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agent-canary

by DorianChn
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    • agent-canary

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    • TrustHarness

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    Deploy Server
    One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

    TDQS

    A4.4/5.0

    Scored across 12 tools

    Disambiguation5/5

    Each canary tool targets a distinct high-risk action (funds transfer, secret read, shell exec, file deletion, email, DB export, internal fetch, security disable, cloud console, k8s exec, secret rotation, git force push), so an agent can clearly tell them apart. The shared 'canary_' prefix and consistent 'represents an attempted X' framing reinforce the boundaries.

    Naming Consistency5/5

    All tools follow a uniform canary_<verb>_<object> pattern (e.g., canary_transfer_funds, canary_read_secrets, canary_k8s_exec). The naming is fully consistent and predictable.

    Tool Count5/5

    12 tools is well-scoped for a security-testing canary server covering a broad but finite set of dangerous operations. Each tool earns its place by representing a distinct attack/unsafe-action category.

    Completeness4/5

    The set covers a comprehensive range of common unsafe actions an agent might attempt (financial, secrets, shell, files, email, database, network, security controls, cloud, k8s, credentials, git). Minor gaps like canary_upload_artifact or canary_modify_iam could exist, but the surface is strong for its purpose.

    Maintenance

    ActivityMaintained
    ResponsivenessWithin a week

    Resources