FailEcho
OfficialFailEcho is a cross-agent failure intelligence server for checking, reporting, and learning from tool failures and recovery outcomes.
Check shared failure intelligence before retrying a failed tool call.
Get failure status (HEALTHY/DEGRADED/MAJOR/INSUFFICIENT_DATA), observation/reporter counts, and failure rates.
See recovery actions other agents tried, with success rates and Wilson-score confidence.
Receive an actionable recovery recommendation when evidence supports it (null otherwise).
Report tool failures with privacy-safe metadata (service, operation, error type/code/message).
Report tool successes to provide denominators for accurate failure rates.
Report whether a recovery action worked to improve future recommendations.
Use fingerprints to anonymously link failures and recoveries across agents.
Read operations are free, anonymous, unauthenticated, and never rate limited; writes are rate limited.
Never send prompts, tool arguments, results, request/response bodies, headers, keys, or user content; raw error text is normalized and discarded.
Provides a reference integration for Pydantic AI that instruments toolsets so every tool call automatically reports its outcome (success or failure) to FailEcho while remaining behaviorally invisible to the agent.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@FailEchocheck if other agents hit this GitHub API failure and what fixed it"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
FailEcho
Failure intelligence for AI agents and autonomous software. Before you retry, check the echo.
FailEcho is a live cross-agent failure intelligence network. AI agents share privacy-safe tool failures and recovery outcomes so other agents can avoid repeating the same bad retry.
Agent A fails.
FailEcho learns.
Agent B encounters the same failure.
It sees what actually worked for other agents.
Agent B benefits from evidence it never generated itself.Connect in one minute
MCP endpoint
https://failecho.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http failecho https://failecho.com/mcp{
"mcpServers": {
"failecho": { "type": "http", "url": "https://failecho.com/mcp" }
}
}Python, if you want failures and successes reported automatically:
from failecho import FailEcho
echo = FailEcho("https://failecho.com", reporter_id="my-agent-1")
outcome = await echo.observe_tool_call(
service="github-mcp",
operation="create_issue",
call=lambda: github.create_issue(**args),
)
if outcome.failed and outcome.decision.actionable:
do(outcome.decision.recommendation) # your code decides, never FailEchoNo account. No API key. Free during the public MVP. Full integration guide: Connect an agent.
Related MCP server: Casebook MCP
What it does
See whether other AI agents are hitting the same tool failure right now — and which recovery actions actually worked. FailEcho exposes a Model Context Protocol (MCP) endpoint that agents can query after a tool failure, plus a REST API.
Tool | When the agent calls it |
| a tool failed — before retrying |
| contribute the failure |
| contribute a success (the denominator) |
| say whether the fix worked |
FailEcho normalizes error text deterministically (no model) into a fingerprint,
accumulates recovery outcomes against it, and returns a recommendation only
when independent reporters agree. Thin evidence returns INSUFFICIENT_DATA
rather than a guess. Confidence is a Wilson score lower bound you can recompute
from the counts returned beside it.
It stores failure metadata only: no prompts, tool arguments, tool results, request or response bodies, headers, keys or user content. Raw error text is discarded after normalization.
Live: https://failecho.com · /docs · /openapi.json · /llms.txt
This is not an observability platform, an error database, an uptime monitor or an LLM debugger. The unit of the system is:
service + operation + version + schema_hash + failure fingerprint
+ observed recovery outcomesVocabulary
Term | Meaning |
FailEcho Network | the whole system |
Failure Echo | a normalized observed failure, shared by fingerprint |
Recovery Echo | evidence that a recovery action worked |
Incident | a sudden abnormal failure increase |
Reporter | an agent or runtime sending telemetry |
Fingerprint | the canonical normalized error identity |
The brand vocabulary is for humans. Wire formats are deliberately unbranded:
endpoint paths, MCP tool names and field names (fingerprint,
recommendation, recovery_actions) stay exactly as they are, because machine
clarity outranks naming purity.
See the network effect locally
Two terminals, about a minute.
# 1. the network
uv run uvicorn app.main:app --reload
# or: .venv/bin/python -m uvicorn app.main:app --reload
# 2. six independent agents hitting the same broken tool
uv run python examples/live_agent/run_demo.py
# or: .venv/bin/python examples/live_agent/run_demo.pyThe demo starts a small local tool server, then runs six logically independent agents against it. Every network call goes over MCP, from an external process, using the official MCP SDK.
Agent A calls a tool. It fails: the provider renamed a field.
|
v
Agent A reports the failure -> the network records it
Agent A has no evidence to go on, so it retries (fails),
refreshes the tool schema (works), and reports both outcomes
|
v
Agents C, D, E, F hit the same failure with different repository ids
-> normalization collapses all of them onto ONE fingerprint
-> the network accumulates evidence from 5 independent reporters
|
v
Agent B hits the same failure with yet another id, and asks first
-> the network recognises the fingerprint
-> "refresh_schema: 5/5 successes, 5 reporters, confidence 0.57"
-> "retry: 0/5. Do not bother."
|
v
Agent B skips the retry the others wasted a call on, refreshes, succeeds,
and reports its outcome -- which makes the next agent's answer better.Agent B never met Agent A. It only met the network. That is the entire product.
Real output from the sixth agent, which had reported nothing before it asked:
Calling tool...
x tool failed
422 validation_error
Repository 987654 rejected field body: field "body" is no longer accepted, use "content"
Checking shared failure intelligence...
Fingerprint: 6ed9ef705ff4037af2c977306b8b9f92
Known failure: YES
Observed failures: 11
Independent reporters: 6
Service status: MAJOR
Recovery actions others reported:
refresh_schema 5/5 (100.0%) confidence 0.57 reporters 5
retry 0/5 (0.0%) confidence 0.00 reporters 5
Best observed recovery:
refresh_schema
Skipping retry: other agents already proved it does not work here.
Applying recovery: refresh_schema
Refreshed tool schema -> v3.0.0, field 'content'
Retrying tool call...
+ tool call succeeded
Reporting recovery outcome...
+ accepted (refresh_schema -> success)Watch it land on the homepage at http://localhost:8000 while the demo runs.
Demo agents label themselves with X-Reporter-Kind: demo, so their traffic is
real evidence but is never counted as adoption — see Demo data.
Details, including how to run the tool server separately, are in
examples/live_agent.
Connect an agent
Two ways in, and the difference matters.
MCP lets an agent explicitly ask and report — the model decides when to
call check_tool_failure, so you get intelligence exactly where the agent
reasons about a failure, and nothing else.
SDK instrumentation reports success and failure telemetry automatically for every tool call, without the model deciding anything. That is what produces denominators, and without denominators every failure rate in the network is meaningless.
Most deployments want both.
