gecko-mcp
# gecko-mcp
[](https://github.com/Frumane/gecko-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
[](LICENSE)
> An **MCP (Model Context Protocol)** server that lets AI assistants — Claude Code,
> Claude Desktop, Cursor, and any MCP client — **read pages, take screenshots and
> manage tabs** in [Floorp](https://floorp.app) **and other Firefox-based browsers**
> (LibreWolf, Waterfox, Zen, Mullvad, Firefox…), using your real, logged-in session.
Think "Claude in Chrome", but for the whole Firefox/Gecko family.

**Get started in ~30 seconds:**
```bash
npx gecko-mcp setup
```
Registers gecko-mcp with **Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code (Copilot), Windsurf, Zed, Codex** and more — per-project or global. See [Setup](#setup) for manual config and [Requirements](#requirements) for the one-time browser step.
> **Cautious about installing this?** Good — you should be. It's small (2 deps, all
> in [`src/`](src)), the OS keyboard/mouse is **locked by default** (browser-only
> until you opt in), releases ship with **npm provenance** (verifiable against this
> source), and the full threat model is in [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). Read it
> before you run `npx gecko-mcp`.
## How it works
gecko-mcp talks to the browser through one of two backends, picked automatically:
- **Floorp** ships a built-in automation HTTP API. Set `floorp.mcp.enabled = true`
in `about:config` and gecko-mcp uses the fast `http://127.0.0.1:58261` API —
no extension, richest feature set.
- **Any other Gecko browser** — launch it with **Marionette** (the automation
engine built into every Firefox fork) and gecko-mcp drives your live session
over it. Same tools, same real session.
```
Claude Code / Desktop / Cursor
│ MCP (stdio)
▼
gecko-mcp ──► Floorp :58261 (built-in API) ─┐
(this project) ──► Marionette :2828 (any Gecko fork) ─┴─► your real tabs
```
## Requirements
- A **Firefox-based browser** installed and running, with automation enabled:
- **Floorp:** set **`floorp.mcp.enabled`** to `true` in `about:config`, restart Floorp.
- **Other forks (LibreWolf / Waterfox / Zen / Mullvad / Firefox):** launch the
browser with **`-marionette`** (see [Browser support](#browser-support)).
- **Node.js** ≥ 18.
## Setup
### Quick start — the setup wizard
```bash
npx gecko-mcp setup
```
An interactive wizard registers gecko-mcp with the AI coding tool(s) of your
choice — **Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code (Copilot), Gemini CLI, Codex,
Zed, Cline** (and a copy-paste snippet for **Kimi Code, Antigravity**, or any
other MCP client) — and lets you install it **for the current project** or
**globally (all repos)**. It merges into existing config (and backs it up first).
Non-interactive / scriptable:
```bash
npx gecko-mcp setup --list # show supported tools
npx gecko-mcp setup --tool claude-code,cursor --scope global
npx gecko-mcp setup --tool codex --scope global --print # dry run
```
### Manual
Any MCP client works with this server block (no clone/build needed — `npx`
fetches it):
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"gecko": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "gecko-mcp"]
}
}
}
```
Or with Claude Code's CLI: `claude mcp add gecko -s user -- npx -y gecko-mcp`.
> **One-time Floorp step:** set `floorp.mcp.enabled = true` in `about:config` and
> restart Floorp so its automation API is available.
## Browser support
gecko-mcp picks its backend automatically: if Floorp's `:58261` API is reachable
it uses that; otherwise it connects to **Marionette**, the automation engine built
into every Gecko browser. To use a non-Floorp browser, launch it once with
Marionette enabled:
| Browser | Launch with Marionette |
|---|---|
| **Floorp** | *(no flag — just set `floorp.mcp.enabled=true`; uses the native API)* |
| **Firefox** | `firefox -marionette` |
| **LibreWolf** | `librewolf -marionette` |
| **Waterfox** | `waterfox -marionette` |
| **Zen** | `zen -marionette` |
| **Mullvad** | `mullvad-browser -marionette` |
Marionette listens on TCP **2828** by default. To use another port, set the
`marionette.port` pref in the profile (e.g. via `user.js`) and start gecko-mcp
with a matching `MARIONETTE_PORT`. Force a backend with `GECKO_MCP_BACKEND=marionette`.
