Genesis Mesh MCP
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
Genesis Mesh MCP
A standalone Model Context Protocol server for Genesis Mesh: Network Authority operations, offline trust primitives, signing, evidence verification and a complete reference to the core public surface.
Core compatibility: Genesis Mesh 1.11.0. This is an unreleased development adapter (0.1.0.dev0), not yet a component of the coordinated release train. It reuses the core implementation and the official MCP Python SDK; it does not implement a second trust protocol.
Coverage
Named adapters cover all 116 public HTTP method/path operations, plus separate signed node and attestation rosters.
Offline tools cover agreements, delegation, recognition, tokens, freshness, policy decisions, execution evidence, audit verification, disclosure, consensus, data governance, oversight, risk, privacy, purge, discovery, interoperability, grants and key history.
The catalog accounts for 782 contract entries, including every CLI command, public Python symbol, signed artifact, error code, package and behavioral rule. These are overlapping surfaces, not 782 independent features.
Resources include model schemas, all 137 CLI command references, compatibility details, configuration capabilities, the coverage report and reviewed per-tool test citations.
285 tools include configured workflows for federation, fleet generation/mesh/status/verification, remote proofs/canaries/cleanup, audit packs/archives, held anchors, treaty lifecycle, node enrollment/status, peer sends and guard requests.
Coverage accounting, executable adapters and tested behavior are reported separately. The executable-workflow gap count is zero against the pinned contract: 119 CLI commands have adapters and 18 describe host/custody operations. Host daemons, general database migration/restore and production root-key custody remain documented boundaries. This is not identical CLI flag/process behavior or proof of production deployment. See measured coverage, workflow scope, and configuration examples.
Related MCP server: fallpharm-mcp
Install
Requires Python 3.12 or later. From this repository:
python -m venv .venv
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m pip install -c requirements.lock ".[dev]"
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m genesismesh_mcp --checkOn Linux/macOS, use .venv/bin/python. The constraints file pins the dependency set verified for this checkout. Development commands work with an editable installation too: replace ".[dev]" with -e ".[dev]".
--check checks compatibility, packaged snapshot integrity, tool registration and coverage. It does not connect to an authority or validate that credentials are usable.
Connect an MCP host
Use the installed interpreter's absolute path. A typical MCP host configuration is:
{
"mcpServers": {
"genesismesh": {
"command": "C:/path/to/genesismesh-mcp/.venv/Scripts/python.exe",
"args": ["-m", "genesismesh_mcp"]
}
}
}The server runs over stdio. stdout carries MCP only. Offline verification works without a Network Authority.
To serve hosts that connect by URL, genesismesh-mcp-http runs the same tools over Streamable HTTP with a built-in OAuth authorization server: clients register themselves, an operator-issued approval code authorizes each one, and token scopes (gm:read, gm:operator, ..., gm:admin) narrow the configured profiles per request. Autonomous agents use scoped tokens from genesismesh-mcp-admin create-agent. There is no unauthenticated HTTP listener. See serving over HTTP.
Tool discovery returns every profile-enabled tool in the initial response so chat hosts that read only one listing can discover the full interface. Set tool_page_size to a positive integer only for a client that follows MCP pagination; the default is null (one complete listing). Resource discovery remains paginated.
To use an authority, create a gitignored config.local.json:
{
"authority_url": "https://your-authority.example",
"profiles": ["read", "verify"]
}Append "--config", "C:/path/to/config.local.json" to the host's arguments. Configuration paths resolve relative to that file. HTTP is allowed only for explicitly enabled loopback development, using "allow_http_loopback": true.
Enable privileged operations deliberately
Profiles are checked both when listing tools and when invoking them directly:
Profile | Purpose |
| Public authority reads and public bundle export |
| Offline checks and verification endpoints |
| Operator-authenticated authority operations; also needs |
| Dedicated node identity operations; also needs |
| Authority mutations and recorded operations |
| Offline artifact signing with explicitly permitted signers |
| Confined artifact reads and configured workflow storage/journals |
| Configured peer sends and fixed guard actions; requires their other profiles |
| Private fleet or node-key creation in server-configured storage |
| Configured canary audit stores and explicitly disposable proof-database cleanup |
For authority administration, configure operator_key_file, operator_key_id, and an independently obtained authority_public_key. Core operator tiers still apply. Node operations use node_key_file; edge enrollment also uses executor_key_file. Enrollment's invite_token is local configuration, not a model input.
Offline signing requires both a signer reference and an exact tool allowlist:
{
"profiles": ["verify", "sign"],
"signer_files": {"issuer": "keys/issuer.key"},
"signer_permissions": {
"issuer": ["gm_offline_freshness_issue_freshness_proof"]
}
}Keys use the core's base64 key-file format. There are no wildcard signer permissions. The model supplies a signer_ref, never a private key, key path, signer backend or replacement authority URL. There is no raw arbitrary-signing tool.