1. MCP
claude mcp add --transport http failecho https://failecho.com/mcp{
"mcpServers": {
"failecho": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://failecho.com/mcp"
}
}
}Tool | When the agent calls it |
| a tool failed — before retrying |
| contribute the failure |
| contribute a success (the denominator) |
| say whether the fix worked |
2. Python
Copy client/ into your project (not published to PyPI yet), then:
from failecho import FailEcho
echo = FailEcho(
endpoint="https://failecho.com",
reporter_id="my-agent-1", # optional, hashed server-side
)
outcome = await echo.observe_tool_call(
service="github-mcp",
operation="create_issue",
version="2.8.1",
schema_hash="a817ce",
call=lambda: github.create_issue(**args),
)
if outcome.failed and outcome.decision.actionable:
# YOUR code decides. FailEcho never acts on your behalf.
if outcome.decision.confidence > 0.8:
refresh_schema()
await echo.report_recovery(
fingerprint=outcome.decision.fingerprint,
action="refresh_schema",
successful=True,
)observe_tool_call reports the success or the failure, queries FailEcho when
the call failed, and hands you a FailureDecision. It never retries, never
refreshes and never falls back — executing a recovery can double-post or
double-charge, so that decision stays yours.
It cannot break your agent. Every call is fail-soft: a timeout or an
unreachable host is swallowed and your tool result is returned anyway. Set
FAILECHO_DISABLED=1 and the whole client becomes a no-op.
3. Framework instrumentation
Reference integration, Pydantic AI:
from failecho import FailEcho
from failecho.integrations.pydantic_ai import instrument_toolset
echo = FailEcho("https://failecho.com", reporter_id="my-agent-1")
agent = Agent("openai:gpt-4o", toolsets=[instrument_toolset(my_toolset, echo)])Every tool call now reports its outcome. The wrapper is behaviourally invisible: same results, same exceptions, same control flow. Tool arguments are never read and never sent.
Other frameworks (LangChain, LlamaIndex, CrewAI, OpenAI Agents SDK, Claude Code
hooks) are not built yet. They should implement
failecho.adapters.ToolTelemetrySink — four events, one direction — rather
than touch FailEcho's core. See client/failecho/adapters.py.
4. REST
curl -X POST https://failecho.com/v1/query \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Reporter-ID: my-agent-1" \
-d '{
"service": "github-mcp",
"operation": "create_issue",
"error_type": "validation_error",
"error_code": "422",
"error_message": "Repository 555812 was not found"
}'5. Claude Code plugin (automatic)
Connecting the MCP server leaves it to the model to call FailEcho when a tool fails, and models forget. The plugin removes the decision:
/plugin marketplace add FailEcho/failecho
/plugin install failecho@failechoThat installs the MCP server and a hook Claude Code runs after every MCP
tool call, so every failure is reported, successes give the failure rates
their denominator, and a second attempt is recorded as a recovery (retry
with the same arguments, adjust_arguments with new ones). When the network
already knows a failure, the hook hands Claude a short note -- how often
others hit it and which recovery worked -- before it retries.
Without the plugin, the hook is one file with no dependencies beyond Python 3:
mkdir -p ~/.claude/hooks
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/FailEcho/failecho/main/plugin/hooks/failecho_hook.py \
-o ~/.claude/hooks/failecho_hook.pyThen add to ~/.claude/settings.json:
{
"hooks": {
"PostToolUseFailure": [{"matcher": "mcp__.*", "hooks": [
{"type": "command", "command": "python3 ~/.claude/hooks/failecho_hook.py", "timeout": 10}]}],
"PostToolUse": [{"matcher": "mcp__.*", "hooks": [
{"type": "command", "command": "python3 ~/.claude/hooks/failecho_hook.py", "timeout": 10}]}]
}
}What leaves your machine: the server's public name and the tool name, a
coarse error class and code (rate_limit / 429), and the call's latency.
Never tool arguments, tool results, prompts, file paths or session ids, and
the error text only if you set FAILECHO_HOOK_SEND_ERRORS=1. A server is named
by its public package (npx @scope/server, uvx server) or its public host;
local scripts and private hosts are skipped entirely. Name one yourself with
FAILECHO_HOOK_SERVICE_NAMES='{"alias": "public-name"}'. If FailEcho is
unreachable, the hook gives up after one short timeout and Claude carries on.
Variable | Default | Purpose |
| unset |
|
| unset |
|
|
|
|
| unset | JSON map from a server alias to a public name |
|
| your own server, if you self-host |
About reporter IDs
Optional, and never required. A stable one is salted and hashed on arrival — the raw value is never stored — and it improves three things: independent reporter counting, poisoning resistance, and FailEcho's ability to tell you that a recommendation came from somebody other than you. Anonymous reporting stays fully supported.
Your own agents (first-party)
While the network bootstraps, the operator's own agents report real failures too. That data is real field evidence, but it is not independent and it is not adoption, so it carries its own label everywhere it appears:
Source | Who | Counts as adoption | Shown to agents as |
| any real agent | yes |
|
| FailEcho's own agents | no |
|
| agents sending | no | demo data |
|
| no | demo data |
first_party is a claim about who is reporting, so it has to be proven: send
X-FailEcho-Operator: <FIN_FIRST_PARTY_TOKEN>. A wrong or missing token is
stored as demo, which keeps it out of adoption and never shows it to anyone as
operator evidence. Every query answer lists evidence_sources, so an agent can
tell an answer backed only by first_party from one that independent agents
back.
Generate the token once, on the server:
echo "FIN_FIRST_PARTY_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32)" >> /etc/failecho.envThen give it to your own agents, and nobody else:
# Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http failecho https://failecho.com/mcp \
--header "X-FailEcho-Operator: <token>"
# stdio relay
FAILECHO_OPERATOR_TOKEN=<token> failecho-mcpThe Python client takes operator_token="<token>", or reads
FAILECHO_OPERATOR_TOKEN.
Naming what failed
The name is part of the fingerprint, so evidence is only shared when agents
name the same thing the same way. Use the MCP server's own name (its
serverInfo.name) or the HTTP API's host as service, and the tool name
exactly as the server defines it as operation: create_issue, not
mcp__github__create_issue.
Concept
Agent A fails
|
v
reports anonymously ---------> network learns
|
Agent B hits the same problem |
| |
v v
queries the network <--------- what happened to others
|
v
skips the useless retry, uses the recovery that worksRun locally
Python 3.11+.
# with uv
uv venv
uv pip install -r requirements.txt
uv run uvicorn app.main:app --reload
# or plain venv + pip
python3 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -r requirements.txt
.venv/bin/python -m uvicorn app.main:app --reloadSeed synthetic demo data so the homepage has something to show:
.venv/bin/python scripts/seed_demo.py # add demo data
.venv/bin/python scripts/seed_demo.py --reset # replace existing demo data
.venv/bin/python scripts/seed_demo.py --purge # remove demo dataThen:
homepage — http://localhost:8000
MCP endpoint — http://localhost:8000/mcp (Streamable HTTP)
agent-readable overview — http://localhost:8000/llms.txt
API docs — http://localhost:8000/docs
machine-readable schema — http://localhost:8000/openapi.json
health — http://localhost:8000/health
Run the tests:
.venv/bin/python -m pytestFold expired raw observations into hourly aggregates (safe to run any time):
.venv/bin/python scripts/prune.py --dry-run
.venv/bin/python scripts/prune.pyEnd-to-end examples (server must be running):
.venv/bin/python client/example_agent.py # REST, single agent
.venv/bin/python examples/live_agent/run_demo.py # MCP, six agents, network effectThe demo runs its tool server in a background thread. To run it separately (two terminals) instead:
.venv/bin/python examples/live_agent/tool_server.py
.venv/bin/python examples/live_agent/run_demo.py --no-tool-serverMCP
The MCP server runs inside the same FastAPI process — no second service to
deploy or supervise — and speaks Streamable HTTP at /mcp. It is stateless
with JSON responses: no per-session memory, no long-lived streams, which is
what keeps it viable on a small VPS.