> **Note:** Marionette must be enabled *at launch* to attach to your live session.
> On the Marionette backend, Floorp-only extras (`snapshot` fingerprints,
> `list_workspaces`/`switch_workspace`, accessibility tree) return a clear
> "not supported" message — use `find` / `read_page` instead. Everything else
> (tabs, navigation, click, type, forms, screenshots, cookies, real OS input…) works.
## Tools
**Tabs & reading**
| Tool | What it does |
|------|--------------|
| `list_tabs` | List all open tabs (title, URL, browserId, active, pinned). |
| `open_tab` | Open a new tab at a URL; **returns the new tab's `browserId`** so you can target it. |
| `get_active_tab` | Return the active tab's title, URL and browserId. |
| `navigate_tab` | Navigate an existing tab to a URL. |
| `close_tab` | Close a tab. |
| `read_page` | Read a tab's content as clean Markdown (or HTML / accessibility tree). Output is capped (default 25 KB) to protect the context. |
| `find` | **Fast element locator** — search a page server-side by visible text and/or tag; returns a compact list of ready-to-use CSS `selector`s (~1 KB) instead of the whole HTML. Use it to find a button/link/field, then act on the selector. |
| `snapshot` | Structured page map: Markdown with inline `fp:` refs + an element selector map — locate elements without grepping HTML, then act via a `ref`. |
| `screenshot` | Capture a screenshot of a tab (viewport or full page). |
| `launch_floorp` | Ensure Floorp is running — launches it if the API isn't reachable (Windows). |
| `launch` | Start any Firefox-based browser (Firefox, LibreWolf, Zen…) with Marionette enabled so gecko-mcp can drive it. |
**Interaction**
| Tool | What it does |
|------|--------------|
| `click` | Click an element by CSS selector **or a `ref` from `snapshot`**; auto-scrolls it into view first. |
| `type_text` | Type into an input/textarea — or a rich/contenteditable editor (Slate, ProseMirror…) — by CSS selector. |
| `fill_form` | Fill multiple fields at once. |
| `press_key` | Press a keyboard key (Enter, Tab, …). |
| `wait_for_element` | Wait for an element to attach / become visible / etc. |
| `get_value` | **Sensitive.** Read the current value of an input/textarea/select (can read password fields). |
Most tools target the **active tab** by default; pass a `browserId` (from
`list_tabs`) to target a specific tab.
### OS keyboard & mouse — **locked by default** 🔒
The tools below can affect things *outside* the browser, so they are **disabled
until you turn them on**. With nothing set, gecko-mcp does browser automation only.
Unlock them per-session by just asking ("**enable OS input**", which calls the
`enable_os_input` tool), or persistently with `GECKO_MCP_ENABLE_OS_INPUT=1`. Lock
again with `disable_os_input`. While locked, these tools refuse with a clear message.
The **`evaluate`** tool (run arbitrary page JavaScript) is locked the same way —
unlock with `enable_evaluate` or `GECKO_MCP_ENABLE_EVALUATE=1`.
| Tool | What it does |
|------|--------------|
| `enable_os_input` / `disable_os_input` | Unlock / re-lock the OS keyboard & mouse tools for this session. |
| `enable_evaluate` / `disable_evaluate` | Unlock / re-lock the `evaluate` (run page JS) tool for this session. |
| `evaluate` | **Locked.** Run JavaScript in the page and return its value (`return …`). |
**Real OS keyboard (Windows)** — for React/rich editors and bot-guarded submits
that ignore synthetic input:
| Tool | What it does |
|------|--------------|
| `real_type` | Type into the focused element via **genuine OS key events** (`isTrusted`). |
| `real_key` | Press a real key/combo, e.g. `"Enter"`, `"ctrl+a"`. |
| `real_clear` | Real Ctrl+A + Delete — reliably clears a rich/contenteditable field. |
These produce input a page can't distinguish from a human's, so they drive
React/Slate editors and submit composers that synthetic clicks/typing can't.
