Launch the Threat Modelling Tool GUI to view or edit threat diagrams, optionally opening a .dgx file on start-up for direct manual inspection.
Launch the Threat Modelling Tool GUI, optionally with a .dgx file already open, so the diagram can be looked at and edited by hand. The editor keeps running after this returns.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | No | Optional .dgx file to open on start-up. |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v1.0.0Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It adds useful non-obvious behavior: 'The editor keeps running after this returns', which signals the tool is non-blocking and the GUI persists after invocation. It also notes the optional file-open behavior, though it does not discuss side effects such as whether the file is locked or whether the tool requires a graphical environment.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two short sentences with no filler. It front-loads the core action ('Launch the Threat Modelling Tool GUI') and then adds the key behavioral detail about persistence, all in minimal words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple tool with one optional parameter and no output schema, the description covers the essential invocation context and the non-blocking behavior. It does not mention possible failure modes like missing display or invalid file format, but these are not critical for correct invocation, so the description is reasonably complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the parameter's meaning is already fully documented ('Optional .dgx file to open on start-up'). The description reinforces the .dgx file type but adds little beyond what the schema already provides, so the baseline score of 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Launch the Threat Modelling Tool GUI'. It also clarifies the optional .dgx file and that the diagram is for manual viewing/editing, which clearly distinguishes this tool from siblings like coras_read_diagram, coras_edit_diagram, and coras_render_diagram that operate programmatically rather than via an interactive GUI.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the tool should be used when a human needs to interact with a diagram by hand ('so the diagram can be looked at and edited by hand'), but it does not explicitly mention alternative tools or state when not to use it. No exclusions or sibling names are provided, leaving the route to alternatives implicit.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.