An invitation tool intentionally returns its newly issued enrollment token; treat that result as sensitive.
Nodes and agents that hold their own keys
The connector issues invites; it never holds an outside node's private key, so the node joins and registers itself. Issue the invite with na_admin_create_invite, bound to the node's public key (recipient_public_key): the result's token_id is the single-use invite token. The node then joins (/join) and registers its descriptor (/agents) at the authority's public node URL, signing with its own key. Configure that URL as node_enrollment_url when the server's own authority_url is a private address. Every MCP client learns this without documentation: the server instructions say it, the invite result carries an enrollment note with the join_url, the genesis-mesh://guide/enroll-node resource holds the steps and a Python example, and the enroll_node prompt runs the procedure. Oversight signing does not prove that a separate human approved: the host and configured key custodian must control those calls. A policy ALLOW is an assessment, not proof an external action executed.
Discover and use the core
Read these MCP resources:
genesis-mesh://coverage— implementation, test evidence, disabled profiles, boundaries and gaps.genesis-mesh://compatibility— core version, immutable revision and contract digest.genesis-mesh://configuration— enabled profiles and signer permissions; no key paths or secrets.genesis-mesh://schema/<module>:<Model>— structural JSON schema; not cryptographic verification.genesis-mesh://cli/trust/delegate/verify— core CLI syntax and option reference.genesis-mesh://errors,genesis-mesh://rules,genesis-mesh://packages— preserved core contract semantics.
Examples of requests to an MCP host:
“Inspect this authority's key history and recognition policy.”
“Verify this agreement and explain the rejection details.”
“Validate this trust bundle; distinguish structural consistency from authenticity.”
“Verify this evidence export against the root key and anchors I hold.”
“Build an Atlas from this graph and overlay the signed evidence.”
“Show which core operations this server implements and which still need orchestration.”
Typed tools expose argument schemas through MCP. Binary arguments/results use standard base64. Signed artifacts retain the core's wire representation. HTTP results distinguish http_ok from protocol decisions within result; a successful HTTP request can still return a trust denial.
Verify a change
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m ruff check .
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m coverage run -m pytest -q --evidence-report=temp/coverage/tests.json --junitxml=temp/coverage/junit.xml
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m coverage json
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m coverage report
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts/snapshot_cli.py --check
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts/check_coverage.py --core ../genesismesh --require-http --require-no-gaps --test-evidence temp/coverage/tests.json --branch-coverage temp/coverage/branches.json --require-full-behavior
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts/render_coverage.py --check
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe -m buildThe source check requires the exact revision in data/compatibility.json. New core surfaces, changed signatures, invalid aliases, snapshot drift and missing workflow adapters fail CI. --require-no-gaps includes incomplete compositions; schemas, references and documented host boundaries remain separate classifications.
CI also requires --require-clean-evidence. Every exercised catalog claim must cite tests that were collected and passed, including all matching parameterized cases. The per-tool ledger requires actual registered-handler success and refusal observations. Missing, skipped, expected-failure, deselected and stale evidence fails this gate. Branch measurements carry the same source digest. Each Windows/Linux and Python job retains its receipt, branch report, JUnit results and resolved verification report for 14 days; a final job requires zero missing adapter statements and branch arcs across all four reports. See verification evidence for scope and interpretation.
Tests include disposable real HTTP authorities, Noise peers, guard subprocesses, SQLite stores, domain success/denial paths, official MCP clients, real stdio processes, signing isolation and filesystem limits. Recovery tests exercise missing mutation replies, revoked certificates, changed anchors, corrupt readback and key-history rollback. scripts/smoke_installed.py must additionally run with a fresh wheel-only virtual environment; an editable-environment stdio test is not clean-wheel evidence. CI runs Windows/Linux and Python 3.12/3.14.
Limits
max_input_bytes and max_output_bytes default to 1 MiB and 4 MiB. Oversized artifacts are refused, never silently truncated. HTTP responses are read with bounded streaming and redirects/retries disabled. timeout_seconds controls socket inactivity and streamed-body elapsed checks; it is not a hard process or CPU deadline. Known quadratic audit/Atlas workloads have separate complexity limits.
General workspace access remains read-only. Workflow writes use separately configured artifact, node, provisioning and proof-store locations. Private workflow/node/provisioning storage cannot overlap readable workspace or artifact roots. Over stdio, the host user is the security boundary; over HTTP, each client's OAuth scopes are, and every client acts with the same configured keys: this is one operator's server, not a multi-tenant service. No production authority was modified to test this implementation.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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