Workflow: `click` the field to focus it → `real_clear` / `real_type` / `real_key "Enter"`.
> **Safety guard:** OS keystrokes go to the foreground window, so before sending
> anything these tools bring Floorp to the foreground and **verify** it — if Floorp
> isn't running or can't be focused, they **abort without typing a single key**, so
> input can never leak into another app.
**Real OS mouse (Windows)** — genuine `isTrusted` clicks at screen coordinates:
| Tool | What it does |
|------|--------------|
| `window_bounds` | Floorp's window rectangle in screen pixels (to compute targets). |
| `move_cursor` | Move the real OS cursor to a screen pixel inside Floorp. |
| `real_click` | Real OS click (left/right, single/double) at a screen pixel inside Floorp. |
> **Double guard:** the click is sent only when Floorp is verified foreground **and**
> the point lies **inside Floorp's window rect** — a stray coordinate is refused, so
> a click can never land in another app/window. Coordinates are screen pixels
> (note display scaling/DPI when mapping from a screenshot).
**More interaction & queries**
| Tool | What it does |
|------|--------------|
| `hover` / `double_click` / `right_click` | Mouse gestures on an element (selector or `ref`). |
| `select_option` | Choose an option in a `<select>`. |
| `set_checked` | Check/uncheck a checkbox or radio. |
| `submit_form` | Submit a form. |
| `upload_file` | **Sensitive.** Set a file `<input>` by absolute path — restrict with `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_UPLOAD_DIRS`. |
| `get_attribute` | Read an element attribute (href, value, …). |
| `get_article` | Readability-extracted main article as Markdown. |
| `get_cookies` | **Sensitive.** Cookies visible to the page — values redacted unless `includeValues: true`. |
| `wait_for_network_idle` | Wait for network activity to settle. |
| `list_workspaces` / `switch_workspace` | Floorp workspaces (where supported). |
## Security
Understand the threat model before enabling this. Two risks dominate:
1. **Floorp's automation API has no authentication by default.** While
`floorp.mcp.enabled` is on, **any local process** can drive your logged-in
browser via `127.0.0.1:58261` — not just this server. There is also no
Origin check, so hostile web pages may attempt CSRF/DNS-rebinding tricks
against it. Mitigations:
- Turn `floorp.mcp.enabled` **off** when you're not using automation.
- Set the `GECKO_MCP_TOKEN` environment variable — this server then sends it
as a `Bearer` token on every request (effective on Floorp builds that
enforce a token; harmless otherwise).
2. **Prompt injection ("lethal trifecta").** The assistant reads untrusted page
content *and* can act on your authenticated sessions (click, type, submit,
navigate, real OS input). A malicious page could try to instruct the
assistant to act against you. Treat everything read from a page as untrusted;
don't run automation unattended on sites you don't trust.
Hardening built into this server:
- **OS keyboard/mouse is locked by default (least privilege):** the only tools that
can act outside the browser refuse to run until you explicitly unlock them
(`enable_os_input` tool, or `GECKO_MCP_ENABLE_OS_INPUT=1`). By default gecko-mcp
can only automate the browser, never your wider machine.
- **Real OS input is double-guarded:** keys/clicks are sent only after verifying
Floorp is the foreground window, and mouse clicks must land inside Floorp's
window rectangle — otherwise it aborts *without* sending anything. PowerShell
payloads are passed base64-encoded via process-private environment variables
(no shell interpolation, no temp script files on disk).
- **URL scheme + host allowlist:** `open_tab`/`navigate_tab` accept only `http(s)`
(and `about:blank`) by default, and **refuse loopback/private hosts**
(`127.0.0.1`, `localhost`, `10/8`, `172.16/12`, `192.168/16`, `169.254/16`,
IPv6 ULA/link-local). This stops a prompt-injected agent from pivoting the
browser onto Floorp's own API or your LAN and reading the response back. Lift
with `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_PRIVILEGED_URLS=1`. Optionally pin navigation to a
domain allowlist with `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_DOMAINS`.
