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inspect_carrier

Extracts bounded metadata from a file or .app bundle to map container structure, without claiming vulnerability analysis.

Instructions

Bounded file/container metadata only; does not claim vulnerability analysis

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "target_path": "<target_path>"
    },
    "name": "inspect_carrier"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNo
target_pathYesPath to file or .app bundle directory

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

C2.7/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It discloses only that inspection is 'bounded' and limited to metadata, but omits whether it is read-only, what limits are enforced, permission requirements, and what happens with unsupported paths or containers.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single compact sentence with no filler, and the scoping constraint is front-loaded. It is terse to the point of under-specification, but that is better captured under completeness than conciseness.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no annotations, no output schema, and only 50% schema coverage, the description is too thin for an agent to invoke this tool confidently. It should clarify what metadata is returned, what 'bounded' means for the limit parameter, and how it differs from adjacent inspection tools.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 50%: target_path is documented in the schema, but limit is not. The description adds no parameter meaning, so it fails to compensate for the undocumented limit parameter and its bounds.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose3/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description indicates scope ('file/container metadata only') and disclaims vulnerability analysis, which separates it from security-focused siblings like check_security and find_dangerous_patterns. However, it does not clearly state the verb or exactly what kind of metadata is returned, and it does not differentiate from metadata-oriented siblings such as get_headers, get_sections, or analyze_binary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'does not claim vulnerability analysis' implies a when-not-to-use condition, routing agents away from this tool for security analysis. But it gives no explicit guidance on when to choose this over analyze_binary, get_headers, or get_sections, and no prerequisites are stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.