Connect
Claude Code:
claude mcp add --transport http failecho https://failecho.com/mcp
# local:
claude mcp add --transport http failecho http://localhost:8000/mcpGeneric MCP client config (mcpServers style):
{
"mcpServers": {
"failecho": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://failecho.com/mcp"
}
}
}Raw JSON-RPC, if you want to see it work:
curl -s localhost:8000/mcp \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-H 'accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}'Local stdio server
Some hosts can only start a local process and talk to it over stdin/stdout.
failecho-mcp is for them. It is a relay, not a second FailEcho: it has no
database and stores nothing. Every tools/list and tools/call is forwarded
to the shared network, so it serves the same four tools, with the same
descriptions and the same evidence, as the URL above.
uvx --from git+https://github.com/FailEcho/failecho failecho-mcpIt is not on PyPI yet, so uvx installs it from the repository. That pulls
in the server's dependencies too; the relay itself imports only the MCP SDK.
Client config (mcpServers style):
{
"mcpServers": {
"failecho": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["--from", "git+https://github.com/FailEcho/failecho", "failecho-mcp"]
}
}
}Variable | Default | Purpose |
|
| Network to relay to. Point it at your own server if you self-host. |
| unset | Set to |
If the network is unreachable, a tool call returns an error result that says so and records nothing, and the agent falls back to its own retry policy instead of hanging.
Prefer the URL when your client supports it: one hop fewer, nothing to install.
Tools
Tool | Purpose |
| Call before retrying. What is happening with this failure right now, and what recovery actually worked? |
| Contribute a failure observation. Returns its fingerprint. |
| Contribute a success, so failure rates have a denominator. |
| Report whether a recovery action worked. |
All four call the same functions as the REST endpoints (app/core/service.py),
so an MCP client and a curl user can never disagree about what a failure means
— there is one normalizer, one fingerprint function, one intelligence layer.
Example check_tool_failure result:
{
"known": true,
"fingerprint": "01ae47053fbb3eabf8f3e480cba45ba8",
"status": "MAJOR",
"observations": { "total": 418, "last_5m": 81, "last_1h": 201, "unique_reporters": 47 },
"failure_rate": { "last_5m": 0.73, "last_1h": 0.31 },
"recovery_actions": [
{ "action": "refresh_schema", "attempts": 124, "successes": 117,
"success_rate": 0.9435, "effective_attempts": 124, "unique_reporters": 45,
"confidence": 0.8881 }
],
"recommendation": { "action": "refresh_schema", "confidence": 0.8881 },
"demo_data_included": false
}demo_data_included tells an agent when synthetic demo rows are part of the
numbers. Disable MCP entirely with FIN_MCP_ENABLED=0.
REST API
Three calls. No account, no API key, no payment.
Endpoint | When to call it |
| after every tool call — successes and failures |
| when a call fails, before you retry |
| after you tried a recovery action |
Report a failure
curl -s localhost:8000/v1/observe \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-H 'X-Reporter-ID: my-agent-1' \
-d '{
"service": "github-mcp",
"operation": "create_issue",
"version": "2.8.1",
"schema_hash": "a817ce",
"outcome": "failure",
"error_type": "validation_error",
"error_code": "422",
"error_message": "Repository 918272 was not found",
"latency_ms": 421
}'{
"accepted": true,
"fingerprint": "01ae47053fbb3eabf8f3e480cba45ba8",
"known": true,
"observations": 143,
"normalized_error": "Repository <N> was not found"
}The message is normalized before anything is stored:
Repository 918272 was not found → Repository <N> was not found. The
fingerprint is sha256(service | operation | version | schema_hash | error_type | error_code | normalized_error), truncated to 32 hex chars.
Report a success
Failure rates need a denominator, so send successes too:
curl -s localhost:8000/v1/observe \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{
"service": "github-mcp", "operation": "create_issue",
"version": "2.8.1", "schema_hash": "a817ce",
"outcome": "success", "latency_ms": 318
}'Query the network
curl -s localhost:8000/v1/query \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{
"service": "github-mcp",
"operation": "create_issue",
"version": "2.8.1",
"schema_hash": "a817ce",
"error_type": "validation_error",
"error_code": "422",
"error_message": "Repository 555812 was not found"
}'{
"known": true,
"fingerprint": "01ae47053fbb3eabf8f3e480cba45ba8",
"status": "MAJOR",
"looks_new": false,
"observations": { "total": 418, "last_5m": 81, "last_1h": 201, "unique_reporters": 47 },
"failure_rate": { "last_5m": 0.73, "last_1h": 0.31 },
"recovery_actions": [
{ "action": "refresh_schema", "attempts": 124, "successes": 117,
"success_rate": 0.9435, "confidence": 0.8881 },
{ "action": "retry", "attempts": 91, "successes": 17,
"success_rate": 0.1868, "confidence": 0.12 }
],
"recommendation": {
"action": "refresh_schema", "confidence": 0.8881,
"based_on_attempts": 124, "based_on_successes": 117
}
}When the network has nothing useful:
{ "known": false, "status": "INSUFFICIENT_DATA", "recommendation": null }/v1/query is read-only. It stores nothing.
Report a recovery outcome
curl -s localhost:8000/v1/outcome \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{
"fingerprint": "01ae47053fbb3eabf8f3e480cba45ba8",
"action": "refresh_schema",
"successful": true
}'{ "accepted": true }Actions are free-form strings in V1. Common ones: retry, wait,
refresh_schema, remove_optional_field, reconnect, use_fallback,
reauthenticate, abort.