- **Cookie values are redacted by default** in `get_cookies`; raw values require
an explicit `includeValues: true`.
- **`get_value` can read secrets:** browsers let same-origin JS read password
fields, so this tool *can* return a typed password. It's flagged SENSITIVE —
use it only on fields the user asked about, never to harvest credentials.
- **Upload allowlist:** set `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_UPLOAD_DIRS` (`;`-separated
directories) to confine `upload_file`. Paths are canonicalised with realpath
(symlinks resolved) and checked so `..`, a symlink, a same-prefix sibling
directory, or a UNC path can't escape the allowed folders.
- **`find` skips hidden elements** (inline `display:none`/`visibility:hidden`,
`hidden`, `type=hidden`, `aria-hidden`) so a page can't lure the agent into
clicking an invisible button via text search.
- **Input bounds:** numeric/text tool parameters are range- and length-capped
(coordinates, timeouts, `maxChars`, `find` limit, typed text, form fields) to
prevent resource-exhaustion / crash inputs.
- **Truncated API errors & validated port:** Floorp error bodies are truncated
before reaching the model; `GECKO_MCP_PORT` is validated as 1–65535.
- **Tool annotations for human-in-the-loop:** every tool carries MCP hints
(`readOnlyHint`/`destructiveHint`/…) so your client can auto-run read-only
tools and confirm destructive ones (`close_tab`, `navigate_tab`, `submit_form`,
`upload_file`). A server can't show prompts itself — approval is the client's
job — so this is how gecko-mcp tells the client what's safe vs consequential.
- **No `evaluate` tool:** arbitrary page-JS execution is deliberately not exposed.
What is **not** defended (inherent / Floorp-side): a malicious *local* process can
still read or impersonate the unauthenticated loopback API (plaintext, no TLS), and
prompt injection from a page you choose to automate can still drive legitimate
actions on that page. Disable `floorp.mcp.enabled` when idle and don't automate
untrusted sites unattended.
| Environment variable | Effect |
|---|---|
| `GECKO_MCP_TOKEN` | Sent as `Authorization: Bearer …` to the Floorp API. |
| `GECKO_MCP_PORT` | API port (default `58261`, validated 1–65535). |
| `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_PRIVILEGED_URLS` | `1` allows non-http(s) URLs **and** loopback/private hosts in open/navigate. |
| `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_DOMAINS` | Comma-separated domain allowlist for navigation (subdomains included). Unset = any public host. |
| `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_UPLOAD_DIRS` | Restrict `upload_file` to these directories (`;`-separated). |
| `FLOORP_PATH` | Full path to `floorp.exe` for `launch_floorp`. |
| `GECKO_MCP_BACKEND` | Force the backend: `floorp` or `marionette`. Default: auto-detect. |
| `MARIONETTE_PORT` | Marionette TCP port for non-Floorp browsers (default `2828`). |
| `GECKO_MCP_ENABLE_OS_INPUT` | `1` unlocks the OS keyboard/mouse tools at startup (otherwise locked until the `enable_os_input` tool is called). |
| `GECKO_MCP_ENABLE_EVALUATE` | `1` unlocks the `evaluate` (run page JS) tool at startup (otherwise locked until `enable_evaluate`). |
| `GECKO_MCP_BROWSER_PROCESS` | Process-name regex the real OS keyboard/mouse may target (default covers the common Gecko forks). |
> The legacy `FLOORP_MCP_*` variable names still work as fallbacks (from before the
> rename), so existing configs keep working — prefer `GECKO_MCP_*` going forward.
## Performance
- **HTTP tool calls are cheap** — a full attach → act → detach round-trip against
Floorp's local API is ~5–6 ms. `find` searches the page server-side and returns
~1 KB of ready-to-use selectors instead of dumping the whole HTML, and
`read_page` is capped (default 25 KB) so a page read can't flood the context.
