agent-canary
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Alternatives to agent-canary
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- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables active deception for AI agents by injecting decoy honeypot tools that detect indirect prompt injection attempts, instantly terminate hostile sessions, and seal cryptographic incident evidence.Apache 2.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceTripwire detection for autonomous AI agents. Plants honeypot files, MCP tripwire tools, and API decoy endpoints to log agent scope creep and unauthorized tool use with full forensic context.MIT
- AlicenseBqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI agents to defend against prompt injection by exposing decoy tools and transparently proxying real MCP servers to block injected calls.11MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceSimulates sensitive internal tools as a honeypot to detect unauthorized access and AI agent behaviors using Canarytokens, deployed as a serverless Cloudflare Worker with MCP protocol support.23MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables real-time injection fuzzing, exfiltration canary detection, least-privilege tool sandboxing, and cryptographic audit proofs for untrusted prompts, RAG context, and agent actions over MCP.7MIT
TDQS
Scored across 12 tools
Each canary tool targets a distinct high-risk action (funds transfer, secret read, shell exec, file deletion, email, DB export, internal fetch, security disable, cloud console, k8s exec, secret rotation, git force push), so an agent can clearly tell them apart. The shared 'canary_' prefix and consistent 'represents an attempted X' framing reinforce the boundaries.
All tools follow a uniform canary_<verb>_<object> pattern (e.g., canary_transfer_funds, canary_read_secrets, canary_k8s_exec). The naming is fully consistent and predictable.
12 tools is well-scoped for a security-testing canary server covering a broad but finite set of dangerous operations. Each tool earns its place by representing a distinct attack/unsafe-action category.
The set covers a comprehensive range of common unsafe actions an agent might attempt (financial, secrets, shell, files, email, database, network, security controls, cloud, k8s, credentials, git). Minor gaps like canary_upload_artifact or canary_modify_iam could exist, but the surface is strong for its purpose.