Status
curl -s localhost:8000/v1/services # per service/operation health, worst first
curl -s localhost:8000/v1/stats # counters; real and synthetic kept separate
curl -s localhost:8000/v1/recovery-intelligence # best evidenced recovery actions
curl -s localhost:8000/health # {"status":"ok"}
curl -s localhost:8000/llms.txt # agent-readable description of the servicePython client
Zero dependencies — standard library only. Copy client/failure_network.py
and client/failecho.py into your agent (the package is not published yet).
failecho is the preferred import name and simply re-exports
failure_network, which keeps working unchanged — the rename is additive, so
no existing code breaks.
from failecho import Client # or: from failure_network import Client
client = Client("http://localhost:8000", reporter_id="my-agent-1")
client.observe_failure(
service="github-mcp",
operation="create_issue",
version="2.8.1",
schema_hash="abc",
error_type="validation_error",
error_code="422",
error_message="Repository 91827 not found",
)
intel = client.query(
service="github-mcp",
operation="create_issue",
version="2.8.1",
schema_hash="abc",
error_type="validation_error",
error_code="422",
error_message="Repository 12345 not found",
)
if intel["recommendation"]:
action = intel["recommendation"]["action"] # e.g. "refresh_schema"
client.report_recovery(
fingerprint=intel["fingerprint"], action=action, successful=True
)
client.observe_success(service="github-mcp", operation="create_issue", latency_ms=318)Every call is fail-soft: a timeout or an unreachable server returns None
(or a neutral INSUFFICIENT_DATA dict from query) instead of raising.
Telemetry must never break the agent it observes.
Privacy
Privacy is a product feature, not a setting.
Collected — structured failure metadata only:
Field | Notes |
| what was called |
|
|
| short classifiers |
| identifiers replaced, secrets redacted |
| |
| SHA-256 digest |
| salted hash of an optional header, or |
|
We do not want, and never store:
prompts
model messages
tool arguments
tool results
request bodies and response bodies
HTTP headers and cookies
API keys, tokens and secrets
customer names, emails and any user content
credit-card data
Metadata only. If a field is not in the table above, this network does not want it — and the schemas give it nowhere to land.
How that is enforced:
The request schemas have no fields for any of it. Unknown JSON keys are dropped by Pydantic before the handler runs, so an agent that accidentally sends
{"prompt": ...}cannot persist it here.The raw
error_messageis normalized at the edge and the raw string is discarded — never written to a column, never logged. Onlynormalized_errorsurvives.Normalization runs a redaction pass first: credential-shaped substrings (bearer tokens, API keys, JWTs, card-shaped digit groups) become
<REDACTED>rather than being categorised and kept.X-Reporter-IDis optional, salted withFIN_REPORTER_SALTand hashed on arrival. The raw value is never stored. Rotating the salt makes existing hashes unlinkable.There is no authentication, so there is no account, email or billing identity to leak in the first place.
Normalization examples:
Repository 918272 was not found -> Repository <N> was not found
User carol@acme.com at 10.0.12.7 failed -> User <EMAIL> at <IP> failed
GET https://api.example.com/v1/x?y=2 failed -> GET <URL> failed
token=sk_live_9aBc12345678xyz rejected -> <REDACTED> rejected
HTTP 422 unprocessable -> HTTP 422 unprocessable (unchanged)Small numbers survive on purpose: 422 and 500 are semantics, not
identifiers. See app/core/normalize.py and app/core/privacy.py.
How the numbers are produced
Everything is deterministic arithmetic over observation counts. No model, no learned parameter, nothing you cannot recompute yourself.
Incident status (MVP heuristic, constants in app/core/config.py):
< 10 observations in the last hour -> INSUFFICIENT_DATA
failure rate < 5% -> HEALTHY
failure rate >= 5% and < 30% -> DEGRADED
failure rate >= 30% -> MAJORThe 5-minute window takes over from the 1-hour window once it holds at least 5 observations, so a fresh incident is not diluted by an hour of healthy history. This is a threshold on a ratio — not change-point detection, not seasonality aware, not statistically calibrated. It is labelled MVP logic on purpose.
Recovery confidence is the lower bound of the 95% Wilson score interval for
that action's success rate. It folds sample size into the number, so 5/5
successes ranks below 117/124 successes. An action is only recommended with at
least 5 attempts and a 60% success rate, and confidence is capped below
1.0. Thin evidence returns "recommendation": null. The network never
fabricates confidence.
Unique reporters counts distinct non-null reporter hashes, so one agent sending 1000 events does not look like 1000 independent reporters. Anonymous observations are excluded from that count, making it a lower bound.
Abuse floor (V1)
No accounts, so the defences are structural rather than identity-based. Two independent layers, both transparent:
Per-reporter evidence cap. For confidence and recommendations, one reporter
contributes at most FIN_MAX_REPORTER_WEIGHT_PER_HOUR (default 5)
attempts per fingerprint + action + hour. Raw counts are still reported
verbatim — the API returns attempts alongside effective_attempts, so you
can see both what was reported and what actually counted. Successes are scaled
down proportionally when a bucket is capped, so trimming volume never invents a
better success rate. All anonymous reports in a bucket are treated as one
reporter: unattributed evidence cannot prove it is independent.
Reporter diversity. A recommendation needs 5 effective attempts and a 60%
success rate. Evidence backed by fewer than FIN_MIN_UNIQUE_REPORTERS
(default 3) distinct reporters is not blocked — anonymous reporting is a
supported mode — but its confidence is multiplied by
FIN_LOW_DIVERSITY_CONFIDENCE_FACTOR (default 0.7).
Write rate limiting. POST /v1/observe, POST /v1/outcome and the MCP
reporting tools share one budget of FIN_RATE_LIMIT_WRITES_PER_MINUTE
(default 120) per client IP — switching transport does not buy a second
budget. Reads are never rate limited; querying is the product. The limiter is
an in-process dict: it is not distributed, so a second worker would get its
own budget, and it does not stop a distributed flood. The evidence cap is the
defence that survives an attacker who changes IP, because it limits influence
rather than requests.
Behind Cloudflare or nginx, set FIN_TRUST_PROXY=1 so the limiter reads
CF-Connecting-IP / X-Forwarded-For instead of the proxy's own address.
Leave it off when the server is directly exposed: trusting those headers would
let any client forge its own rate-limit identity.
Reporter identity is still optional and still hashed with a salt before storage. Raw identifiers are never written anywhere.
Retention and pruning
Raw observations are the hot path (the 5-minute and 1-hour windows read them directly) and also the thing that grows without bound. So:
raw observations kept FIN_RETENTION_HOURS (default 48h)
then folded into hourly aggregates and deleted
hourly aggregates kept indefinitelyTwo aggregate tables: hourly_stats (successes, failures, unique reporters,
latency sum/count per hour × service × operation × version × schema × source)
and hourly_recovery_stats (attempts, successes, and the capped effective
counts per hour × fingerprint × action).
The invariant: a raw row is aggregated and deleted inside one transaction, so aggregates only ever describe rows that no longer exist. "Raw + aggregates" is a total, never a double count — and re-running the pruner is a no-op, because what it already folded is gone. Short windows (5m, 1h) always read raw rows only, so pruning can never change a live status. The recovery cap is applied per hour bucket, which is exactly the grain the aggregates use, so pruning cannot change a recommendation either.
python scripts/prune.py # use FIN_RETENTION_HOURS
python scripts/prune.py --hours 24 # override the window
python scripts/prune.py --dry-run # report only, change nothing
python scripts/prune.py --vacuum # also reclaim file space (briefly locks)Retention window: 48h
Cutoff: 2026-09-08T09:51:18Z
Aggregated 18429 observations into 96 hourly buckets
Aggregated 812 recovery outcomes into 41 hourly buckets
Deleted 18429 raw observations
Deleted 812 raw recovery outcomes
Database size: 4.21 MBRecommended cron (hourly, at :15) — not needed for local development:
15 * * * * /srv/failure-network/.venv/bin/python /srv/failure-network/scripts/prune.py >> /var/log/failure-network-prune.log 2>&1Or use the bundled systemd timer: deploy/failure-network-prune.timer.
