Genesis Mesh MCP
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Genesis Mesh MCPverify the signature on this audit evidence bundle"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Genesis Mesh MCP
A standalone Model Context Protocol server for Genesis Mesh: Network Authority operations, offline trust primitives, signing, evidence verification and a complete reference to the core public surface.
Core compatibility: Genesis Mesh 1.8.1. This is an unreleased development adapter (0.1.0.dev0), not yet a component of the coordinated release train. It reuses the core implementation and the official MCP Python SDK; it does not implement a second trust protocol.
Coverage
Named adapters cover all 116 public HTTP method/path operations, plus separate signed node and attestation rosters.
Offline tools cover agreements, delegation, recognition, tokens, freshness, policy decisions, execution evidence, audit verification, disclosure, consensus, data governance, oversight, risk, privacy, purge, discovery, interoperability, grants and key history.
The catalog accounts for 782 contract entries, including every CLI command, public Python symbol, signed artifact, error code, package and behavioral rule. These are overlapping surfaces, not 782 independent features.
Resources include model schemas, all 137 CLI command references, compatibility details, configuration capabilities and the current coverage report.
Coverage accounting, executable adapters and tested behavior are reported separately. Some fleet/federation/proof/peer-runtime workflows remain explicit gaps; multi-step audit, enrollment and treaty workflows have usable component operations without claiming end-to-end orchestration. Host daemons, database migration/restore and root-key custody have documented boundaries. See the measured coverage report and architecture.
Related MCP server: fallpharm-mcp
Install
Requires Python 3.12 or later. From this repository:
python -m venv .venv
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m pip install -c requirements.lock ".[dev]"
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m genesismesh_mcp --checkOn Linux/macOS, use .venv/bin/python. The constraints file pins the dependency set verified for this checkout. Development commands work with an editable installation too: replace ".[dev]" with -e ".[dev]".
--check checks compatibility, packaged snapshot integrity, tool registration and coverage. It does not connect to an authority or validate that credentials are usable.
Connect an MCP host
Use the installed interpreter's absolute path. A typical MCP host configuration is:
{
"mcpServers": {
"genesismesh": {
"command": "C:/path/to/genesismesh-mcp/.venv/Scripts/python.exe",
"args": ["-m", "genesismesh_mcp"]
}
}
}The server runs over stdio. stdout carries MCP only. There is no unauthenticated remote HTTP listener. Offline verification works without a Network Authority.
To use an authority, create a gitignored config.local.json:
{
"authority_url": "https://your-authority.example",
"profiles": ["read", "verify"]
}Append "--config", "C:/path/to/config.local.json" to the host's arguments. Configuration paths resolve relative to that file. HTTP is allowed only for explicitly enabled loopback development, using "allow_http_loopback": true.
Enable privileged operations deliberately
Profiles are checked both when listing tools and when invoking them directly:
Profile | Purpose |
| Public authority reads and public bundle export |
| Offline checks and verification endpoints |
| Operator-authenticated authority operations; also needs |
| Dedicated node identity operations; also needs |
| Authority mutations and recorded operations |
| Offline artifact signing with explicitly permitted signers |
| Read bounded artifacts from a configured workspace; also needs |
For authority administration, configure operator_key_file, operator_key_id, and an independently obtained authority_public_key. Core operator tiers still apply. Node operations use node_key_file; edge enrollment also uses executor_key_file. Enrollment's invite_token is local configuration, not a model input.
Offline signing requires both a signer reference and an exact tool allowlist:
{
"profiles": ["verify", "sign"],
"signer_files": {"issuer": "keys/issuer.key"},
"signer_permissions": {
"issuer": ["gm_offline_freshness_issue_freshness_proof"]
}
}Keys use the core's base64 key-file format. There are no wildcard signer permissions. The model supplies a signer_ref, never a private key, key path, signer backend or replacement authority URL. There is no raw arbitrary-signing tool.
An invitation tool intentionally returns its newly issued enrollment token; treat that result as sensitive. Oversight signing does not prove that a separate human approved: the host and configured key custodian must control those calls. A policy ALLOW is an assessment, not proof an external action executed.
Discover and use the core
Read these MCP resources:
genesis-mesh://coverage— implementation, test evidence, disabled profiles, boundaries and gaps.genesis-mesh://compatibility— core version, immutable revision and contract digest.genesis-mesh://configuration— enabled profiles and signer permissions; no key paths or secrets.genesis-mesh://schema/<module>:<Model>— structural JSON schema; not cryptographic verification.genesis-mesh://cli/trust/delegate/verify— core CLI syntax and option reference.genesis-mesh://errors,genesis-mesh://rules,genesis-mesh://packages— preserved core contract semantics.
Examples of requests to an MCP host:
“Inspect this authority's key history and recognition policy.”
“Verify this agreement and explain the rejection details.”
“Validate this trust bundle; distinguish structural consistency from authenticity.”
“Verify this evidence export against the root key and anchors I hold.”
“Build an Atlas from this graph and overlay the signed evidence.”
“Show which core operations this server implements and which still need orchestration.”
Typed tools expose argument schemas through MCP. Binary arguments/results use standard base64. Signed artifacts retain the core's wire representation. HTTP results distinguish http_ok from protocol decisions within result; a successful HTTP request can still return a trust denial.
Verify a change
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m ruff check .
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m pytest -q
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts/snapshot_cli.py --check
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts/check_coverage.py --core ../genesismesh --require-http
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts/render_coverage.py --check
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m buildThe source check requires the exact revision in data/compatibility.json. New core surfaces, changed signatures, invalid aliases and snapshot drift fail the check. --require-no-gaps is an additional aspirational gate and currently fails for the explicitly documented orchestration gaps.
Tests include disposable real HTTP authorities, domain success/denial paths, official MCP clients, real stdio processes, signing isolation and filesystem limits. scripts/smoke_installed.py must additionally run with a fresh wheel-only virtual environment; an editable-environment stdio test is not clean-wheel evidence. CI is configured for Windows/Linux and Python 3.12/3.14; local results do not establish unrun CI outcomes.
Limits
max_input_bytes and max_output_bytes default to 1 MiB and 4 MiB. Oversized artifacts are refused, never silently truncated. HTTP responses are read with bounded streaming and redirects/retries disabled. timeout_seconds controls socket inactivity and streamed-body elapsed checks; it is not a hard process or CPU deadline. Known quadratic audit/Atlas workloads have separate complexity limits.
Workspace access is read-only and confined to the configured root. The stdio host user is the security boundary: this is not a multi-user hosted authorization service. No production authority was modified to test this implementation.
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
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