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BOD-25-01-CSA-Microsoft-Policy-MCP

enforce_privileged_mfa

Enforce phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for privileged roles to comply with CSA BOD 25-01 requirements in Microsoft 365 environments.

Instructions

Enforce phishing-resistant MFA for privileged roles (MS.AAD.3.6v1)

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Implementation Reference

  • The handler function for the 'enforce_privileged_mfa' tool. It creates a Conditional Access Policy via Microsoft Graph API that requires phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 or Windows Hello for Business) for privileged roles such as Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator.
    private async enforcePrivilegedMFA() {
      try {
        // Configure MFA for privileged roles using Microsoft Graph API
        await this.graphClient
          .api('/policies/conditionalAccessPolicies')
          .post({
            displayName: 'Require Phishing-resistant MFA for Privileged Roles',
            state: 'enabled',
            conditions: {
              applications: {
                includeApplications: ['all'],
              },
              users: {
                includeRoles: ['Global Administrator', 'Privileged Role Administrator'],
              },
            },
            grantControls: {
              operator: 'AND',
              builtInControls: ['fido2', 'windowsHelloForBusiness'],
            },
          });
    
        return {
          content: [
            {
              type: 'text',
              text: 'Phishing-resistant MFA enforced for privileged roles successfully',
            },
          ],
        };
      } catch (error: unknown) {
        throw new McpError(
          ErrorCode.InternalError,
          `Failed to enforce privileged MFA: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error'}`
        );
      }
    }
  • Registers the 'enforce_privileged_mfa' tool in the MCP server's tool list, including its name, description, and input schema (empty object).
    {
      name: 'enforce_privileged_mfa',
      description: 'Enforce phishing-resistant MFA for privileged roles (MS.AAD.3.6v1)',
      inputSchema: {
        type: 'object',
        properties: {},
      },
    },
  • Defines the input schema for the 'enforce_privileged_mfa' tool as an empty object (no parameters required).
    inputSchema: {
      type: 'object',
      properties: {},
    },
  • Switch case in the CallToolRequest handler that dispatches calls to 'enforce_privileged_mfa' to the enforcePrivilegedMFA method.
    case 'enforce_privileged_mfa':
      return await this.enforcePrivilegedMFA();
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. 'Enforce' implies a mutation or configuration change, but the description doesn't specify whether this is a one-time action, requires admin permissions, has side effects (e.g., affecting user access), or provides confirmation of success. It also omits details like rate limits, error handling, or what 'MS.AAD.3.6v1' refers to. For a tool with potential security impacts, this is a significant gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single, efficient sentence that front-loads the core action ('Enforce phishing-resistant MFA') and scope ('for privileged roles'). The reference 'MS.AAD.3.6v1' adds context without verbosity. Every word serves a purpose, with no redundant or vague phrasing, making it easy for an agent to parse quickly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity (a security enforcement action with no parameters) and the lack of annotations and output schema, the description is minimally adequate. It states what the tool does but misses critical behavioral details like what 'enforce' entails operationally, expected outcomes, or error conditions. For a privileged role MFA tool, more context on dependencies or consequences would improve completeness, but it meets a basic threshold.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has 0 parameters with 100% coverage, so no parameter documentation is needed. The description doesn't add parameter details, which is appropriate. Baseline is 4 for zero parameters, as the schema fully covers the absence of inputs, and the description doesn't need to compensate for any gaps.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's purpose: 'Enforce phishing-resistant MFA for privileged roles' with a specific verb ('enforce'), resource ('phishing-resistant MFA'), and scope ('privileged roles'). It distinguishes from siblings like 'enforce_phishing_resistant_mfa' (which lacks the privileged role focus) and 'enforce_alternative_mfa' (which specifies alternative MFA). However, it doesn't explicitly differentiate from all siblings, such as 'configure_admin_alerts' or 'restrict_app_consent', which might overlap in security policy contexts.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It mentions 'privileged roles' but doesn't specify prerequisites, timing, or exclusions. For example, it doesn't clarify if this should be used before or after 'enforce_phishing_resistant_mfa', or if it's part of a broader security workflow with siblings like 'configure_role_alerts'. The lack of usage context leaves the agent guessing about appropriate scenarios.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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