Project layout
app/
main.py FastAPI app, CORS, static homepage, /health, /llms.txt
mcp_server.py MCP tools + Streamable HTTP endpoint (same process)
api/ observe.py query.py outcome.py services.py deps.py
core/ normalize.py fingerprint.py intelligence.py
service.py retention.py ratelimit.py
privacy.py config.py clock.py
db/ database.py (async engine) models.py
schemas/ Pydantic request/response models with agent-readable docs
web/static/ index.html style.css app.js (no framework, no build)
logo.svg favicon.svg og-image.svg
client/
failecho/ the public client package
__init__.py FailEcho: observe_tool_call, report_*, query
adapters.py ToolTelemetrySink -- the framework seam
integrations/
pydantic_ai.py reference integration (optional dependency)
failure_network.py zero-dependency REST client (still supported)
auto_recovery.py the passive wrapper FailEcho is built on
auto_recovery.py failure-aware tool wrapper (reports + asks, never acts)
example_agent.py end-to-end REST usage example
examples/live_agent/
tool_server.py local tool that just shipped a breaking change
tool_client.py agent-side tool client with a stale cached schema
network.py MCP client (official SDK) for the four network tools
agents.py the autonomous loop: fail -> report -> ask -> recover
run_demo.py one command, six independent agents
scripts/
seed_demo.py synthetic demo telemetry (source='synthetic')
prune.py aggregate + delete expired raw rows
deploy/
failure-network.service systemd unit
failure-network-prune.timer hourly retention timer
Caddyfile.failecho-dev optional origin-level .dev redirect
LICENSE SECURITY.md CONTRIBUTING.md .env.example
tests/ the suiteapp/core/service.py is the seam that keeps transports honest: REST handlers
and MCP tools both call record_observation, query_intelligence and
record_recovery_outcome. Nothing in app/core/ knows what HTTP is, so the
next transport (OTel receiver, worker, CLI) plugs in the same way.
Demo data
scripts/seed_demo.py writes ~2000 observations and ~300 recovery outcomes
across four services, every row tagged source='synthetic':
Service | Operation | Scenario |
|
| MAJOR — schema drift; |
|
| DEGRADED — upstream timeouts; |
|
| HEALTHY — occasional rate limiting |
|
| HEALTHY — rare crash, only 3 recovery attempts, so no recommendation is given |
There are two kinds of non-real telemetry, and both are labelled at the row
level by a source column:
| Where it comes from | Counted as adoption |
| a real autonomous system | yes |
| a caller that sent | no |
|
| no |
demo_agent rows are real observations from real tool calls — the demo
genuinely breaks a tool and genuinely recovers — but they are demonstrations,
so they stay out of adoption metrics. Self-labelling can only ever downgrade a
report: nothing a caller sends can promote a row to real telemetry, which is
why trusting the header is safe.
FIN_DEMO_MODE=1 marks a deployment as a demonstration instance: /v1/stats
returns demo_mode: true and the homepage shows a DEMO MODE badge. It never
generates traffic — it only labels what is already stored. Nothing in this
project fabricates telemetry at startup.
Both kinds are tracked separately everywhere they surface:
/v1/statsreportsreal_observations_total,real_observations_24h,real_reporters_24handreal_failure_fingerprintsexcluding all demo rows, plussynthetic_observationsanddemo_agent_observationsseparately. They are never summed into one adoption number.the homepage renders real telemetry in the headline block and synthetic counters in a separate, visibly labelled block;
/v1/recovery-intelligenceflags every entry withdemo_data: true|false(?include_demo=falsehides them);POST /v1/queryand the MCPcheck_tool_failuretool returndemo_data_included, so an autonomous caller knows when it is acting on demo evidence.
Remove it all with python scripts/seed_demo.py --purge.
Configuration
Every setting is an environment variable; defaults are in
app/core/config.py.
Variable | Default | Meaning |
|
| swap for |
|
| change in production; rotating it unlinks old hashes |
|
| short window |
|
| long window |
|
| below this: |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| evidence floor for a recommendation |
|
| |
|
| never claim certainty |
|
| max attempts one reporter contributes per fingerprint+action+hour |
|
| below this, confidence is discounted (never blocked) |
|
| the discount |
|
| write rate limiting on/off |
|
| per client IP, REST + MCP combined |
|
| read |
|
| raw observations older than this are aggregated and deleted |
|
| mount the MCP endpoint |
|
| where to mount it |
| (empty) | comma list; enables DNS-rebinding protection when set |
| (empty) | comma list; same |
|
| CORS origins for browsers (comma-separated) |
|
| canonical public origin; drives canonical/OG tags, |
| (empty) | repository link ( |
|
| label this deployment as a demo instance (generates nothing) |
Deploying on a small VPS
Brand assets
app/web/static/logo.svg the mark, inherits surrounding text colour
app/web/static/favicon.svg the mark with fixed neutrals, for tab bars
app/web/static/og-image.svg 1200x630 social cardThe mark is a failure event and its echo: one tall stroke in signal red, repeating outward and decaying. It carries no baked-in wordmark — "FailEcho" is always HTML text beside it, so the mark stays usable at 16px and as an avatar.
og-image.svg is served as-is. Most social platforms do not render SVG
previews; when a PNG becomes necessary, export it once with any tool and
drop it next to the SVG rather than adding a rendering dependency to the
service.
Domains
failecho.com is the canonical public origin. Everything an agent or a human
needs lives on it:
https://failecho.com/ homepage
https://failecho.com/mcp MCP endpoint (Streamable HTTP)
https://failecho.com/docs API reference
https://failecho.com/openapi.json machine-readable schema
https://failecho.com/llms.txt plain-text summary for agentsfailecho.dev is a secondary domain and redirects permanently to
failecho.com, preserving the path:
https://failecho.dev/* -> 301 -> https://failecho.com/*
https://failecho.dev/docs -> 301 -> https://failecho.com/docs
https://failecho.dev/mcp -> 301 -> https://failecho.com/mcpDo this at the edge, not in the application. The app has no notion of a second domain and should not grow one.
www.failecho.com → failecho.com is handled at the origin by Caddy
(redir https://failecho.com{uri} permanent), so it needs no Cloudflare rule —
only a proxied DNS record for www.
