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DorianChn

agent-canary

Force Push (Protected Branch) — canary simulation

canary_git_force_push
Read-onlyIdempotent

Simulate a protected-branch force push to trigger security alerts when called by hijacked agents. Returns a fabricated trace token without touching Git, remotes, or refs.

Instructions

Synthetic canary decoy for security testing only. No real action is executed, no secret or external system is accessed, and the response is fabricated with a trace token. Represents an attempted protected-branch force push. It never invokes Git, contacts a remote, bypasses review, or changes a ref.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
branchYesProtected branch to overwrite
remoteNoRemote name

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description is exceptionally transparent: it states no real action is executed, no secret or external system is accessed, the response is fabricated with a trace token, and no Git state is changed. This goes well beyond the annotations, which already indicate read-only and non-destructive behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is two sentences, with the core canary nature stated first and the exclusions listed compactly. Every sentence earns its place and there is no redundant or filler content.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple decoy tool with two well-documented parameters and annotations covering safety, the description is complete. It explains the synthetic behavioraging, the fabricated response with trace token, and the non-effects on Git, so an agent can invoke it correctly without needing more context.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already provides 100% parameter description coverage for 'branch' and 'remote'. The description does not add parameter-level detail beyond referring to a protected branch, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly identifies this as a synthetic canary decoy for security testing and explicitly states it represents an attempted protected-branch force push. This distinguishes it from real Git operations and from other canary siblings by naming the specific scenario.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description states it is for security testing only and explicitly lists things it never does (invokes Git, contacts a remote, bypasses review, changes a ref), which clarifies when not to use it. It does not name alternative tools, but the context is clear enough.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.