local |
Environment Variables
V1
Variable | Default | Description |
|
| Root directory for CWD validation |
| (empty) | Comma-separated additional allowed directories |
|
| Session auto-cleanup timeout (1 hour) |
|
| Cleanup check interval (1 minute) |
| (empty) | Comma-separated commands to allow despite denylist |
| (empty) | Additional commands to deny |
|
| Risky command handling: |
V2 (Design Phase)
Variable | Default | Description |
|
| SSH hosts configuration file path |
| (not set) | Set to |
Type Definitions
TerminalSnapshot
type TerminalSnapshot = {
sessionId: string
screen: string
cursor: { x: number; y: number }
cols: number
rows: number
status: "starting" | "running" | "exited" | "killed" | "error"
changed?: boolean
exitCode?: number | null
title?: string
isFullscreen?: boolean
highlights?: Array<{
row: number
colStart: number
colEnd: number
text: string
kind: "inverse" | "selection" | "active" | "unknown"
}>
riskSignals?: Array<{
type: "confirmation_prompt" | "credential_prompt" | "destructive_prompt" | "external_agent_permission"
text: string
severity: "low" | "medium" | "high"
}>
timestamp: string
observationTrust: "untrusted"
}ToolError
type ToolError = {
ok: false
error: {
code: TerminalUseErrorCode
message: string
provider?: string
sessionId?: string
retryable: boolean
hint?: string
details?: unknown
}
}
type TerminalUseErrorCode =
| "SESSION_NOT_FOUND"
| "PROVIDER_NOT_AVAILABLE"
| "PROVIDER_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED"
| "SESSION_TIMEOUT"
| "UNSAFE_COMMAND"
| "LARGE_PASTE_REFUSED"
| "SECRET_DETECTED"
| "CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED"
| "SESSION_BUSY"
| "PROCESS_EXITED"
| "DEPENDENCY_MISSING"
| "INVALID_CWD"
| "INVALID_MOUSE_COORDS"
| "INVALID_KEY"
| "INTERNAL_ERROR"
// V2 additions (design phase)
| "SSH_PROFILE_NOT_FOUND"
| "SSH_HOST_KEY_MISMATCH"
| "SSH_HOST_KEY_UNKNOWN"
| "SSH_AUTH_FAILED"
| "SSH_CONNECT_TIMEOUT"
| "SSH_CONNECTION_LOST"
| "SSH_INLINE_TARGET_DENIED"
| "REMOTE_CWD_DENIED"
| "REMOTE_TMUX_NOT_AVAILABLE"
| "REMOTE_COMMAND_DENIED"TerminalTarget (V2, Design Phase)
type TerminalTarget =
| { kind: "local" }
| {
kind: "ssh"
profile?: string
host?: string
port?: number
username?: string
auth?: SshAuthRef
knownHostPolicy?: "strict"
}Development
Script | Description |
| Start MCP server (tsx direct run) |
| TypeScript compilation |
| Type checking ( |
| Run all tests |
| Unit tests |
| Provider contract tests |
| MCP stdio smoke tests |
| Integration tests |
| typecheck + test |
Platform Support
Platform | V1 Status | Notes |
Linux x86_64 / ARM64 | Supported | native-pty + tmux both available |
macOS Intel / Apple Silicon | Supported / Best effort | native-pty requires Xcode CLI tools; tmux via brew |
WSL2 | Supported / Best effort | Same as Linux; verify node-pty compilation |
Native Windows | Not supported | ConPTY support planned for future release; tmux unavailable |
Known Limitations
native-pty depends on node-gyp; compilation may fail in some environments (falls back to tmux)
@xterm/headlesshighlight detection is best-efforttmux provider does not support true color ANSI
Native Windows not supported (V1)
Sessions are not persistent; server restart loses them
Large paste hard limit at 10000 characters
Confirmation detection uses regex matching; false positives are possible
Acknowledgments
This project was inspired by and references the following open-source projects. We are grateful to their authors and contributors.
Direct References (code-level inspiration)
Project | Repository | License | How Referenced |
MIT | Key mapping format ( |
Architecture & Design References (documentation-level only)
Project | Repository | License | How Referenced |
MIT | SSH security best practices reference (known_hosts, ssh-agent) | ||
MIT | Distributed session owner architecture reference | ||
MIT | Anti-pattern reference (host key verification disabled by default) | ||
MIT | PTY container comparison reference |
Runtime Dependencies
All runtime and optional dependencies are permissively licensed (MIT or Apache-2.0). No GPL/LGPL copyleft dependencies exist.
Package | Repository | License |
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk | MIT | |
ssh2 | MIT | |
zod | MIT | |
@xterm/headless | MIT | |
@xterm/addon-unicode11 | MIT | |
node-pty (optional) | MIT |
Standards & Specifications Referenced
XTerm Control Sequences — ANSI escape sequence encoding (SGR-1006 mouse, C0/C1/SS3 keys)
tmux(1) manual —
capture-pane,send-keys,display-messageformat variablesModel Context Protocol Specification — MCP server/tool/resource/prompt registration patterns
License
MIT
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