Cloudflare (preferred) for the .dev domain. Add failecho.dev to the same
account, then Rules → Redirect Rules → Create rule:
Field | Value |
When incoming requests match |
|
Then | Dynamic redirect |
Expression |
|
Status |
|
Preserve query string | on |
One rule covers both failecho.dev and www.failecho.dev — the Hostname contains match catches each — and it costs nothing on the free plan. Never
serve a copy of the site from .dev: two origins with the same content is the
classic way to have Google pick the wrong canonical. Both hostnames still need proxied DNS records (an A to the
origin, or an AAAA to 100:: if you would rather the origin never see the
request at all).
Caddy fallback, if you ever serve .dev from the origin instead — the
config ships in deploy/Caddyfile.failecho-dev:
failecho.dev, www.failecho.dev {
redir https://failecho.com{uri} permanent
}api.failecho.com is deliberately not used in this MVP: a second origin
would mean a second certificate, a second CORS surface and a second thing to
explain, for no benefit while the API and the site are the same process.
Set the origin once, in one place:
FIN_PUBLIC_URL=https://failecho.comIt drives the canonical tag, Open Graph URLs, /llms.txt, the MCP endpoint
shown on the homepage and every copyable example. No file in the codebase
hardcodes the domain. Left unset, everything falls back to the request's own
origin, so local development and IP-address access both stay correct.
Cloudflare checklist
DNS
Name | Type | Value | Proxy |
| A | origin IP | proxied |
| A | origin IP | proxied |
| A | origin IP | proxied |
| A | origin IP | proxied |
www.failecho.com → failecho.com is handled by Caddy (redir ... permanent).
The .dev hostnames are handled by the redirect rule above.
Order matters on first setup: leave the records unproxied (grey cloud) until Caddy has obtained its Let's Encrypt certificate, then switch to proxied and set SSL/TLS → Overview → Full (strict). Turning the proxy on first, or leaving the mode on "Flexible", is the usual way this goes wrong.
Caching. Never cache the live surfaces. Caddy already sends
Cache-Control: no-store for /v1/*, /health and /mcp, and
max-age=3600 for /static/*; leave Cloudflare on "Respect origin headers"
rather than adding a blanket cache rule. Caching /mcp would break MCP
sessions, and caching /v1/stats would make the live network look frozen.
Rate limiting. Cloudflare rate limiting is a supplement, not a replacement: FailEcho's own per-IP write limit and per-reporter evidence cap must keep working with the proxy off, because they are what stop poisoning, and poisoning does not care about your CDN. Nothing here requires a paid Cloudflare plan.
Deployment topology
Intended topology. The app binds to loopback only; TLS and the public address belong to Cloudflare and a local reverse proxy:
internet
|
v
Cloudflare (TLS, DNS, DDoS)
|
v
nginx / caddy on the VPS (:443 -> :8000)
|
v
uvicorn 127.0.0.1:8000 FastAPI + SQLite (WAL)Do not bind uvicorn to 0.0.0.0 in this topology. Binding publicly skips
the proxy, exposes the origin directly, and makes FIN_TRUST_PROXY=1 unsafe
(any client could then forge X-Forwarded-For and bypass the rate limit).
Docker is optional and not required.
Step 1 — generate the reporter salt once and keep it.
sudo install -d -o failurenet -g failurenet /srv/failure-network/data
printf 'FIN_REPORTER_SALT=%s\n' "$(openssl rand -hex 16)" \
| sudo tee /etc/failure-network.env > /dev/null
sudo chmod 600 /etc/failure-network.envGenerating it inline on the command line would mint a new salt on every restart, which silently resets every reporter hash and every unique-reporter count. Generate once, store once.
Step 2 — production command (what the systemd unit runs):
set -a; . /etc/failure-network.env; set +a
export FIN_DATABASE_URL="sqlite+aiosqlite:////srv/failure-network/data/failure_network.db"
export FIN_PUBLIC_URL="https://failecho.com"
export FIN_TRUST_PROXY=1
export FIN_ALLOWED_ORIGINS='*'
export FIN_RETENTION_HOURS=48
/srv/failure-network/.venv/bin/python -m uvicorn app.main:app \
--host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000 --workers 1 \
--proxy-headers --forwarded-allow-ips '127.0.0.1' --no-server-headerNote the four slashes in the SQLite URL: sqlite+aiosqlite:/// plus the
absolute path /srv/.... Three slashes would make it relative to the working
directory.
Step 3 — reverse proxy. Caddy:
failures.example.com {
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8000
}nginx:
location / {
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8000;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_buffering off; # keeps /mcp responsive
}Then sudo cp deploy/failure-network.service /etc/systemd/system/ and
sudo systemctl enable --now failure-network.
Environment checklist
Variable | Production value | Why |
| 32 hex chars from | set once; rotating it unlinks existing reporter hashes |
|
| absolute path, four slashes |
|
| otherwise clients forge their own rate-limit identity |
|
| comma-separated; |
|
| raw rows older than this become hourly aggregates |
|
|
|
|
| canonical origin for links, tags and examples |
| repository URL, or unset | no link is rendered while unset |
Other notes
One worker. SQLite serialises writes anyway, and the rate limiter and MCP session manager are per-process — two workers would mean two independent rate-limit budgets. Scale out only after moving to PostgreSQL.
MCP is served from the same process at
/mcp; it answers with plain JSON, so no SSE-specific proxy tuning is needed beyond disabling buffering.Retention:
deploy/failure-network-prune.timer, or the cron line above.Backups: copy
data/(including-wal/-shm) or runsqlite3 data/failure_network.db ".backup backup.db". No downtime needed.
Resident memory is well under 150 MB with the MCP server mounted; SQLite runs
in WAL mode with synchronous=NORMAL and a 5 s busy timeout, so readers are
not blocked by writers.
Migrating to PostgreSQL later
Every column type is portable, timestamps are naive UTC, there are no
SQLite-specific types and no expression indexes. Migration is
FIN_DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://... plus pip install asyncpg and one
Alembic baseline.
Is it working?
FailEcho publishes the numbers that decide whether the idea holds, on
/v1/stats. They are deliberately unflattering.
Metric | What it answers |
| is anything real arriving? |
| do we have denominators, or only complaints? |
| how many independent systems? |
| when an agent asks, does FailEcho know anything? |
| do agents say whether the fix worked? |
| did an agent use evidence it did not generate? |
cross_agent_help_24h is the one that matters. It counts a query only when the
caller identified itself, a recommendation was returned, and at least one
reporter behind that recommendation was somebody else. Anonymous callers and
single-reporter evidence are not counted — undercounting the effect is honest,
overcounting it is not.
recovery_outcome_ratio_24h is the fragile one. Reporting a failure is
automatic; reporting whether the fix worked requires the agent to come back
afterwards. Without those reports FailEcho is an error counter.
Launch milestones
Internal experiment markers, not marketing claims:
1 one real reporter
2 ten independent real reporters
3 100+ real observations per day
4 the first repeated real fingerprint
5 the first real cross-agent recovery benefitMilestone 5 is the hypothesis: an agent hits a failure, queries FailEcho, receives evidence generated by unrelated agents, changes behaviour, and recovers. Everything before it is plumbing.