- **Real OS input uses a persistent PowerShell host.** Spawning `powershell.exe`
(~700 ms) and compiling the P/Invoke helper (~600 ms) used to happen on *every*
`real_*`/`move_cursor`/`window_bounds` call (~1.9 s each). Now one host is
started lazily, compiles once, and runs a read-eval loop — so the first call
pays ~1.6 s but every call after is **~350 ms** for a guarded key/click (~5×
faster) and a few ms for a window-bounds query. The foreground/bounds safety
guards still run on every command; the host is recycled if it hangs or dies.
## Notes & limitations
Learned from driving real apps (incl. Google Flow):
- **Rich editors:** `type_text` handles plain inputs *and* contenteditable editors
(Slate, ProseMirror, Lexical) — it falls back to dispatching a real text-input
event when an element has no `.value`. Reliably *clearing* such editors isn't
solved yet (no `select-all`/`evaluate`).
- **Submitting React composers:** many chat/prompt composers submit on a real
**Enter keydown**, not on a synthetic click of the send button. Prefer
`press_key` `"Enter"` over `click` for those.
- **Trusted events:** you cannot forge `isTrusted=true` from page JavaScript — it
is a browser security invariant. Floorp injects input at a privileged layer, so
ordinary clicks/keys behave like real ones; but flows guarded by reCAPTCHA or
strict bot-detection may still refuse automated submission.
- **`evaluate`:** the page-JS eval endpoint returns HTTP 404 on some Floorp builds,
so it is not exposed as a tool here.
- **Multiple windows:** when more than one window is open, the "active tab" is
ambiguous (each window has its own active tab). Prefer the `browserId` returned
by `open_tab`, or one from `list_tabs`, and pass it explicitly to every tool.
## Roadmap
- [x] Tab management, page reading, screenshots
- [x] Interaction tools: click, type, fill forms, key presses, read field values
- [x] Real OS keyboard (Windows): `real_type` / `real_key` / `real_clear`, with a
foreground safety guard — drives React/Slate editors & bot-guarded submits
- [x] `snapshot` (fingerprint refs + selector map) + `click` by `ref` + auto-scroll-into-view
- [x] `launch_floorp` — start Floorp if not running (Windows)
- [x] Extra tools: hover, double/right-click, select_option, set_checked, submit,
upload_file, get_attribute, get_article, get_cookies, wait_for_network_idle, workspaces
- [x] Real OS mouse (Windows): `window_bounds` / `move_cursor` / `real_click`, with a
foreground + in-window-bounds double guard
- [x] **Marionette backend — all Firefox-based browsers** (LibreWolf, Waterfox,
Zen, Mullvad, Firefox…), auto-selected when Floorp's API isn't present
- [ ] macOS / Linux native-input backends
- [ ] JS `evaluate` (available in newer Floorp builds; older ones return HTTP 404)
- [ ] Optional bearer-token auth
- [ ] `launch` helper for non-Floorp browsers (start them with `-marionette`)
## Acknowledgements
Built against the automation API exposed by Floorp. The official
[`Floorp-Projects/floorp-mcp-server`](https://github.com/Floorp-Projects/floorp-mcp-server)
was a useful reference for mapping the endpoint surface. This is an independent,
clean-room MIT-licensed implementation.
## License
[MIT](./LICENSE) © Frumane
TDQS
Scored across 41 tools
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is potential confusion between synthetic (click, type_text) and real OS (real_click, real_type) variants, and between snapshot/find/read_page for content extraction. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate.
All tool names follow a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern (e.g., open_tab, get_article, enable_evaluate, real_click). No mixed conventions or chaotic naming.
41 tools is high for a browser automation server, which typically has 10-20. While many actions are covered, some tools like separate real/synthetic variants and enable/disable toggles bloat the count.
Covers core browser automation well: navigation, tabs, element interaction, content extraction, OS input, screenshots, workspaces. Missing download handling and drag-and-drop, but not severely incomplete.