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managed_sign_in

Authenticates into GDEX managed custody by submitting an AES-256-CBC encrypted sign-in payload with a chain ID, enabling session-key signing for user and private agent calls.

Instructions

Sign in to GDEX managed-custody system using encrypted computedData payload.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "computedData": "<computedData>",
      "chainId": "<chainId>"
    },
    "name": "managed_sign_in"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
chainIdYesChain ID (622112261=Solana, 42161=Arbitrum for HL perps)
accountRefNoConnected account from gdex_connect. Supplies session key, wallet address, API key and session data so no secret is passed in chat
computedDataYesAES-256-CBC encrypted sign-in payload
sessionPrivateKeyNoSession private key from generate_session_keypair; needed to sign /v1/user and private agent calls after sign-in

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv5.3.0
    • addedInput schema / properties / accountRef
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Connected account from gdex_connect. Supplies session key, wallet address, API key and session data so no secret is passed in chat",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / sessionPrivateKey
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Session private key from generate_session_keypair; needed to sign /v1/user and private agent calls after sign-in",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  2. First observedv4.11.3

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint=true, so the agent knows this is a non-destructive network write; the description is consistent with that. What it omits is behavior beyond the safety profile: that signing in establishes a session whose key is later needed for private calls, and whether repeated calls create new sessions or refresh existing ones.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence that identifies the action and the payload it consumes with no filler. It is not padded, though it is thin enough that a second sentence on prerequisites would have earned its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given 100% schema coverage and usable annotations, the core call information is present, and no output schema means return values need not be described. However, for an authentication entry point in a large multi-auth toolset, the missing prerequisite chain (connect account, generate keypair, build payload) leaves an agent to reconstruct the flow from sibling names alone.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and each parameter already carries a substantive description (chain IDs, accountRef sourcing, AES-256-CBC payload, session key purpose). The description merely echoes computedData, adding no syntax, format, or linkage detail beyond the structured fields, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Sign in to GDEX managed-custody system') plus the mechanism ('encrypted computedData payload'). It is distinguishable from build_sign_in_payload (which presumably produces the payload) but never names any sibling, so differentiation is inferred rather than explicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use guidance and no mention of the alternatives in the sibling list (auth_login, oauth_login, gdex_connect, build_sign_in_payload). At most the phrase 'using encrypted computedData payload' hints that a payload must exist first, but the ordering and prerequisites are left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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