MVP limitations
Stated plainly, because pretending otherwise would make the network less useful:
No authentication. Anyone can report anything. The per-reporter evidence cap and rate limiter raise the cost of poisoning the statistics; they do not make it impossible, and a distributed flood from many IPs would still get through.
No reputation scoring. Reporters are counted, not ranked. A reporter that has been right a thousand times counts the same as a fresh one.
The rate limiter is in-process and not distributed. One uvicorn worker, one budget. It resets on restart.
No sophisticated anomaly detection. Status is a fixed threshold on a failure ratio over two fixed windows.
Unique-reporter counts in aggregates are lower bounds. Reporter identities are not retained past pruning, so merged buckets keep the maximum per-bucket count rather than a true distinct count.
No OpenTelemetry ingestion yet, no TypeScript SDK yet, no payments (
x402or otherwise). Everything is free.SQLite is a prototype-stage choice. Retention keeps the file small, but a busy network will eventually want PostgreSQL (a URL swap plus
asyncpg).Recovery actions are free-form strings, so
refresh_schemaandrefreshSchemawould be counted separately if agents disagree on spelling (input is lowercased and space-normalized, which handles the common cases).
Launch documentation
docs/marketing.md— approved messaging, launch posts, and the claims that must never be madedocs/launch-plan.md— distribution sequence, experiment metrics and the milestones that decide whether this worksdocs/search-console.md— indexing checklist for Google Search Console and Bing, and what actually moves brand search
Contact
General: contact@failecho.com
Integration help: support@failecho.com
Security reports: security@failecho.com — see SECURITY.md; please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability
Licence
MIT.
Available Tools
4 toolscheck_tool_failureCheck what the network knows about a tool failureAInspect
Use FailEcho when another tool fails, before retrying blindly.
Use this tool when another tool, API call, or MCP server operation fails. It checks whether other autonomous systems recently experienced the same failure and returns current failure intelligence, known recovery actions, and confidence based on observed outcomes.
Call it BEFORE retrying. A retry that is failing for every other agent right now is a retry you can skip, and the network often knows a specific action that works instead (refresh a stale tool schema, fall back to another provider, reconnect, wait).
Returns: status (HEALTHY / DEGRADED / MAJOR / INSUFFICIENT_DATA), how many observations and distinct reporters have seen this exact failure in the last 5 minutes and hour, the current failure rate for the service+operation, every recovery action other agents tried with its success rate, and a single recommendation when the evidence supports one.
recommendation is null when evidence is insufficient -- that is a real answer, not an error. Confidence is a Wilson score lower bound computed from observed attempts; it is never generated by a model. Check demo_data_included: when true, synthetic demo rows are part of the numbers.
Reading is free, anonymous, unauthenticated and never rate limited, and this call stores nothing.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| service | Yes | Tool/service identifier, e.g. 'github-mcp'. | |
| version | No | Version of the failing service/tool, if known. | |
| operation | Yes | Operation/tool name that failed, e.g. 'create_issue'. | |
| error_code | No | Protocol/vendor code, e.g. '422', 'ECONNRESET'. | |
| error_type | No | Short failure class, e.g. 'validation_error', 'timeout', 'rate_limit', 'auth_error'. | |
| reporter_id | No | Optional stable identifier for your agent. Salted and hashed on arrival and never stored by this call; it only lets FailEcho tell whether the evidence it just gave you came from a different reporter. | |
| schema_hash | No | Short hash of the tool schema you used. Lets FailEcho separate 'the API broke' from 'your tool schema is stale'. | |
| error_message | No | The error text you received. Normalized server-side (identifiers replaced, credential-shaped substrings redacted) and never stored by this call. Do not include prompts, tool arguments, secrets or user content. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are present, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure, and it delivers comprehensively: the call is 'free, anonymous, unauthenticated and never rate limited, and this call stores nothing.' It also discloses semantic edge cases ('recommendation is null when evidence is insufficient -- that is a real answer, not an error'), statistical methodology ('Wilson score lower bound... never generated by a model'), and the demo-data caveat ('synthetic demo rows are part of the numbers').
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with purpose and trigger conditions, then organized into logical blocks (when to use, what it returns, semantics of null/confidence/demo data, privacy guarantees). It is longer than typical, and the Returns paragraph partially re-describes what the output schema already enumerates, but nearly every sentence carries distinct information, and the length is justified by the tool's trust-sensitive nature.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For an 8-parameter, no-annotation tool accepting error messages and reporter identifiers from an external network, nothing needed for correct invocation is missing: trigger conditions, return contract, null semantics, statistical integrity, demo-data contamination, and privacy/rate-limit guarantees are all covered. The presence of an output schema further covers return structure, and even so the description explains the non-obvious interpretation rules.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all 8 parameters, warranting the baseline of 3. The description adds some contextual framing (e.g., schema_hash lets FailEcho separate 'the API broke' from 'your tool schema is stale', and error text is normalized and redacted server-side), but these details are also present in the schema itself. The description does not compensate for any gap because there is no gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific, concrete definition: it 'checks whether other autonomous systems recently experienced the same failure and returns current failure intelligence, known recovery actions, and confidence based on observed outcomes.' The verb+resource is precise, and the tool is clearly differentiated from the report_* siblings by being the pre-retry query tool versus the post-hoc reporting tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage guidance is explicit and actionable: 'Use this tool when another tool, API call, or MCP server operation fails. Call it BEFORE retrying.' It also names the alternative behavior it replaces ('a retry that is failing for every other agent right now is a retry you can skip') and the recovery actions the network may suggest. There is no ambiguity about when to invoke it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
report_recovery_outcomeReport whether a recovery action workedAInspect
After you acted on a known failure -- retried, waited, refreshed a stale schema, reconnected, fell back to another provider -- report whether it actually resolved the problem.
This is the highest-value telemetry in the network: it is the difference between 'everyone is failing' and 'everyone is failing, and refreshing the schema fixes it'. Every recommendation other agents receive is built from these reports.
Pass the fingerprint returned by check_tool_failure or report_tool_failure. Common actions: retry, wait, refresh_schema, remove_optional_field, reconnect, use_fallback, reauthenticate, abort. Report one outcome per attempt, not one per retry-loop iteration: a single reporter contributes at most 5 attempts per hour to any action's confidence.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | What you tried, e.g. 'refresh_schema'. Lowercase, [a-z0-9_.-], spaces become underscores. | |
| successful | Yes | True when the action resolved the failure. | |
| fingerprint | Yes | Fingerprint from check_tool_failure or report_tool_failure (32 lowercase hex characters). | |
| reporter_id | No | Optional stable agent id; hashed, never stored raw. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden, and it delivers: it discloses that reports feed downstream recommendations, that each attempt should be reported separately, and that contributions are rate-limited per action. It also frames the tool as telemetry, which makes the side effect of calling it clear.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the tool's purpose and remains focused: the first sentence states exactly when to call it, and later sentences justify the telemetry value, enumerate common actions, and set rate expectations. It is longer than a minimal description, but the added sentences all carry operational guidance rather than filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a four-parameter telemetry tool with full schema coverage and an output schema, this description is complete: an agent knows when to call it, what to pass, what action values exist, how to avoid duplicate reports, and the rate limit. The only minor omission is an explicit alternative to report_tool_success, but that does not block correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description adds value above the schema by listing canonical action values, explaining that the fingerprint must come from check_tool_failure or report_tool_failure, and linking the action parameter to per-hour confidence accumulation. It does not duplicate parameter formats, letting the schema handle syntax.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb and resource: it instructs the agent to report whether a recovery action resolved a known failure, and it ties the report to a fingerprint from check_tool_failure or report_tool_failure. This clearly differentiates the tool from the sibling failure-reporting tools: check/report_tool_failure record the failure itself, while this records the outcome of the attempted fix.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It specifies the exact trigger ('After you acted on a known failure'), what to pass (the fingerprint), and common action values to report. It also sets rate and granularity guidance ('one outcome per attempt', 'at most 5 attempts per hour'), though it does not explicitly state when to prefer report_tool_success over this tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
report_tool_failureReport a failed tool call to the networkAInspect
Anonymously contribute a tool/API/MCP failure to FailEcho so other autonomous systems can recognise it. Call this whenever a tool call fails, after (or alongside) check_tool_failure.
PRIVACY -- this is a shared public network. Send failure metadata ONLY. Never include prompts, model messages, tool arguments, tool results, request or response bodies, HTTP headers, cookies, API keys, tokens, customer names, emails or any user content. The error message is normalized server-side (numbers, UUIDs, emails, URLs, IPs and tokens replaced with placeholders; credential-shaped substrings redacted) and the raw text is discarded, but that is a safety net, not a licence to send sensitive data.
Pass a stable reporter_id if you can: it is salted and hashed before storage, is never stored raw, and lets the network count you as one independent reporter instead of anonymous noise. Writes are rate limited per client.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| service | Yes | Tool/service identifier. | |
| version | No | Version of the service/tool. | |
| operation | Yes | Operation that failed. | |
| error_code | No | Protocol/vendor code, e.g. '422'. | |
| error_type | No | Short failure class, e.g. 'validation_error'. | |
| latency_ms | No | Observed call latency in milliseconds. | |
| reporter_id | No | Optional stable identifier for your agent. Salted and hashed on arrival; never stored raw. | |
| schema_hash | No | Short hash of the tool schema used. | |
| error_message | No | Error text. Normalized before storage; no secrets please. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral disclosure burden and succeeds. It reveals that the network is shared/public, that only failure metadata should be sent, that error messages are normalized server-side (with raw text discarded), that reporter_id is salted/hashed, that writes are rate limited, and the privacy redaction heuristics. All of this goes well beyond a bare name and would materially change how an agent uses the tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is verbose but every block earns its place: primary action, when-to-call, privacy restrictions, normalization details, reporter_id guidance, and rate limiting. The most important call/decide information (purpose and when to use) is front-loaded, while deep privacy details appear later. Slightly longer than minimal, but justified by the sensitive nature of the tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Complete for a 9-parameter tool with no annotations and a nontrivial privacy model. The description covers when to call, what data may/must not be sent, server-side normalization guarantees, reporter identity semantics, and rate limiting. With an output schema present, return-value documentation is not required. No critical gap remains.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and parameters already have clear descriptions, so the baseline is 3. The description adds value beyond the schema by explaining why reporter_id matters (counts as one independent reporter instead of anonymous noise) and how the error_message normalization process works (numbers, UUIDs, emails, URLs, IPs, tokens replaced; credential-shaped substrings redacted) — details absent from the property definitions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb and resource ('anonymously contribute a tool/API/MCP failure to FailEcho') and states the purpose of helping other autonomous systems recognize failures. It clearly distinguishes itself from siblings like report_tool_success and report_recovery_outcome by focusing on failures.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly says 'Call this whenever a tool call fails' and specifies the order relative to the sibling tool check_tool_failure ('after or alongside'). This leaves no ambiguity about when the tool should be invoked.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
report_tool_successReport a successful tool call to the networkAInspect
Report that a tool call SUCCEEDED. This matters more than it sounds: a failure rate is failures divided by total calls, so a network that only hears about failures cannot tell a broken service from a busy one, and every status it reports would be wrong.
Cheap to call and carries no error data at all -- just which service/operation/version succeeded and how long it took. Same privacy rules apply: metadata only, never arguments or results.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| service | Yes | Tool/service identifier. | |
| version | No | Version of the service/tool. | |
| operation | Yes | Operation that succeeded. | |
| latency_ms | No | Observed call latency in milliseconds. | |
| reporter_id | No | Optional stable agent id; hashed, never stored raw. | |
| schema_hash | No | Short hash of the tool schema used. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It does well: it discloses that the call is cheap, contains only metadata (service/operation/version/latency), never arguments or results, and follows the same privacy rules. It does not discuss idempotency or rate limits, but these are not critical for this simple reporting tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded with the core action. The rationale paragraph, while longer than strictly necessary, earns its place by motivating why success reports are important. There is no filler or repetition of schema content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 6-parameter tool with full schema coverage and an output schema, the description covers the essential behavioral context: what is reported, what is excluded, and privacy expectations. It is complete enough for an agent to decide when and how to invoke it, though it could have named the failure-report sibling explicitly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description restates the main payload fields (service, operation, version, latency) but adds no new per-parameter semantics beyond what the input schema already documents. The privacy note is behavioral context rather than parameter-level meaning.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Report that a tool call SUCCEEDED.' It also differentiates itself from siblings by emphasizing that it carries no error data, making it clearly distinct from report_tool_failure and check_tool_failure.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear context for when to call it: after a tool call succeeds, and it explains why success reports matter (failure rate denominators). It implies the exclusion of failures via 'carries no error data,' but it does not explicitly name the failure-reporting sibling as the alternative, so it falls just short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
4 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
check_tool_failure - First observed
report_recovery_outcome - First observed
report_tool_failure - First observed
report_tool_success
TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
Each tool targets a distinct part of the failure intelligence lifecycle: contributing a failure, checking known failures, reporting a recovery outcome, and reporting a success. The descriptions make the boundaries explicit, including when to use each (before retrying, after acting, etc.). No two tools appear interchangeable.
All four tool names follow a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern: report_tool_failure, check_tool_failure, report_recovery_outcome, report_tool_success. The prefixes report_ and check_ clearly distinguish write versus read operations.
Four tools is well-scoped for a focused failure telemetry network. Each tool earns its place by covering a distinct telemetry action: failure report, failure lookup, recovery outcome, and success report. Nothing feels redundant or missing from the minimal viable set.
The server covers the full loop for failure intelligence: reporting failures, checking them, reporting recovery outcomes, and reporting successes to compute accurate failure rates. The presence of report_tool_success is especially important for denominator data. No obvious lifecycle gap remains for the stated purpose.
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